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

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AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

MARC BALDWIN is a graduate student at the London School of Economics. He was co-chair of Oberlin College DSA and has worked as a community organizer.

ROBERT BOYERS is editor of the quarterly *Salmagundi* and professor of English at Skidmore College. His most recent book is *Atrocity and Amnesia: The Political Novel Since 1945.*

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG is a contributing editor of the *New Republic.* His latest book is *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution.*

OLIVER CONANT is a New York-based critic who has published in the *New Leader, Virginia Quarterly,* and other journals.

THEODORE DRAPER's most recent book is *Present History,* a collection of articles and essays.

LEON FINK is an associate professor in the Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and author of *Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics.*

JONATHAN FRANKEL teaches Russian and Jewish history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1882-1917.*

PETER GLOTZ is national secretary of the German Social Democratic party, a member of the Bundestag, and author of the recent book *Manifest für eine Neue Europäische Linke.*

GUILLERMO GRENIER teaches sociology and coordinates the Labor Studies Program at the University of New Mexico.

DENIS HEALEY, MP for Leeds East, is the British Labour party's spokesman on foreign affairs.

GEORGE KATEB teaches political science at Amherst, and is the author of the recently published *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil.*

J. MICHAEL LUHAN has worked in Central America since 1976 as a Peace Corps volunteer in Guatemala and a free-lance reporter for several U.S. newspapers. In 1985, as the El Salvador-based representative of the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, he led several delegations of U.S. representatives on visits to Nicaragua and El Salvador.

JOHN LOGUE, author of *Socialism and Abundance: Radical Socialism in the Danish Welfare State,* teaches political science at Kent State University.

DAVID GARRARD LOWE is a writer and lecturer who specializes in architectural and cultural history. He is the author of *Lost Chicago* and other books and of numerous magazine articles.

HANS-HENNING PAETZKE is a German writer.

EDOUARD RODITI is the author of a work on Oscar Wilde. He lives in Paris and is working on his memoirs, portions of which will appear, or have appeared in *Bomb, Partisan Review,* and *Grand Street.*

MICHAEL SANDEL teaches political philosophy at Harvard University and is the author of *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.* □

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

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

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

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

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Fascists, Hustlers & Dupes

Irving Howe

Does anyone remember Jacques Doriot? During the 1930s he was a leader of the French Communist party who drifted into fascism. Exploiting his gifts for demagogic oratory, he became a prominent collaborator with the Nazis in the Second World War.

Lyndon LaRouche, also a former leftist gifted at demagogic oratory, has recently been getting a lot of publicity because two of his followers (one of them a self-declared reincarnation of Joan of Arc) won nominations in the Illinois Democratic primary. LaRouche began his political career as a Trotskyist and then steered his little sect—already noted for its large component of kookiness and its indulgence in violence—into or near the New Left. Whether he will descend as deeply into the pits of fascism as Doriot did, we cannot say with certainty; but he has already taken several steps along the Doriot way.

There are differences, of course. It's hard to imagine any of the lumpens whom Doriot assembled being quite as skillful as the well-educated, often professional, and yuppieish followers of LaRouche apparently are at hustling financial contributors, using credit cards to beat the phone system, and suckering corporate executives into buying their slick *Executive Intelligence Review* for its supposed "inside dope" about international politics and finance. These are decidedly American skills, of a kind the Herman Melville who wrote *The Confidence Man* would have appreciated. But some aspects of the LaRouche phenomenon do bear a distinctly fascist flavor, and it's worth stopping for just a moment to see how American crankism and cultism can blend with fascist themes and styles.

Whether on the left or right or just in paranoiaville, LaRouche has maintained the same tight organizational structure. Dissidents who might have doubted that the Queen of England was running an international drug ring, or Henry Kissinger was really in cahoots with Soviet secret police, or even that American national security required Jane Fonda to be fed to the whales, quickly found themselves out on the street. The methods of the "vanguard party" that LaRouche first picked up in the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party were refashioned to his own cultish, authoritarian ends; but the fundamental structure, a copy or parody of the vanguard, remained. Just as the European fascist movements mimicked the organizational methods of the Bolsheviks, creating a tight inner core and then a series of sympathizing groups spread out in concentric circles, so the LaRouche organization focused on the authority—the inspired Word—of the leader who knows everything from the fine points of metaphysics to the secrets of espionage. In America such highly disciplined structures have been known only within the Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist movements—also some religious sects, as at Jonestown. But most native fascist groups have not, to my knowledge, tried to impose this order of discipline. To do that, one needs the ideological flim-flam of a LaRouche; and in part, at least, this is a heritage from his days as a Trotskyist when he learned something about the peculiar powers of ideology, or a scrappy American simulacrum.

Again like the Bolshevik movement, which it copies or parodies, the LaRouche group offers its followers the deeply comforting sensation of being "in the know" about almost everything. Drugs? Leibniz? Perfidious Albion? B'nai B'rith? Donald Regan? Beethoven? Liberals? Kissinger? The Queen? Ask LaRouche, he'll tell you. And his educated or half-educated followers, many of them college graduates, take pleasure in submitting to his knowledge.

Which tells us something important about modern culture: that, through our universities and mass media, we can produce considerable numbers of people able to talk in a sophisticated manner about

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Picasso, Lord Keynes, Freud, Marx, Stravinsky, etc., but quite lacking in those critical skills and traits of independence that mark a serious intellectual or genuinely educated person.

It is a special characteristic of authoritarian cults such as the one LaRouche has built up that they bind their followers not only through illusions of confidential and esoteric knowledge, but, perhaps still more, through wild claims of conspiracy such as any sensible person must immediately recognize as preposterous. But these claims are essential to the cult, since it is through them that the leader "tests" the followers, binding them in a circle of fantasy, delusion, and deceit. The followers will be ready to repeat the line without necessarily believing, even if it runs up against plausibility and the evidence of the senses.

(In a piece about LaRouche [*Dissent*, Fall 1980] that wildly overestimated his intellectual capacities, Lionel Abel did make a shrewd observation: "How many of LaRouche's people really think Kissinger an agent of the British . . . David Hume a creature of the British intelligence service, Ernest Nagel a tool of the CIA, the Reverend Jesse Jackson a 'poverty pimp'? These accusations are, of course, not believed. The are not really disbelieved either; they are enjoyed.")

Again, there is a new twist. The LaRouche group features a quotient of "highbrow" talk, garbled half-knowledge for garbled half-intellectuals. If the Doriot gang in France seldom troubled itself with such refinements, there were European fascist movements that made some appeals—successfully, also—to intellectuals and quasi-intellectuals. In America, however, there is behind LaRouche a rich tradition of village cranks, one-plank crusaders, political and religious fundamentalists. But in the age of higher education this tradition has to be "modernized," so the leader provides his followers with a smattering of high thought.

AFTER THE ILLINOIS PRIMARY, LaRouche appeared on television. Pumped up with a simulated passion and calculatedly aggressive, he offered a curious mixture of themes. Part of what he said made sense: the economic recovery is inadequate, farmers are in distress, some banks are shaky, and most ordinary politicians prefer to ignore such realities. (But it's always been characteristic of fascist spokesmen to point at real problems and griefs, even to appropriate part of the left's criticism.) After this came LaRouche's program—a farrago of irrelevancies, ranging from "assaults" on the drug rings to proposals that every American be examined for AIDS. (The interview I heard didn't have anything about going back to the gold standard, another LaRouche nostrum.)

Shifting smoothly from a description of social ills to a wildly irrelevant exploitation of social prejudices is the hallmark of a demagogue, whether he is leader of a native American cult, a full-fledged fascist, or a combination of the two.

What ought to be troubling thoughtful people about the victory of the two LaRoucheites in Illinois is not so much the fact itself as the political-social circumstances that made it possible. In all of Chicago the LaRouche group is said to have 30 members—all right, multiply by 10 and give them 300. How pervasive—and alarming—is the apathy of the population at large and the demoralization of the Democratic party and its partisans in particular, that this wretched sect could grab two major nominations. If the dominant view in the Democratic party is that the best way to confront Reagan is not to confront him, then the path has been cleared for cults, hustlers, and dupes.

I don't see any large-scale fascist movement arising in the United States in our present circumstances. But the listlessness of our political life constitutes an atmosphere in which even the ugliest weeds can flourish. □

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H. Brand

The Sour Fruits of Reaganomics

Reaganomics represents a new economic policy, one that in principle seeks to curtail or abandon public service and oversight and replace it by presumably more efficient private agents. True, the stress Reaganomics places on competitiveness and profitability as regulatory mechanisms is deeply rooted in economic thought. But no less important has been the notion of the social control of business.

Reaganomics bears only a superficial resemblance to earlier postwar economic policies. Like them, it is Keynesian in form, relying on budget deficits to keep economic expansion going. But unlike them, it is reactionary in substance. The earlier policies by and large aimed at what we might call a mixed economy. The proponents of the mixed economy viewed the public sector as an equal partner of private enterprise, but with an altogether different function: to mitigate such consequences of the competitive market as unemployment, loss of income, the deindustrialization and economic decline of regions, excessive cyclical swings, the damaging effects of imports from low-wage areas, etc. In sum, the public sector was to promote economic growth, but also to lessen its deleterious social effects.

The "mixed economy" could not be sustained. Perhaps the idea of equal partnership between private enterprise and public service in the sense defined here was illusory. At any rate, global conflict, uncontrolled expansion of multinational corporations and of international finance, the inflation of the 1970s, disarray within the Democratic party: all caused its political bases to crumble. Nevertheless, the "mixed economy" remains a potent ideological rival of Reaganomics, for the history of the past century teaches that government must intervene to limit the threats posed to the health of society by an unconstrained free market and uncontrolled business behavior.

These threats are magnified once again, and not merely because of continuing reductions in income supports and other protective welfare-state measures, nor because of the nearly complete deregulation of banking and the demise of antitrust. It is the performance of the economy that calls Reaganomics into question.

Before pursuing the argument here, let us admit that a sense of well-being pervades much of American society. The economic expansion has continued; inflation has abated; job insecurity has lessened. Many families enjoy good incomes: the average per-capita income approaches $12,000, having risen 8 percent in real terms between 1982 and 1985. As Table IV shows, the top fifth of families has greatly raised its share of total family income during the Reagan administration; the next two fifths have at least maintained theirs, and have thus fully partaken in the overall rise in incomes.

There are thus solid economic reasons for that sense of well-being, but there are also political reasons for it that are less pleasant. There has been a near absence of voices on the American left that would disturb the consensus of smug satisfaction to which Reagan administration tax, expenditure, deregulatory, and trade policies have given rise. Unemployment rates for all sex and age groups have never been as high for an expansionary phase of the business cycle, yet voices protesting these have never been so few. The distribution of family incomes is probably more skewed today *against* the most needy families than at any other time during the postwar years; yet noted liberals in Congress voted for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act mandating the "automatic" reduction of the budget deficit, which they knew would spell further severe cuts in the income supports for those families. This article is meant to put Reaganomics in perspective, to stir unease over the injustices it is breeding.

The economy remains mired in industrial de-

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cline. "The decline of manufacturing threatens the entire U.S. economy," writes *Business Week* in a lead article on March 3, 1986. And this at the peak of the business upswing. An enormous budgetary deficit has been engendered, partly to sustain the cyclical expansion, partly to hasten the contraction of public service. The deficit may have shrunk somewhat in recent months, but its financial and political consequences have made the compensatory fiscal actions that a descending phase of the business cycle would call for much more difficult to take. The enmeshment in international trade and finance that Reaganomics has encouraged makes an early reversal of industrial decline unlikely. It also contributes to the downward pressure on wages that has been a primary consequence of the "disinflationary" objectives of Reaganomics. In 1985, average wage adjustments under major collective bargaining contracts provided for increases of 2.7 percent annually over the life of the contract—the *lowest* rate since the Department of Labor first reported the series in 1968, and below the increases in the Consumer Price Index in recent years.

"Victory" Through Defeat

IT IS TRUE THAT THE VIRTUAL DEFEAT of inflationary forces is a hallmark of Reaganomics. This, in turn, has done away with much of the sense of uncertainty and malaise that marked the late 1970s. But how was that brought about? The defeat of inflation was turned into a defeat for labor, for full employment, and for the notion of a social contract between the major wage- and price-setting parties. The Reagan administration, having blamed inflation in its programmatic statement of 1981 on "overly accommodative monetary policies" as well as "excessive" government spending, gave free rein to the Federal Reserve to tighten credit—generating the deepest recession, together with the highest unemployment rates, of the postwar period.

The social and economic costs of that recession were appallingly high. Isabel Sawhill and Charles Stone give a detailed account in *The Reagan Record*:

> These costs translate into billions of dollars of lost income for workers who were jobless or had to accept shorter working hours or lower wages, as well as more bankruptcies and lower farm and business earnings. About one-third of the loss in the pretax earnings of individuals was offset by reduced personal income tax liabilities and increased government transfer payments; hence, disposable income did not fall as much as total income. Nevertheless, the "safety net" programs that cushion income losses during a recession have replaced a smaller fraction of lost income in this recession than they did in past recessions—the direct result of Reagan cutbacks in Unemployment Insurance, Food Stamps, and other assistance programs. Jobless benefits alone were about $8 billion less in 1982 than they would have been without President Reagan's policy initiatives. As a result, a much lower fraction of the unemployed received benefits than in previous recessions—an estimated 45 percent during any month in 1982 . . . compared to 75 percent during 1973-1975. . . . [1]

Sawhill and Stone estimate the income loss at above $3,300 per household for the years 1981-1983, with the relative income losses suffered by the working heads of poor families being four to five times as much as the losses for those heading high-income families. The 1981-82 recession drove 4.3 million more people into poverty. They show that these losses might have been halved, had a milder recession policy been pursued, since food and energy prices and some other components of the Consumer Price Index were declining. The administration and Federal Reserve policymakers, however, wanted to impose the "old-time religion"—meaning unemployment and insecurity unless workers would accept the going wage for the available job. (See my "The Decline of Workers' Incomes, the Weakening of Labor's Position," *Dissent*, Summer 1985.)

I do not intend to minimize whatever successes Reaganomics has scored. Among them is the recent cyclical recovery. But it should be noted that all previous postwar administrations have known when and how to get such a recovery going. This particular success is characterized by problems related to, if not entirely caused by, Reaganomics:

(1) the relative weakness in vital respects of the cyclical recovery and expansion that began late in 1982;

(2) the enormous federal budget deficits, which, whatever their drawbacks, did fuel the recovery—deficits that may well be a condition of continued economic growth;

(3) the redistribution of income toward the higher income groups, and the consequent erosion of the mass consumption power upon which a large part of the economy depends; and

(4) the supposedly uncontrollable "interdependence" of the American economy and the world economy. This development has turned into a threat to much of American industry and labor. Even the Reagan administration has been compelled to limit its impact by such measures as controlling the dollar exchange rate, and internationally coordinated interest rate policies.

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Let us look first at the recent performance of the economy. To gain perspective, we compare the upswing of 1982-1985 with that of 1975-79, using average annual rates of change (in percent) where appropriate, so as to standardize the two differing time spans. Table I shows that while the rate of increase of total business output and of industrial production ran lower in the later than in the earlier expansionary period, the utilization of industrial capacity was much lower in the later than in the earlier expansion. The rate of fixed investment in producer durables and nonresidential structures (in constant dollars) was slightly higher during the more recent period, but a large proportion of the increased spending here was for such short-term investment as motor vehicles and office machinery. The unemployment rate was significantly higher in 1982-5 than in 1975-9. The growth of total and of manufacturing employment lagged. The merchandise deficit in 1985 ran three times higher than the 1979 level. The poverty rate was far higher, and if the rate of gain in real disposable income was greater in the later than in the earlier expansion, much of the difference should be ascribed to the steep tax cuts enacted in 1981.

So a comparison of the two cyclical upswings does not argue well for the efficacy of Reaganomics—less so when we examine how fiscal policy has differed between the Ford-Carter and the Reagan presidencies. Another observation is that the growth rates shown in the table for the real Gross National Product are high, but this is largely because they reflect the expansionary phase of the business cycle. Long-term growth rates, which encompass both the expansionary and recessionary phases of the cycle, have been much lower. Reaganomics has not overcome the cyclical instability of the economy—this remains a key problem of advanced capitalist societies. In fact, long-term growth rates have been steadily declining, according to a recent Brookings Institution report by Edward Denison.

TABLE 1

The U.S. Economy's Performance in Two Cyclical Expansions

Average annual rates, in percent*

	1975-79		1982-85	
Gross National Product, in constant 1982 dollars	4.3%		3.1%	
Industrial production	6.9		6.5	
Production for defense and space activities	1.8		9.2	
Capacity utilization (percent of capacity)	85.2	(1979)	80.6	(1985)
Fixed nonresidential investment, in constant dollars	8.5		8.8	
Output per hour, business sector	1.0		1.5	
Employment, nonfarm payrolls	3.9		3.0	
Manufacturing employment	2.1		1.1	
Proportion of jobs in goods production	29	(1979)	26	(1985)
Unemployment rate (percent of civilian workforce)	5.8	(1979)	7.1	(1985)
Net new business formations, 1967 = 100	128	(1979)	117	(1985)
Ratio, prices received/paid by farmers	107	(1979)	79	(1985)
Interest rate, high-grade corporate bonds	9.63	(1979)	11.37	(1985)
Federal debt, percent of GNP	34	(1979)	46	(1985)
Interest, percent of federal purchases of goods & services	25		40	
Merchandise trade balance ($billions)	−40.4	(1979)	−148.5	(1985)
Poverty rate, percent of all families	9.2	(1979)	11.6	(1985)
Poverty rate, percent of all persons	11.7	(1979)	14.4	(1985)
Real per-capita disposable income	2.9		3.1	
Consumer Price Index	7.8		3.7	

*Except where otherwise noted. Goods production includes mining, construction, and manufacturing. All calculations by author.

Source: *Economic Indicators, Economic Report of the President*, February 1986.

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With regard to the economy's capacity to produce—the potential national income in constant dollars—the rate of growth fell from 3.9 percent per year for 1948-73 to 3.0 percent for 1973-79, and 1.8 percent for 1979-83. According to Denison, "Information up to the end of 1984 does not indicate . . . that the economy has moved out of the pattern of slow growth of potential output . . . that has characterized it since 1973." Moreover, "*actual* output has fallen further below potential output with each succeeding business cycle."[2]

TABLE II

Economic growth, average annual rates

	1948-73	1973-85
Gross domestic product*	3.5%	2.3%
Total hours worked by employed workforce	0.7	1.5
Productivity	2.9	0.8

*In constant dollars.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Another, perhaps more readily understandable way of portraying the problem in quantitative terms is seen in Table II, which highlights the severe decline in the annual rate of productivity improvement over the 1973-85 period—offset only in part by a higher rate in total hours worked. In the earlier period, productivity improvement contributed 83 percent to the economic growth rate; in the later period only 35 percent—and this to a *lower* growth rate. The doubling of the hours-worked rate was related chiefly to employment increases in the service-producing industries.

Some observers may interject here: Why be so concerned with economic growth, whose positive aspects seem ever more to be shadowed by environmental deterioration and social debilities? I limit my response to saying that the steady-state, no-growth economy, whether or not desirable in the abstract, cannot be accommodated within the institutional context of capitalism. Capitalism is synonymous with accumulation, expansion, the forcing of structural change, the search for gain, and hence economic growth. Slackening of economic growth gives rise to crises which in time draw all social institutions into their vortex.

A fundamental difference between the 1975-79 and the 1982-85 upswings has been the far greater dependence of the later than of the earlier one upon swollen budget deficits resulting from a much lower rate of increase in tax receipts and a higher rate of federal government purchases of goods and services. Table III summarizes these findings. During the earlier, highly inflationary period, the federal debt grew at only about three-fourths of the rate of growth of the Gross National Product (in current dollars); while during the later period, with price levels rising moderately, the debt ballooned to twice the rate for the GNP.

The macro-economic implications of the deficit, i.e., that it has fueled the recent cyclical upswing, are contested by no one, although they have not been widely discussed. Let us briefly turn to the redistributional effects of the deficit.

Aiding the Rich

THESE EFFECTS, I WOULD SAY, have been *intended*. They stem from the radical tax reductions proposed by the Reagan administration in 1981 and enacted by Congress. In line with the thinking of conservative economists, the administration claimed from the beginning that high marginal tax rates on business and individuals have discouraged work, innovation, and the investment needed to improve productivity and long-run growth.

These claims do not hold water. Labor force participation, for example, rose throughout the 1970s despite the rising fraction that taxes took of personal incomes (owing to inflation, the progres-

TABLE III

Federal Finance in Two Cyclical Upswings
Average annual rates, in percent*

	1975-79	1982-85
Federal gov't purchases of goods and services	6.4	7.0
Personal and corp. income tax receipts	12.0	4.2
Federal debt	7.5	12.3
Federal debt, percent of GNP	32.3 (1979)	46.9 (1985)

*Unless otherwise noted. Data for 1985 are official estimates.
Source: *Budget of the United States, Economic Indicators*.
All calculations by the author.

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sivity of the tax rate structure, and increasing payroll taxes). Capital investment as a proportion of the GNP did not diminish by comparison with earlier decades. At the same time, the effective (as against the statutory) tax rate on capital investment declined from 55 percent in 1969 to around 33 percent during most of the 1970s. In 1981 and 1982 legislation reduced this tax rate further, to around 15 percent.[3] These corporate tax cuts have offset high interest rates, and lessened the cost of capital. Nevertheless, their contribution to increasing the investment in plant and equipment is doubtful at best. Denison argues that the nation's saving and investment did not increase in response to the government's actions—after 1981 they dropped, as dissaving by the federal government itself became huge.[4]

Bosworth cites evidence indicating that nine-tenths of the increase in physical investment by corporations between 1979 and 1984 went into office equipment (including computers) and automobiles, reflecting favorable price trends rather than being due to lowered taxation.[5] Favorable price trends likewise played the decisive role in maintaining high replacement investment in equipment. So much for the arguments by which the tax cuts were rationalized.

These arguments, however sincerely advanced, represent but a smokescreen that has obscured a momentous effort to redistribute resources—first to the private from the public sector, and second from lower to higher income groups. The sharp decline in the 1982-85 growth rate of federal personal and corporate income tax receipts, by comparison with that rate's cyclical increase over the 1975-79 upswing, attests to the first-mentioned resource shift. (See Table III.) (Over the latter period, tax receipts as defined here rose 18 percent, the GNP 27 percent.) Furthermore, the ballooning of the federal debt has driven up interest paid on the national debt from 32 percent of federal payments for goods and services in 1979 to 47 percent in 1985.

Such interest, very likely, flows disproportionately to the rich. About half of the total federal debt is held by individuals and such other investors as money market funds, pension funds, and savings and loan associations. About one-third of all bonds and other debt instruments, public and private, is held by the top 1 percent of persons holding tangible assets.

The redistributive effects of the 1981 income tax reductions were substantial. They reduced the tax liability of the top fifth of income recipients by nearly 6 percent, but that of other income groups by much lower percentages. In combination with the income losses from the 1981-82 recession and the reduction in benefit payments received by poorer households, Sawhill and Stone estimate the change in the distribution of real disposable income shown in Table IV. This redistribution has meant an 8 percent decline in the real after-tax income per household in the bottom fifth income group, a 2 percent decline per household in that of the second fifth, and a 9 percent *increase* per household in that of the top fifth.

TABLE IV

Percent Share of Real After-Tax Income

Quintile	1980	1984
Bottom	6.8%	6.1%
Second	13.2	12.5
Third	18.5	18.1
Fourth	24.5	24.5
Top	37.0	38.9
All families	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Isabel Sawhill and Charles Stone, *The Reagan Record* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute), p. 322

Table IV points to a fundamental feature of Reaganomics: its economic policy, imposed upon the weakest members of society, is bound to put pressure on wage levels. While families and persons usually are poor because they do not or cannot work, a sizable proportion do hold jobs, if only part-time or part-year. Thus, 49 percent of heads of households in poverty worked some time during 1984, as did 41 percent of all persons in poverty; 9 percent of such persons worked full-time, year-round jobs. Sixty percent of families in poverty in 1984 had one or more workers, of whom 17 percent held full-time, year-round jobs.

As public benefits for these persons and families are reduced or eliminated, more of them are compelled to work for wages that do not lift them out of poverty. The supply of low-wage workers thus appears likely to increase, making it harder to maintain the wage levels that have until now ensured a modest standard of living to the average wage earner. Such increases in the number of available low-wage workers represent an additional source of wage pressure, with imports and resistance to union organizing having similar effects.

The political reasons for the transformation of tax and budgetary policy under the Reagan administration have been ably analyzed by Thomas

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Edsall in *The New Politics of Inequality* (W.W. Norton, 1984). Among the factors underlying this transformation has been the growth in the political influence of business and its conservative spokespeople in the universities and think tanks.

Certain unfavorable or worrisome economic developments, such as slowed productivity improvement and the worsening competitive position of some American industries in world markets, were articulated in a manner promoting the cause of conservative economics. Thus, influential economists attributed the productivity slowdown to insufficient capital formation (and, by extension, to excessive consumption). They advocated a shift from consumption to investment, and argued the need to shift the tax burden from business and its owners to households. (The tax reform proposed by the Reagan administration, and still pending in Congress, would partially reverse the shift, put into effect in 1981, to fit in with "populist" Republican electoral ambitions. But this reform would not alter the more fundamental stance of contracting public services.)

Government regulation was likewise seen as impeding productivity advance, which in turn lent impetus to the drive to deregulate and thus subject important industries and their workforce to sharp competition. Such interpretations of the productivity slowdown have by no means been universally accepted; yet they decisively contributed to Reaganomics, even though they were initially adopted under Carter.

Although of benefit to business and upper income groups, Reaganomics has given rise to nearly intractable financial problems, related in large measure to the federal budget deficit. Before detailing some of these problems, let me note that to an extent these deficits are but a function of the accounting conventions that frame the budget. Unlike the balance sheets of business and state and local governments, the federal budget does not distinguish between capital outlays—for which long payback periods can be assumed and for which long-term debt can be justified—and operating expenses, to be paid out of current receipts. Thus, if we had a federal capital budget, the deficit would be reduced. However, the argument for a federal capital budget (fielded by liberal economists) lacks at present political support and runs counter to the Reaganite intent to privatize public services. And the deficit reflects this intent insofar as it can be used as a club to compel federal spending cuts.

The deficit, while in theory supposed to mitigate crises of overcapacity to which a capitalist economy is subject, has itself become a crisis factor. "Part of the current deficit . . . is due to the fact that the economy is still below full employment," writes Alan Blinder in *Business Week* (December 30, 1985). Among the many indications of overcapacity have been declining fuel and raw material prices; high and still rising vacancy rates in overbuilt commercial structures; record grain stocks and falling agricultural prices that accompany them; a surfeit of "high-tech" products, such as many types of computers and their components; and a trend in industrial capacity utilization (see Table I) that has shown a steadily lower rate at each peak of the business cycle over the past 15 years or so. That trend is mirrored in reverse for unemployment, whose rate has been *higher* at each business cycle peak. It is generally assumed that only part of the deficit is due to economic slack—the part referred to as the "high employment" deficit, because it results from failure to reach high employment, and thus failure of revenues to cover budgeted expenditures. The other, currently much larger, part is termed "structural," because it presumably arises entirely from deliberate increases in expenditures without tax increases. If the deficit means that more spending power is left in the public's hands for private-sector purchases, then it has still not been big enough to eliminate the difference between actual and full capacity utilization. This is not, of course, a new problem in economic policy, but Reaganomics has decidedly worsened it.

THE HIGH INTEREST RATES that the deficit has largely brought on meant an appreciation of the dollar by 53 percent between mid-1980 and early 1985. That appreciation was caused by foreign dollar demand as manifested in a foreign capital inflow of $90 billion in 1984. According to the *1985 Joint Economic Report* of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, in 1980 the United States was still a net supplier of capital to the world at large; by 1984, it had become a net user. In line with the Reagan doctrine of noninterference in the "free" financial markets—markets where interest rates are in effect administered prices, owing partly to the massive weight of Treasury borrowings and partly to unceasing intervention by the central bank—no measures to resist the rise of the dollar were instituted (until powerful protectionist pressures compelled this last September). The result cost the United States nearly two million jobs in the import-competing sector of the economy and kept industrial growth 9 percent below what it would otherwise have been.

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CONTRARY TO ITS AVOWED INTENTIONS, the competitive economic policy of Reaganomics has been weakening the industrial base of the country. Defenders of this policy may argue that the political and economic power of the United States is in no way reduced by its great public—and private—debt, and by the U.S. having turned from world creditor to world debtor. The change in status simply confirms the United States as a safe haven for investment. That may well be so, but there is a hitch: Debts are "sound" only so long as the assets for which they were incurred retain their value. In a period of disinflation, that can become problematical. If you are a farmer who bought land on

Brian Morton

The Decline of Public Health Care

What's happening to our health care system? An article by Arnold S. Relman in the March 1986 *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* offers some disturbing answers.

Relman, editor of the *New England Journal of Medicine*, argues that U.S. health care is undergoing a sea-change. In the period between the Second World War and the 1960s, the U.S. began to embrace the idea "that medical care was a right of all citizens, regardless of their insurance coverage or their ability to pay." Hospital insurance became a standard part of most fringe benefit packages. People without insurance or other means to pay for their care were treated by not-for-profit hospitals, which subsidized their treatment of the poor through revenues provided by patients who could pay. Relman suggests that the Medicare and Medicaid legislation of the 1960s, rather than initiating a new era, was the climax of an old one: "Physicians were now being paid for providing services to the poor which they had previously felt obligated to provide gratis."

Relman emphasizes that this was a confused and often unsatisfactory situation: "Most citizens had open-ended but not really comprehensive kinds of insurance which paid for technical procedures and relatively short hospital stays, but rarely covered prolonged catastrophic illnesses or the less expensive varieties of ambulatory care. The system for the care of the uninsured . . . also left a lot to be desired. It certainly did not provide equal access and it often did not provide care of acceptable quality to those in our society who probably have the greatest need for the best care we can give." But despite all this, he concludes, the old system was better than the one that has replaced it.

With doctors providing services on a "piecework" basis and with patients taking advantage of "open-ended" insurance arrangements, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw an explosion of health care expenditures. This gave rise to what Relman calls "the revolt of the payers." Business and government began to impose new financial arrangements, usually involving fixed-price systems rather than reimbursement of charges. Under the Social Security Amendments of 1983, for instance, Medicare assigns a fixed dollar amount for every category of illness, and reimburses hospitals according to this fixed rate for every Medicare patient treated. If treatment of a particular patient costs less than the fixed amount, the hospital keeps the difference; if the treatment costs more, the hospital absorbs the loss.

Similarly, in the private sector there has been a growth of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which provide both insurance and health services, on a fixed-price basis.

The effect of these new arrangements, Relman writes, "has been to turn hospital economic incentives around." Under the old system, the more services that a hospital provided to its patients, the more the hospital was paid. Under the new system, "hospitals can prosper only by reducing the average number of procedures per patient and the average length of stay." The old system encouraged one kind of abuse: unnecessary hospitalization, unnecessary testing, unnecessary treatment. The new system encourages another kind of abuse: it provides an incentive for hospitals to release their patients as quickly as possible, regardless of need. The term for this within the medical profession is "quicker and sicker."

In the last decade we have also seen the rise of large and aggressively profit-seeking hospital chains, which specialize in "the meticulous avoidance of uninsured patients and those with 'low-profit' illnesses, i.e., patients with chronic problems requiring a heavy investment of human resources and few procedures or tests."

Beleaguered by government cutbacks and competition from profit-seeking chains, institutions dedicated to the treatment of the poor find it harder than ever to provide decent care.

Relman's conclusion is grim. "We seem to have entered a new era in which health care services are to be dispensed primarily to those who can afford them and in which those who cannot will be ignored or given only the most minimal necessary attention." His hope is that the inequity of the emerging system will spark a movement in favor of a national health insurance system. □

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credit, and the land's value drops because, say, crop prices drop, you may have to file for bankruptcy. If many farmers suffer that predicament, the banks that hold their mortgages may also face ruin. The uncertainty inherent in the relation between debt and asset value is the financial system's profound source of instability and the central bank's headache.

Take the federal debt: these are not assets in the conventional sense, only the revenue that can be extracted at least to service, if not repay, the debt. If there is no theoretical limit to this, there are political ones. In 1985, 26 cents of every dollar collected in tax receipts (other than earmarked payroll taxes for social insurance) went for interest on the federal debt held by the public—compared with 13 cents a decade ago, and 19 cents in 1981. The rise reflects increased amounts, as well as increasing rates, of interest. It seems unlikely that tax receipts devoted to debt service or the deficit itself can be enlarged indefinitely simply to cover service on the existing debt. Of course, debt can be partly or totally wiped out by inflationary means, but that would gravely threaten the world financial system, and would visit economic disaster upon much of society by rendering its savings worthless.

The relation between private debt and the ability to repay it has also become more tenuous. That is indicated, if crudely, by the fact that the ratio of debt to GNP is at an unprecedented level for the private sector as a whole.

One reason for this rise has been the rapid retirement of equity (i.e., corporate stock), and its substitution by debt, associated largely with "leveraged" buyouts of established firms, and owed mostly to banks or "junk bond" holders. In fact, the $150 billion of equity in the nonfinancial corporate sector that has been retired is equal to an amount that exceeds the net issuance of equity by nonfinancial business over at least the entire post-Korean War period.[6]

The unprecedented rise in private debt must be linked to the Reagan-era climate of permissiveness, which has given free rein to competitive forces in the banking and financial sector to operate in markets in which many of the traditional sources of restraint have been eliminated by a combination of deregulation and technology-driven innovation. As a result, some measures of credit quality problems are disturbingly high, considering that the problems are occurring during the boom phase of the business cycle. So much so that analysts believe that it could prove difficult to service even existing levels of debt in a less favorable economic and interest rate environment.[7]

The growth in debt must be viewed against the indicators of overcapacity mentioned above. Overcapacity is now worldwide, exerting deflationary pressures, and making much of the existing debt more difficult, if not impossible, to repay. Appraisals of the medium-term outlook by responsible financial authorities, who are unlikely to be much influenced by shallow Wall Street optimism or electoral considerations, have been exceedingly cautious. Thus, the continued strong rise in consumer debt, a mainstay of consumer spending on durable goods, is regarded as being unsustainable. Household debt has recently reached an all-time high of over 75 percent of disposable income, and consumer debt has increased more rapidly than consumer assets over the past two years. Furthermore, the prospects for business fixed investment appear rather bleak; such investment may well decline in 1986. (It is scheduled to increase 2 percent in current dollars this year, spelling a decline in real terms.) The unemployment rate has been projected in the latest *Economic Report of the President* (February 1986) to continue approximating 7 percent of the labor force. At the same time, most of our key trading partners, who rely on our markets to support their growth, remain mired in high levels of unemployment.

Such evaluations make any improvement in the economic outlook depend almost entirely on reductions in government spending (i.e., the federal deficit) and the drop in interest rates that is expected to accompany it. But this is a rather facile view.

As this is written, interest rates are indeed declining, in the expectation that the deficit, and therefore Treasury financing needs, will contract. The question is what will replace the deficit's expansionary force. True, lower interest rates encourage investment in productive enterprise, housing, speculative ventures, etc. It is possible that this will happen, although the overcapacity discussed above makes it doubtful. Moreover, that interest rates should decline at the presumed peak of a business cycle is quite unprecedented; such a decline signifies a slackening in the need for funds and in the underlying demand for goods and services.

As Thomas Edsall has shown, powerful economic and political interests have benefited from Reaganomics. For them, Reaganomics represents a victory and they will cling to its fruits stubbornly. Thus, the effort to privatize—and commercialize—public services will undoubtedly continue. The redistribution of resources from the public to the private sector, and from wage labor to capital,

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will also continue as a Reagan policy. It may well be that, given the United States' position in the world economy, and the constraints which the financial authorities here are able to impose on the economic system, we will avoid the sort of banking crisis that occurred in the early 1930s.

It is likely indeed that the "system" will be salvaged at the expense of smaller firms and of working people. That much is suggested by the earlier rescue operations, and also in the way the current agricultural crisis is being resolved by driving thousands of smaller farmers off the land. Intervention of the state on the side of the rich and powerful is inherent in Reaganomics. □

Notes

[1] Isabel Sawhill and Charles Stone, *The Reagan Record* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute), p. 82.

[2] Edward Denison, *Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929-1982* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), 1985, p. XVI.

[3] Barry Bosworth, *Tax Incentives and Economic Growth* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), 1984, p. 117.

[4] Denison, *op. cit.*, p. XV.

[5] Barry Bosworth, "Taxes and the Investment Recovery," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (January 1985), p. 4. See also John R. Stepp, deputy assistant secretary of labor, "Emerging Trends in Labor-Management Relations," before a conference on labor-management relations, Peoria, Ill., January 21, 1986, p. 3. Stepp said, ". . . [B]etween 1979 and 1984, some 85 percent of new business investment in this country was in computers and office equipment."

[6] "Public and Private Debt Accumulation: A Perspective," Federal Reserve Bank of New York *Quarterly Review* (Autumn 1986).

[7] Ibid.

Irving Howe

Ugly Stuff at the *Nation*

This past March the *Nation* marked its 120th anniversary with a special issue containing articles of varying interest. One of them, alas, stood out—a racist diatribe by Gore Vidal concerning Israel, American Jews, and "fifth columnists." It is many years since I have read anything quite like this in a serious magazine.

As if to make clear that his racist venom is not confined to Jews, Vidal starts out with a bit of "yellow peril" nativism that has a long tradition in America. ". . . [F]or Americans to survive economically in the coming Sino-Japanese world, an alliance with the Soviet Union is necessary. After all, the white race is a minority race . . . and if the two great powers of the Northern Hemisphere [the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.] don't band together, we are going to end up as farmers—or, worse, mere entertainment—for the more than one billion grimly efficient Asiatics." This bit of good fellowship out of the way, Vidal turns to the Jews.

He attacks the neoconservative writers, Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, and Midge Decter. Some twenty-five years ago, it seems, Vidal told Podhoretz that he, Vidal, was writing a play about the American Civil War and Podhoretz (according to Vidal) said he found the Civil War "remote and irrelevant." Apparently, Vidal has never recovered from the shock of this impiety: "I realized that [Podhoretz] was not planning to become an 'assimilated American' . . . but rather, his first loyalty would always be to Israel. Yet he and Midge stay on among us, in order to make propaganda and raise money for Israel."

Now, if Podhoretz's worst fault were that he felt "remote" from the Civil War, one might easily forgive him. Even, one may suppose, a WASP with

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ancestry going back to the Mayflower might feel that way. But surely his lack of interest in the Civil War doesn't demonstrate that he had ceased "planning"—notice the language—to become "an assimilated American."

Why should Podhoretz, born in the United States, have to make any such "plans"? In what way, *except for his being Jewish*, did Podhoretz need to become an "assimilated American"? (And suppose one believes that the best kind of American is one who's just a little unassimilated?) Nor is it clear why Podhoretz's indifference to the Civil War leads to a state of mind in which "his first loyalty would always be to Israel." (Unless, of course, it's in the Jewish genes. . . .) It might, after all, lead to nothing more than a refusal to read books about the Civil War.

Vidal's piece takes an ugly turn when he suggests that the most someone like Podhoretz—and other Jews also?—can be in America (his "host country," as Vidal so nicely puts it) is an "assimilated American."* For from this follows the slur about "first loyalty" and from that, the accusation that American Zionists are "our Israeli fifth columnists"—

Sidney Blumenthal

Stranded in Right Field

. . . In 1980, Jeane Kirkpatrick, a scholar whose specialty was Peronist Argentina, presented a full-blown theory, published in *Commentary* magazine, attributing the fall of the Nicaraguan and Iranian autocrats to the Carter administration's "lack of realism." She derided the idea that "deep historical forces," finally beyond the control of American policymakers, were at work. By failing to support Somoza and the shah, Carter had contributed to the rise of hostile regimes.

Carter's policy fostered instability, Kirkpatrick wrote. She dismissed the "pervasive and mistaken assumption that one can easily locate and impose democratic alternatives" in the Third World and the "equally pervasive and equally flawed belief that change per se in . . . autocracies is inevitable, desirable and in the American interest." She argued instead for backing "positively friendly" authoritarian rulers. And she insisted that "right-wing autocracies," unlike totalitarian ones, "do sometimes evolve into democracies. . . ."

Ronald Reagan was among the readers of Kirkpatrick's article. He was so impressed that he praised it during the 1980 campaign and named its author ambassador to the United Nations after the election. . . .

The Philippines crisis, more than any other event of the 1980s, seemed made to order for the neoconservatives. All the elements present in the Philippines were also present in their theory. There was the "positively friendly" authoritarian dictator, the communist insurgency, the moderate "third force," and clear American interests—in the form of gigantic military bases. In this living laboratory, the theory was put to the test.

In December 1985, Kirkpatrick wrote a column ranking Marcos's Philippines in the top third of U.N. members in the good-government category. The unpleasantries uncovered by "American newspapers, newsweeklies and network newscasts" reflected an "obsessive intolerance" with "a nation of great strategic importance." The shah and Somoza and other long-gone dictators were recalled. "The failings of each were magnified by people who played on American political purism. . . ."

The pattern seemed obvious to Kirkpatrick: "Once these rulers had fallen" they were replaced by "more tragically repressive, aggressive dictatorships. . . ." Kirkpatrick suggested that the "campaign against the government of the Philippines" might "produce similar consequences."

Early this month, she prepared another column on the Philippines, at the very moment that its presidential election was taking place. "American liberals," she charged, were orchestrating a "campaign . . . to suggest the existence of an anti-Marcos 'consensus' inside the United States government." The result was "meddling" and "interference in Philippine politics." She denounced the "American role" as not "edifying" and cast doubt on charges of Marcos's election fraud—"it seems very unlikely."

American policymakers, she urged, must "cease" their "interference" or we would suffer the fate of the explorer Magellan, who was "hacked to death" by "the Philippine tribes." The Carter nightmare appeared to be recurring, only with Reagan in the White House.

But just as the Reagan administration was edging away from the weakening Philippine strongman, Kirkpatrick began edging away from her previously prepared column. Her line became muddy. As the column was being distributed by her syndicate, she rewrote it and sent out a revised version. In this one, she noted that "charges of fraud destroyed [the] perception" of "a creditable election."

A day after Kirkpatrick's original and altered columns simultaneously appeared in various newspapers, Reagan made the debate muddier. In an interview with the *Washington Post* on February 11, the president praised the emergence of a "two-party system" in the Philippines and wondered whether the election fraud was really just "one-sided." That evening, Reagan continued his musings at a press conference, at which he suggested "the possibility of fraud . . . on both sides."

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which means, does it not? that they are disloyal to the United States. And then, touching bottom, Vidal tells Podhoretz and Decter: "I don't much like your country, which is Israel."

BUT WAIT A MINUTE. Podhoretz and Decter have quite as much right as any other Americans whose Americanness is not thereby impugned to express their views about Israel or anything else. If they "make propaganda and raise money for Israel," it may be because they sincerely believe this to be good for America or freedom. And their free exercise of such rights—whatever one may think of their opinions—does not depend on when their ancestors came to the United States.

It's hardly a secret that we of *Dissent* disagree strongly with Podhoretz and Decter. But that's not the issue here. At stake is whether people holding neoconservative views about Israel are to be branded "fifth columnists" in a liberal magazine. Not too long ago such talk was called red-baiting, and it's no more attractive when it turns up as anti-red-baiting.

Soon after Vidal's article appeared there came a

Strangely enough, Reagan's comments had little connection with the policy pursued by his administration. On the morning of his press conference, policymakers at the White House had issued a statement expressing concern about Marcos's election fraud. The battle on the inside had already been won by those trying to extricate the U.S. from the Filipino dictator.

Most of the neoconservatives, however, were not taking their cue from the real administration position but from Reagan's remarks, which he had repudiated himself. Soon, from the neoconservative columns, came a shower of praise for the new "two-party system" now in place in the Philippines.

Something was happening that was ". . . more important than whether Ferdinand Marcos or Corazon Aquino 'wins,' " wrote Ben Wattenberg, the neoconservative writer, in the *Washington Times*. ". . . democracy has won a mighty battle." In this view, the election was more meaningful as an existential act than a political one.

The emergence of a "two-party system" seemed to bear out the Kirkpatrick thesis that authoritarian regimes could evolve into democracies. But in fact there were not two parties and it wasn't a system. Marcos's organization was a party in the sense that the Gambino crime family is a party. And Aquino's party was a ramshackle affair, sustained by deep popular yearnings, expressed mainly in the streets.

On February 22, the neoconservatives found themselves in the unlikely and uncomfortable position of having the same line as Tass, the Soviet news agency, which attacked the U.S. for its "attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Philippines." To be sure, the conjunction of the neoconservatives and the Soviets as the last apologists for Marcos was a curious event. Certainly, their motives differed. The Soviets' action was a classic demonstration of cynical *realpolitik*. The neoconservatives acted out of ideological conviction. Yet both sought to put aside soft sentimentality about democratic niceties in the service of national interest.

The cardinal liberal sin, according to the neoconservatives, is "moral equivalence"—the equation of American and Russian shortcomings. But in the Philippines crisis, the neoconservatives exhibited a moral equivalence of their own—the equation of authoritarians and democrats. Because authoritarian regimes have been toppled and replaced by democratic ones—for example, in Greece, Portugal and Argentina—the neoconservatives tend to see every permutation within authoritarianism as a hopeful step toward democracy. The conclusion they draw is that these regimes should be defended as if they were the seed of democracy, not the suffocating lid.

In the heat of the Philippines controversy, no one articulated the neoconservative sensibility better than Owen Harries, the co-editor of the *National Interest*, a neoconservative quarterly intended to tutor the Reagan administration in foreign policy. On February 23, in the *New York Times*, he blamed the crisis on "the well-intentioned efforts of Americans of various political persuasions. . . ." He claimed the mantle of a higher realism: "Moral considerations . . . cannot be the decisive factors leading to demands for the removal of President Marcos, . . ." And he sketched a scenario in which Aquino's victory fostered "bloody chaos leading to the rapid growth of Communist power. . . ." Marcos, he concluded, must stay. . . .

But by the end, even a few neoconservatives seemed to question a theory that seemed to have so little relevance to what happened in the Philippines. Their advice had gone unheeded. They had been overrun by circumstances, unable to adjust, frozen in their past assumptions.

Charles Krauthammer, a *Washington Post* columnist with neoconservative sympathies, concluded this week that "the authoritarian-totalitarian distinction . . . as a guide for deciding which regime the United States will push toward democracy . . . has been superseded. . . ." Thus the old neoconservative doctrine was now declared obsolete.

Perhaps the most apposite text on the neoconservatives' current condition is Kirkpatrick's famous *Commentary* essay. The "mistakes and distortions" of the Carter years were "all fashionable," she wrote. The liberals had "good intentions," but they were guilty of "idealism." They allowed the "blinding power of ideology" to govern their "interpretation of events."

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torrent of protesting letters to the *Nation*, which occasioned an "Editor's Note" in reply. If anything, this was still more shocking than the fact that the *Nation* had printed Vidal's piece. The *Nation* editors wrote that Vidal had done a service "by violating the taboo that forbids the discussion of the relationship of the American Jewish community to the state of Israel. . . ."

Whatever are the *Nation* editors talking about? What taboo? Many of us have publicly been engaged in precisely this discussion for years now, and one need only look through the files of various magazines—left, right, and center—to see how fierce this debate has been.

Vidal's piece aroused disgust not because of any issue it raised or taboo it violated, but because of the terms in which it was couched—terms about as close to anti-Semitism as anyone not an openly declared anti-Semite could reach.

The "Editor's Note" in the *Nation* puzzled me. I know its chief editor, Victor Navasky, as a decent and humane man. How could he have committed this defense of the unspeakable Vidal? And then I came up with the answer: The "Note" had not been written by Navasky at all; it had been subcontracted to a free-lancer named Uriah Heep. □

*The notion, long cherished by anti-Semites and other reactionaries, that Jews in a given country, whether born there or not, are present by sufference of their gentile "hosts" is not confined to Vidal. Marcel Proust, in his great novel, shows that the same ugly line of thought was present among French aristocrats after the Dreyfus Affair. Baron de Charlus says of Dreyfus: "his crime is non-existent, your [Jewish] friend's compatriot would have committed a crime if he had betrayed Judea, but what has he to do with France?. . . . Your Dreyfus might rather be convicted of breaking the laws of hospitality."

Michael Walzer

What's Terrorism—And What Isn't

Belatedly, the world recognizes the peculiar evil of terrorism—the murder of innocent people, the intrusion of fear into everyday life, the sense of personal vulnerability, the violation of private purposes, the insecurity of public places, the coerciveness of precaution. All this seems obvious now, but as soon as it is obvious, something strange happens. Terrorism, recognized as an evil, becomes the only evil; everything anyone opposes must be called terrorism; antiterrorism is terrorism too. Colonel Qaddafi and his European apologists follow a familiar pattern when they call the American raid "state terrorism."

Consider the pattern. If slavery is the paradigmatic wrong, then capitalism must be "wage slavery," though that misnames the phenomenon, as any slave would know. What looks like mere exaggeration, a piece of linguistic exploitation, produces genuine misunderstanding. Now it is so much more difficult to get at what is really wrong with the wage relationship. Again, if genocide is the paradigmatic wrong, then every mistreatment of a people must be genocidal; if no one is killed, it is "cultural genocide." The falsehood is so obvious in this case that one might well come to feel tolerant of mistreatment. Or again, if violence is what we hate, then all those forms of repression and control that involve no physical injury have to be described (if they are to be opposed) as "implicit violence." That means, nonviolent violence, a notion that doesn't help in explaining the varieties of repression. Why are we (for these are commonly the rhetorical sins of the left) so eager for a vocabulary without nuance?

There is indeed such a thing as state terrorism, but it is no different from terrorism itself: the deliberate killing of innocent people. The phrase makes sense only when contrasted with revolutionary terrorism or nationalist terrorism; then it describes the same phemonenon differently organized, differently justified. Sometimes terrorism organized by the state is on a wholly different scale

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than the terrorism of movements or gangs—as in the bombings of Dresden or Tokyo in World War II. Often enough, however, it is on the same scale. A bomb can be carried into an airport or planted in a pub or supermarket by the agent of a state or of a gang; death squads can be sponsored by a government or a party. It doesn't make much difference, and the difference collapses entirely when a gang is hired by a state or a state taken over by a gang.

The American bombing of Libya was not state terrorism, for it was aimed at specific military targets, and the pilots took some risks in their effort to hit those targets and nothing else. To aim at such targets in Tripoli itself may have been wrong, but the wrong was not terroristic in character. It was one more example of American hubris: an arrogant overconfidence in our own technology. Moral men and women, concerned to avoid civilian deaths, should not put their faith in smart bombs. No bomb is morally smart. It may also be true that the raid was unwise, imprudent, a failure of policy. But that is a different argument, and anyone making it would be obliged to explain what an alternative policy might look like. How should one respond to terrorist gangs sponsored by sovereign states?

We could respond with terrorism. That would mean, in this case, the indiscriminate or random bombing of residential areas. A bomb falling, unaimed, on a city is the moral equivalent of a bomb planted in a public place or a machine gun pointed at a crowd. We shouldn't do that and presumably won't; in any case we haven't.

Beyond that there is a wide range of alternatives, extending all the way from assassination to diplomatic protest. One can fight terrorism politically, economically, or militarily; openly or covertly; alone or in alliance; prudently or recklessly; boldly or fearfully. We have to argue about our options—none of them are pretty, but they are not the same—and for that we need a rich and differentiated vocabulary. Simplification serves the terrorists, all of them, in power and out, because it suggests that terror is all there is, the only real option, with every other policy a mask for the attack upon innocence. Sometimes these days the world looks like that, but as long as we have arguments and choices to make, it is not wholly like that. We have to distinguish degrees of ugliness. It is only those distinctions that hold out some hope for decency. □

Leon Fink

A New Turn at 1199

The beleaguered New York City hospital workers' union, Local 1199, shows signs of renewal. In a rare break with the power of union incumbency, the scandal-ridden regime of President Doris Turner was narrowly defeated in a late-April ballot monitored by the Department of Labor. The final tally shows the opposition "Save Our Union" slate—led by social worker Georgianna Johnson and backed by a coalition of forces with ties to the union's old Leon Davis leadership—with 19,381 votes to 17,017 for Turner. There was an unprecedented 54 percent turnout. This is probably the biggest win by union insurgents since Ed Sadlowski's 1974 victory for the Steelworkers' district directorship. As those who have followed the tangled recent history of Local 1199 might suspect (see "Bread and Roses, Crusts and Thorns," *Dissent*, Spring 1986), the vote tally itself does not immediately resolve the bitter internal dispute within the union. A series of legal challenges may well delay president-elect Johnson's installation—just as crucial citywide hospital bargaining talks are set to begin.

Like the rise of the union itself, the reasons for Turner's defeat reflect an interplay of influences. A mishandled summer 1984 strike, from which union members never received a signed contract or a promised 5 percent wage hike, seriously eroded

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confidence in Turner's leadership. Charges of corruption seemingly substantiated by the Department of Labor's investigation of her spring 1984 election victory further set Turner on the defensive and led to an increasingly closed, siege-like atmosphere around her. Virtually negating her natural charismatic appeal, Turner shied away from both union members and the press in a reelection campaign marked by desperate appeals for loyalty, blanket charges of racism, and vague attacks on "outsiders." At the same time, her opposition scored with new, unanswered charges of financial misdoings at the top of the union. Comparatively little-known and underfinanced, the Save-Our-Union (SOU) campaigners were aided by Leon Davis's public presence as well as by energetic public relations work from old 1199 hand Moe Foner. Taking most of the big hospitals in the city, the insurgents, helped by a sizable Hispanic turnout, cut heavily into Turner's traditional service-worker base, while winning handily among nurses and professional-technical members.

Although Turner in the end proved her own worst enemy, her relations with powerful forces outside the union likely sealed her defeat. In the several weeks prior to the election, she tried in vain to wring some facesaving compromise over the "missing 5 percent" from both the hospitals and the state government. The administration of Governor Mario Cuomo, however, showed no sympathy for a union leader who had backed Ed Koch in the 1982 Democratic primary and later pulled out of a strike-ending agreement in the summer of 1984. Similarly, management's arm, the League of Voluntary Hospitals, which might have been expected to promote the weak and ineffective status quo within the union, showed no such inclination. Turner's refusal to make good on the 1984 agreement apparently made even the specter of potentially renewed militancy look better than anarchy in New York hospital industrial relations.

Whither 1199 under new leadership? Georgianna Johnson, the union's second black woman president, must restore a climate of trust and tolerance within the union. (The SOU platform also commits her to a series of democratic revisions of 1199's traditionally highly-centralized structure.) Beyond salvaging a solid contract this summer, the new leadership intends to rejoin the National Union of Health Care Workers from which Local 1199 split in 1984. Such a project inevitably pits Local 1199 against the authority of Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union international President Alvin Heaps, a strong Turner ally. If 1199 can restore itself to full strength nationally, the American labor movement will have regained one of its most spirited and dynamic players. Whether by 1199 on its own or by resuscitating the idea of a nationwide health care union merger, hospital organizing campaigns will receive a needed shot in the arm. So, too, may the political forces concerned with larger changes in American life. □

IN MEMORIAM

DAN SCHELLY

A lifetime devoted to the democratic socialist movement. A strong friend and supporter of *Dissent*. We will miss his intelligence and constructive criticism.

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Jonathan Frankel

A Calmer Mood in Israel

At this moment, the "Government of National Unity" has been in office here in Jerusalem for almost a year and a half. It almost came apart in April, and whether it will still be in existence by the time this is published, nobody knows. When October comes, will Shimon Peres step down and Yitshak Shamir pick up the crown as envisaged in the "rotation" agreement of 1984? Only the most foolhardy are ready to bet their hard-earned money (now in "new" and stable shekels) one way or the other.

What is remarkable is how fast and how far the mood of the country (something quite distinct from the cacophony of conflicting beliefs) has changed under this regime. Coalition politics, the necessity to plaster over basic ideological negations, the succession of last-minute compromises after haggling through the night, the fact that the government has somehow, incredibly, been able to function—all have had the effect of reducing tensions to an extent that could hardly have been imagined a year or two ago.

After endless buffeting by heavy storms, the ship of state is lying becalmed and the crew is trying to make it seaworthy again. Or, to use a metaphor more appropriate to what is after all largely a sociopsychological phenomenon, it is as though the Israeli public has ceased to follow its usual "manic-depressive" cycle, the rapid transition from collective euphoria to black pessimism. The degree of normality evident in the last year is in the Israeli context positively abnormal. Past experience suggests that this cannot be more than a passing phase, a lull, a remission, but, then again, it is not totally impossible that the forces of moderation may gain permanent advantage from this moment of public calm.

The truce imposed by the inconclusive election of July 1984 on the two dominant parties of left and right, Labor and Likud, has made its impact felt at every level of life. I gather, for example, from my children (one in high school, the other doing her army service) that politics are hardly ever discussed among their age groups—not for fear of unleashing intolerable hatreds (as during the Lebanese War), but because for once even here private life has ousted the public domain from the minds of the youth.

The retreat from politics, combined with disillusionment caused by the Lebanese Wars, goes a long way to explain the tendency of many young army recruits (eighteen-year-olds) to keep a low profile in the army, meaning for some not to volunteer for the crack combat units and for others not to sign on beyond the compulsory three years as short-service officers. (The slang term for this syndrome is "rosh katan," literally "small head," meaning to keep one's head down.)

The rash of teen-age suicides, also a new social phenomenon here, may well be related to the more introspective attitudes of the adolescent generation. As against this, though, hundreds of lives a year are being saved on the roads. A visitor returning to Israel after an absence of a couple of years will notice that wildly dangerous driving is far less prevalent now than then.

The fact that the government has been able to put an end to the runaway inflation has undoubtedly contributed to this sobering-up. When money was losing its value at the rate of two or three

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percent a day, the banks were packed with people buying investments linked to the cost-of-living, or the dollar, index. At the least, this prevented one's earnings from disappearing into thin air; at the most, if one were quick, one could make huge real profits. I still remember how soldiers on reserve duty out in the field (even in Lebanon) felt that when they finally reached a telephone they had no choice but to speak to their brokers before their wives. Today, the banks are never full. There is much less money available and what there is can be withdrawn by bank cards (allowing the client to escape reprimand about his overdraft).

THE PARTIAL REPLACEMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL by managerial politics has led, among other things, to a dramatic decline in the role of the extra-parliamentary pressure groups. Mass demonstrations, which played so important a part during the Begin period, have gone out of fashion. Neither the dovish Peace Now nor the hawkish Gush Emunim can count on supporters to come out to the streets en masse. (The one partial exception is Meir Kahane. When he holds a public rally—and he has never been able to get together more than a couple of hundred of supporters at a time—thousands appear to heckle and harass him.)

Given the armistice between the two major parties, it is not surprising that we have been witnessing a spate of recriminations *pro domo sua* within the camps of both doves and hawks. There have been much publicized disagreements within Gush Emunim between those leaders, such as Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who see the Jewish terrorist underground as essentially blameless, and those, such as Rabbi Yoel Ben Nun, who condemn it as a major deviation.

At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz (the famous philosopher) has found this an opportune moment to settle accounts with Peace Now. In not calling on its members to refuse army service in Lebanon during the war, he has written, the movement demonstrated support for "the principle of absolute obedience to the State . . . that major principle of fascism to which Eichmann appealed during his trial." This statement, in turn, has been described as "political pornography" by another well-known Hebrew University philosopher, Avishai Margalit.

By far the most serious case of internecine war has broken out within the Likud itself. Menahem Begin's heirs have turned to fighting each other with a ferocity that to my knowledge has no precedent in the history of intra-party rivalries in this country. The recent congress of the Herut party (the main constituent of the Likud bloc), the first to be held since 1979, broke up in total chaos after three days of furious turmoil, unable to agree on anything. "Mafia" and "criminals" were among the epithets used by the veteran leadership (primarily of Polish origin) under Yitshak Shamir; while "professor"—directed against Moshe Arens (who once taught aeronautics at the Haifa Technion)—figured among the words of contempt most favored by David Levy, who, with Ariel Sharon, enjoyed the greatest support among the new generation of delegates (largely of North African origin).

How totally unexpected almost everything in the development of the National Unity Government has been! When the idea of a grand coalition was first raised by Yitshak Shamir before the elections of 1984, it seemed a sure sign that Labor was heading for victory (as the public opinion polls predicted). And if Peres had been willing to allow Yitshak Navon (at the time much more popular than he) to lead Labor into the elections, the party probably would have won the few extra seats needed to establish a narrow coalition and to leave the Likud outside. Whether a government based on such shaky foundations, harassed by a massive, irresponsible and demagogic opposition, could have tackled the crises facing the country is another matter.

Once the election results were known, all that the Likud needed in order to set up a coalition without Labor was the cooperation of Ezer Weizman, whose party had won only three seats. Holding the balance of power, he could have dictated almost any price. The only office that the Likud was not ready to give him was, it seems, the premiership itself. His refusal to return to his onetime comrades (he broke with the Likud leadership in 1980) placed an insuperable stumbling block in Shamir's path.

Weizmann, who retains an unusual penchant for saying what he actually thinks, has been one of the two heroes in the events of the last year and a half. The other is Shimon Peres.

Given the basic deadlock built into the very structure of the government finally put together in October 1984, very little, if any, good was expected of it. Life in such an enforced marriage was surely bound to resemble that in Sartre's *Huis clos* where

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hell is a claustrophobic cohabitation of incompatibles. Some of my friends were sure the coalition would fall apart within a month or two. At the best, it seemed, Peres, with his long history of trimming to the prevailing winds, would be able to do nothing but formulate policies based on the lowest common denominator.

And the fact is that in his relations with the Orthodox religious parties—there are four in the coalition—he has done almost everything he can to meet their demands. He supports a bill that aims to restrict greatly the sale of pork products in the country. He is in favor of banning soccer matches in the national stadium on the Sabbath. Huge sums from the state budget continue to flow unabated even in these times of fiscal restraint to innumerable *yeshivot* (many of which still regard the "Zionist State" as totally lacking theological legitimacy). And the prime minister contrives frequently to have the papers publish photos of him publicly wearing a *yarmulke*. So doing, he is trying to follow in the steps of Menahem Begin, who, although not an observant Jew, liked to give the impression that he was. The idea, of course, is that eventually the religious parties will be ready to serve in a narrow coalition under Labor leadership, as they did until 1977. (Is not Paris worth a mass?) How realistic all this is, only time will tell.

In the most crucial areas of national policy, though, Peres has acted not only with inexhaustible patience and persistence (the qualities for which he became best known over the years as a party organizer), but also with a dash and vision that have taken everybody, maybe even himself, by surprise. Far from allowing the Likud to dictate policy, he has constantly seized the initiative. It did not take him long, apparently, to see that the rotation agreement—designating Yitshak Shamir by name as the Likud candidate for the premiership—gives him, Peres, a decisive tactical advantage. If the coalition breaks up before October 1986, it is highly improbable that Shamir (an aging and unpopular leader) would be chosen to lead the Likud into the next elections. Shamir is thus virtually a hostage to the agreement and Peres, by constantly calling his bluff, has pursued policies anathema to the Likud.

Another key factor which has permitted Peres to act like a prime minister in fact as well as name has been the totally uncustomary behavior of the Labor leadership. Constant infighting and factionalism plagued the party during the last decade of its hegemony, 1967-1977, rendering effective government all but impossible. The public feuds between Yitshak Rabin and Peres did much to lose Labor the elections of 1977 and 1981. It can be safely assumed that there is no love lost between the two men even now; nonetheless, as prime minister and defense minister, respectively, they have so far maintained a smooth working relationship. The Labor ministers these days make the businesslike impression of men who have finally ceased to see power as theirs by right.

It is easy to forget just how much resistance, both political and psychological, had to be overcome in order for the new government sharply to change course. Everybody is obviously against three-figure annual inflation rates, not to talk of the one thousand percent that Israel was approaching in the summer of 1984. Nonetheless, the four finance ministers in the two Likud governments were never given the political backing without which there was simply no way of cutting profits, government (including defense) expenditures, subsidies, and living standards. Until his criticism of Peres goaded the prime minister into demanding his resignation, Finance Minister Yitshak Moda'i, a Likud member, had the support of Peres and the Labor ministers to carry through the economic plan—against the loud opposition of cabinet ministers from his own party. By now, the gap in the balance of trade has been cut by over a billion dollars a year and the monthly inflation rate is down to not much more than one percent. Unemployment has risen, but so far on a smaller scale than in the major West European countries.

The same story repeated itself when it came to the withdrawal from Lebanon. In theory, both major parties had concluded by 1983 that Israel should extricate itself fast from the Lebanese quagmire. But in Moshe Arens's year and a half as defense minister in the Likud government, he constantly postponed the decisive step. And when it came to it, most of the Likud ministers in the National Unity Government actually refused to support the withdrawal of the troops in summer 1985. During the three years of our involvement, over 650 Israeli soldiers lost their lives in Lebanon; in the last nine months, despite the continuing Israeli patrols in the "security zone" north of the border six soldiers

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have been killed and there have been no deaths in Northern Galilee from shellings or terrorist attacks.

As against this, Peres has so far failed to bring about any dramatic improvement in relations between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. True, it is possible, even probable, that before the end of his term, the dispute over the minute area of Taba, and its luxury seaside hotel, will finally have been settled. The long-delayed agreement by the Likud to let the case move on to "arbitration" has loosened the logjam and nowadays high-level negotiating teams are shuttling back and forth between Cairo and Tel Aviv every other week. Such initiatives are essential if the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is not to atrophy.

But no substantive progress has been made to widen the circle of peace. Left to themselves, the Israeli prime minister and King Hussein of Jordan could surely reach some kind of working agreement. Limited self-government for the West Bank and Gaza as a transitional stage to a final settlement remains the obvious way to bypass insuperable obstacles—so long as the names "Camp David" and "autonomy" (anathema in most of the Arab world) are avoided. Hussein, though, is caught in a complex web of dependencies involving Arafat and the mainstream PLO, the breakaway Palestinian groups (Hawatmeh, Habash, Abu Nidal), Syria, and the Soviet Union. It is just possible that, by granting the principle of "national self-determination" (meaning, a Palestinian state for the West Bank and Gaza), Peres could have cut the Gordian knot. But accepted wisdom has it that to break up the coalition and run an election on such an issue would mean political suicide for Labor. As for Hussein, if he were to step too far out of line, it could well cost him his life and even end the Hashemite dynasty.

Frustrated at grand diplomacy, Peres has started emphasizing the need to increase local Arab participation in administering the West Bank and Gaza. (This line of thinking is much facilitated by the fact that virtually no new settlements are being established at the moment.) But progress has been slow. Rabin, who as Minister of Defense has direct responsibility for the occupied areas, seems to think that any dramatic change in the way they are run is liable to be for the worse. And, in fact, the newly appointed Arab mayor of Nablus, Zaafer al-Masri, who replaced an Israeli military official, was assassinated by one of the Palestinian "rejectionist" groups within a couple of months of his taking up the post—even though he had been very careful to gain the assent in advance not only of Hussein but also of Arafat. The "devolution of powers" will probably continue, but only in slow motion.

Still, Peres's peace initiatives should not be written off as a simple failure. The remarkable fact is that he has totally transformed the tactical conduct of Israeli foreign policy as it has been pursued at least since 1967 (and, to a great extent, even since 1949). It has been the common assumption of governments here that an unyielding and at times intransigent public posture is clearly in the national interest. To sound too reasonable could be taken for weakness and invite intolerable pressure from the Great Powers for one-sided concessions. The traumas of Munich and of the ignominious withdrawal from Sinai in 1957 reinforced the assumption that a small country threatened on all sides has to demonstrate its abhorrence of appeasement. Hence, we had the angry rejection of the various peace formulae associated with Rogers, Jarring, and Reagan. Even when Begin offered to return all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, he chose to do so secretly while maintaining a characteristically tough stance in public throughout the period of negotiations.

Now, quite unexpectedly, Peres has broken out of this pattern and has demonstrated that to talk of peace as an immediate goal; to make procedural concessions (an "international conference," with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation including pro-PLO members); to launch trial balloons boldly before the public eye (reopening the issue of the Golan Heights as part of a deal involving the renewal of Soviet Jewish emigration) does not have to mean bringing in a Neville Chamberlain who carves up the country. Apart from anything else, a series of sharp and controversial military actions (the bombing in Tunis; the hijacking of the plane supposedly carrying Habash; the massive search for the two soldiers kidnapped in Southern Lebanon) served to demonstrate that talk of peace was not to be taken for a loss of nerve.

At the least, this new style of foreign policy has done much to improve Israel's image abroad, especially in Western Europe, and has, at the same time, exposed the hopeless confusion in which the PLO is entangled. It is remarkable that neither

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Egypt nor Jordan has sought to put the blame on Israel for the open breach between Hussein and Arafat.

More significant is the fact that Peres has been able to present the basic choices in his low-key, common-sense style, without bringing the roof down on his head. Even Sharon has had to muzzle his criticism lest he prevent the rotation from taking place. And, meanwhile, the tone of public discourse in matters pertaining to foreign affairs has become remarkably measured.

In general, the Labor party is trying to use this interlude to win over the public, particularly the youth, to the basic value-system that it once took more or less for granted but which is now under real threat. The Ministry of Education, headed by Yitshak Navon, has launched a series of programs for the schools designed to explain the meaning of democracy; and the Education Corps of the army has taken a similar initiative. In the Knesset, Labor is attempting to push through a law against racism. Much of this activity—even perhaps Peres's constant stress on the pursuit of peace as a national value—comes as a reaction to the election of Meir Kahane to the Knesset and to his subsequent meteoric rise in the public opinion polls.

By ordinary standards of political logic, then, the Labor party in Israel should be looking forward to the next election with the greatest confidence. After all, the Israeli public has been witness over the last five years to a clear-cut demonstration of the essential difference between total irresponsibility and failure in government, on the one hand, and competent, rational leadership, on the other.

But, paradoxically, it is still very much an open question whether Labor can again win an election and establish an effective government (meaning a narrow coalition) under its leadership. Will demonstrated political success suffice to reverse fundamental social and sociopolitical trends?

It is now nineteen years since the Six Day War. A new generation of voters has grown up knowing no frontiers to the east other than those established by the cease-fire of June 1967. The Israeli occupation, the constant acts of indiscriminate Arab terror, the consequent arrests, imprisonments, expulsions are simply part of the landscape in which they have lived their lives. How receptive can they be to talk of territorial concessions, of coexistence, of peace not as a trap but as a way to security? It is arguable (and it is an argument I often hear) that the forces of liberalism and democracy are caught in a vicious circle. Labor, it is said, cannot win again so long as the occupied territories remain under Israeli rule; but unless Labor wins, the territories will remain occupied indefinitely.

Certainly, the laws of social dynamics, the structural factors built into the system as a whole, appear to be working powerfully in favor of the annexationist right. The proportion of the young people in the population as a whole is on the rise (because of the relatively high birth rate) and all opinion polls show that support for the right-wing parties is much greater in this age group than in the population as a whole. This trend partly reflects, but is also reinforced by, the growing share of the vote going (again because of long-term demographic factors) to Jewish Israelis of North African origin. Alienation from Labor and empathy for the right are deeply imprinted on a large majority within this section of Israeli society.

Then again, the left is up against the rapid transformation of the religious camp in Israeli politics from the malleability that marked it in the pre-1967 era to the militancy of today. Even though the Orthodox population is also growing fast (huge families and a rejection of birth control are the norm in certain circles), this has not so far produced a significant increase in its parliamentary representation. The four religious parties have twelve Knesset members among them, a mere ten percent of the total. But there are clear signs that the various factions within Orthodoxy which historically were worlds apart, are now more and more sharing a common language of quasi-fundamentalism, and xenophobia.

Of course, significant differences remain. The two chief rabbis, for example, have let it be known that they are opposed to Jews even visiting the Temple Mount—this at a time when other rabbis are demanding that a synagogue be built at its outer edge; when members of the religious Gush Emunim movement are in prison for having plotted to blow up the Dome of the Rock which stands at the center of the Mount; and when a nearby *yeshiva* is busy preparing the priestly garments for the moment at which somehow (the Messianic Coming?) the Temple is rebuilt.

There is no escaping the fact that the religious parties have been remarkably reluctant to demonstrate publicly and loudly that a clear line runs

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between them and Meir Kahane who, after all, also claims the mantle of Orthodoxy. The antiracism bill and the Education Ministry's plans for joint meetings between children from Arab and Jewish schools have also been received coolly in some religious circles—and with varying degrees of hostility in others. (On a recent Friday night, only police intervention prevented a crowd of hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Jews from breaking down the gates of my daughter's high school in an effort to put an end to a weekend seminar being held with Arab pupils from the Galilee.)

Is this the writing on the wall for Labor? Without at least one or two of the religious parties, its chances of putting together a viable coalition even in the next Knesset are almost nil. Given any choice, though, those parties all seem almost bound to prefer the Likud. Increasingly, they speak the same language.

Despite the high ratings that Meir Kahane enjoyed in the opinion polls during his first year as a Knesset member (at one point he had about ten percent of the possible vote), few observers expect him to make major gains in the next election. He seems bereft of all organizational skills and remains very much the lone wolf. The fact that the media have systematically deprived him of publicity has done much to erode his support. ("I am seen, therefore I am," is perhaps axiomatic for politics in the television era.)

But this does not mean that Labor will benefit from Kahane's rise and fall. The polls suggest that the overall strength of the two main blocs (left and right) has remained remarkably stable since 1984. The Likud has gone down, but the party of the radical right, Tehiyah (which opposed Begin's peace with Egypt), has been the primary beneficiary. Add up support for the Likud, Tehiyah, and the religious parties and you have close to a majority. Only the very large Arab vote (which is also increasing, thanks to yet another powerful demographic trend) maintains a precarious balance. This persistent deadlock goes a long way to explain why neither party has been in any hurry to break up the coalition government. It also means that Ariel Sharon—now once more on the rise in the Likud—could conceivably end up, after all, as prime minister of Israel within the next few years.

Given the solid base of support for "rejectionism" both in Israel and in the Arab world—two extremes that feed on each other—it is not surprising to hear voices on the left calling for the formal annexation of the territories. Meron Benvenisti has long been saying that if Israeli law were extended to the occupied areas, the Arab population would at least be entitled to full political and civil rights. Now he has been joined by a well-known young West Bank intellectual, Sari Nusseibeh, who sees annexation as the key to the "secular and democratic" state which the Palestinian national movement has long advocated. Nusseibeh may be saying this with tongue in cheek, because the Israeli democratic system could hardly survive a situation where forty or fifty percent or more of the voting population is Arab. It is enough to look at the history of the Deep South between Reconstruction and the civil rights movement to see how the shell of democracy can exist without its spirit.

Besides, when all is said and done, the logic of politics may still prove stronger than the laws of social dynamics. There is a floating vote—albeit of indeterminate dimensions—on the outer peripheries of Likud support. The middle-aged and the better-educated strata within the North African and other Oriental communities; the members of the middle class who find any talk of socialism anathema but might still vote for one of the center parties close to Labor rather than stay with Likud at all costs; the Israeli Arabs who usually vote for the Communists or another party of the radical left—all these represent a potential reservoir of support for Labor and its small allied parties. There could just be a reward for political success; and punishment for political failure. This is, after all, a country of constant surprises.

In his novel, *Menukha nekhona* (*A Perfect Peace*), published in 1982, Amos Oz includes the figure of Levi Eshkol, Labor's prime minister of twenty years ago. The portrait is warm, showing a large, care-worn man, physically a little clumsy, but endowed with endless patience and a certain homespun common sense, wisdom even. (One is reminded of Kutuzov in *War and Peace* and Samsonov in *August 1914*, and at one point Oz even compares him to a "good-natured Slavic peasant, full of years.") The selection of Eshkol for this role was no random choice, for with the passage of time his reputation has been growing at least among the intelligentsia here.

His years of office before the Six Day War have come to appear as a precious moment of relative

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stability when the watchword was no longer total mobilization, and when the individual could take pause. Zionism as normality rather than as messianism (be it of the Ben Gurion or Begin varieties) is what Eshkol represents.

After the election results of 1984 were announced, Amos Oz was one of the well-known writers (A.B. Yehoshua was another) who at once came out in favor of a National Unity Government as the least of the various evils then available. Today, a year and a half later, the style of government employed by Peres—and its impact on Israeli society—has come to remind one more than anything else of the Eshkol interlude. There is much irony in this, of course, because twenty years ago Peres was one of Eshkol's bitterest opponents and, in general, his climb to the top did untold damage to the Labor party. Indeed, he can be seen as belonging to the generation of the "sons" (both native-born and immigrant) who, as Oz depicts it in his novel, were forced to grow up stunted in the shadow of the founding fathers.

Now that Peres and the surviving Labor leaders have finally come of age, will their period in office come to be seen, like that of Eshkol before June 1967, as a short interval, to be remembered with nostalgia but of little long-term significance? Or are we watching the tide begin to turn? □

Marc Baldwin

"Privatization": Thatcherite Panacea

LONDON—Selling state-owned industries has become a policy throughout the world. In Britain, "privatization" is nothing less than a bid for a new Conservative hegemony. By looking at three prime goals of the policy—depoliticization of industrial policy, weakening the base of the Labour party, reasserting capitalist ideology—we can better understand the policy and its failure. In particular, a look at one of the supposed victories of the Thatcher revolution reveals the incapacity of free-market nostalgia to confront the structural crisis of the present period.

It is easy to overemphasize the extent of British postwar consensus around the welfare state. Nevertheless, there remains in Britain general commitment to full employment, the welfare state, and mild corporatism. It is this consensus that Margaret Thatcher is attacking with privatization. Thatcher's economic policy—deflation and supply-side attacks on regulations and unions—leads to denationalization and contracting out of services as a way of depoliticizing production decisions. Thatcher has rejected not only former Prime Minister Heath's tripartite talks in the National Economic Development Council and Labour's Social Contract, but also the minimal joint economic management fostered by Harold Macmillan in the early 1960s. These initiatives represented explicit acknowledgment of the social nature of production.

II

"PRIVATIZATION" IN ALL ITS FORMS consistently limits the role of government in production and wage arrangements. Increased reliance on the vagaries of the market to control wage levels under recession conditions has allowed the Thatcher regime to avoid directly confronting the labor movement. The government's *legislative* anti-union attacks have focused on more peripheral rights. Surprisingly, little explicitly anti-union legislation has

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been proposed. Rather, the invisible hand of tight money has been allowed to do its work. By avoiding incomes policies and by privatizing, Thatcher assures that unions face a multiplicity of troubles in troubled times.

Privatization also plays a direct role in weakening the base of the Labour party. Two trends converge. One is the marked predominance of public employees among the unionized. In 1980, 90 percent of white-collar and manual workers in nationalized industries were unionized; 75 percent of manual workers and only 39 percent of white-collar employees in private industry were unionized. Management recognized manual unions in 98 percent of nationalized establishments and white-collar unions in 94 percent. Private manufacturers recognized 68 percent and 32 percent respectively.[1]

The second trend is in electoral alignments. Patrick Dunleavy notes that "Labour is becoming (indeed has already become in terms of its MPs) a public-sector and trade-union party, rather than a party oriented towards the working class as a whole."[2] Obviously, if the public sector is highly unionized and the base of the Labour party has shifted toward this sector, privatization will have electoral payoffs for the Tories. The combination of privatization, recession, and limitations on union involvement in politics (banning political and sympathetic strikes, mandatory votes on political funds) adds up to a powerful attack on the Labour opposition.

Finally, privatization embodies Thatcher's ideological vision and alters the socioeconomic landscape to support that vision. Denationalization efforts have not only taken asset shares out of government hands; they have attempted in some cases to put them into the hands of workers, to provide direct education in the virtues of stock ownership while making renationalization more problematic. Although employee ownership is not inherently bad, the few British initiatives are being articulated into a recessionary economy with no national industrial policy support. They also show no concern for egalitarian internal distribution of stock nor for changes in management structure.

What these efforts reflect is minimal structural change to promote Conservative hegemony. A quarter of the adults in Reagan's America own stock shares, compared with 7 percent in Britain in 1984. There were fewer than thirty profit-sharing schemes when Thatcher came to power; by December 1984 there were 804.[3] The assistant editor of the *Financial Times* has even advocated *giving away* the stock of public corporations.[4] Sales of council houses and stock to smallholders expand the social base to which Conservative party rhetoric can appeal and make renationalization politically difficult.

Following the bad example of the privatization of British Aerospace in February of 1981, where the number of shareholders fell from the initial 158,000 to 27,000 in ten months due to speculation, the government has pursued a wide range of policies to encourage extended shareholding. For example, British Telecom sales included a "loyalty bonus" payable to those who held their shares for three years or more, a one-to-one share issue drawn from the government's remaining 49.8 percent holding.[5] Future sales promise to be even more heavily weighted toward enlarging the pool of individual stockholders. Government projections intend for private investors to provide at least half of the £14.75 billion to be raised through privatization in the next three years. Only one-third of Cable & Wireless shares are preplaced with institutions as against 61 percent when British Telecom was floated. It is interesting to note that not all asset sales will be focused on individual investors. In keeping with Thatcher's designs: "Heavy television advertising, for example, will be restricted to flotations of companies which are regarded as safe, with predictable profit growth."[6] All this fostering of individual stockholding and management buy-outs has hardly been a Tory platform in the past, and the boldness of Thatcher's claims today is a far cry from the defensive attention to the need to raise funds and cut government borrowing that marked the policy's public face in her first government.

III

That Thatcher intends to alter irrevocably the political and economic landscape of Britain is apparent. That the initiative will fail despite the various precautions is also clear. Thatcher recently suffered tremendous embarrassment over the sale of Westland Helicopters to the American conglomerate United Technologies, and, within weeks, a Tory revolt against the sale of a British Leyland subsidiary. The international reality of free-market prescriptions is proving too much for many Conservative MPs; Thatcher has been turned back by their feeling that she is "selling the family silver." But also important for the project's outcome will be the negative lessons of the privatized companies.

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In February 1985, the *Economist* opened an article with the declaration, "Britain's National Freight Consortium (NFC) is making free-market economists proud."[7] But the article went on to provide a case study in the failure of the free market to address the structural crisis of British capitalism. That failure is apparent in three elements of the NFC "success" story.

The first problematic prescription NFC offers is unemployment. "To win a competitive advantage, NFC has been cutting out fat and weak spots: its redundancy costs topped £5 million in 1982 and 1983 and £2 million last year." The parcels division will see considerable "restructuring": "This includes chopping 800 jobs and closing depots at Roadline division. . . ." Thatcher's project will have to contend with this rising unemployment. At present, the strategy is to stress the long-term perspective of monetarism, namely, that the economy takes time to transform.

IV

But the second trend evident in the NFC calls that long-term faith into question. Presumably the motive force for economic recovery will be domestic investment. The NFC plans to double its profits by 1990, but the route is "to invest £520 million . . . about 75 percent of it in Britain and most of the rest in America." The NFC acquired Merchants Home Delivery of Los Angeles for £14 million and has set up household removals joint ventures in Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Like the rest of Thatcher's monetarism, privatization has nothing to offer the struggling sectors of the British economy. Looking entirely at aggregate economic criteria obscures the deep structural crisis of the economy, as speculative profits mask industrial disaster. In the absence of targeted state investment, reliance on the privatized companies to invest in Britain has merely encouraged, as in the NFC case, further capital flight, and disinvestment from manufacturing.

The final stumbling block of privatization and Thatcherite hegemony is widening wage differentials. Union experience has not been across-the-board decline in wages after denationalization. Rather, wages tend more closely to reflect market pressures. In the case of NFC, worker/shareholders compose 55 percent of the workforce and own 83 percent of the company's shares. It is a classic *management* buy-out. White-collar employees are the dominant shareholders so that from the start wage differentials have been reinforced by stock ownership differentials. Sir Peter Thompson, executive chairman, has added performance bonuses to existing differences so that *management* who met or exceeded performance targets got bonuses of up to 40 percent of pay in 1984. Sir Peter got £22,200 on top of his £76,000 a year salary through such schemes. Pay differentials may serve to fragment the workers in privatized industry, promoting infighting rather than solidarity. But it is also possible that the gap between the highest salaries and those of the majority of workers will be perceived by workers as their common problem. A few shares of stock are not much incentive to vote Tory in the face of enormous income disparities, unemployment, and capital flight.

Ultimately what holds together the disparate elements of the privatization policy—liberalization, asset sales, contracting out, vouchers, fees for use—is their label. "Privatization" consistently asserts the value of private over public even when the impact on public welfare is negative or ambiguous. The other glue that holds privatization together is the minimal structural change intended to make the policy stick. With Thatcher's "dissatisfaction" rating at 67 percent this winter, the policy is a case study in Thatcherite failure. □

Notes

[1] David Thomas, "Unions and Denationalization," *Public Money* 4 (December 1984), pp. 33–36.

[2] Patrick Dunleavy, "Voting and the Electorate," in H. Drucker, P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, and G. Peele, *Developments in British Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1985), p. 54. This argument is pursued at book length in Dunleavy and Husbands, *British Democracy at the Crossroads* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984).

[3] "Making the modern dinosaur extinct," *Economist*, February 23, 1985, pp. 72–74.

[4] Samuel Brittan, "The Politics and Economics of Privatization," *The Political Quarterly* 55 (April–June 1984), pp. 109–128. Brittan advocates this strategy for the Alliance parties.

[5] *Economist*, *op. cit.*

[6] Philip Stephens, "Individual investors expected to provide half privatization cash," *Financial Times*, December 9, 1985.

[7] "National Freight keeps on trucking," *Economist*, February 23, 1985, pp. 76–77.

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Photo by Joe Heegard

Blockade of Hormel's corporate office May 10, 1986.

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Nicolaus Mills

P-9 Fights the Odds

The Hormel Strike Challenges American Labor

AUSTIN, MINNESOTA: 6:15 and they have at last dropped off the wood for the fire barrels. But until the sun comes up, nothing is going to be enough to keep us warm. The picket lines left the Austin Labor Center at four o'clock, and for the last two hours the men who are going to be arrested this morning have been waiting for the early morning shift to arrive. I keep thinking of what one of the strikers said to me yesterday. "When my Dad worked here we had a saving wage. Then it went to a living wage. Now it's a survival wage. All you hear is, 'Be thankful you've got a job.'" 8:30 and the police and sheriff's deputies have started the arrests. There is an unspoken understanding at work. The crowd (300) will let the police and deputies (35 at most) make the arrests, and they in turn will be very careful in removing the strikers who have wedged themselves between their locked cars and the Hormel gates. No one is going to be hurt. No one is worried that it will be noon before production gets started up again. Doughnut crumbs and saliva are still frozen to the wool scarf I wrapped around my face to keep warm. I watch the television crews arrive. They are sure to get all the details and at the same time miss everything important: the P-9 strikers' anger, their belief that long ago they ran out of easy options.

FROM THE OUTSIDE, Hormel's new $100 million hog-processing plant in Austin, Minnesota, bears no resemblance to the gloomy brick Chicago slaughterhouses Upton Sinclair described eighty years ago in *The Jungle*. The flagship plant is a monument to high tech. Even the chain-link fence surrounding it does not alter its streamlined look. But for the workers inside, the changes that industrial design has brought about have been much less spectacular. They still work in areas known as "the kill" and "the cut." They still slip on blood. They still must battle temperatures that in parts of the plant go as low as 38 degrees. Only now, they face these dangers on speededup equipment that in itself has become a menace.

When it was completed in 1982, the new plant put to rest the fears of people in this company town of 23,000 that Hormel would move, taking with it a payroll that since 1891 has made life possible here. Now that optimism has faded. Drivers coming off the highway are greeted with a sign that says, "Austin. Where the Good Life is Here to Stay." But in the face of a ten-month strike by Local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union-AFL-CIO (UFCW), that sign no longer has the credibility it once did. No matter how this strike ends, Austin will not go back to being the quiet town where there was always steady work and Jay Hormel, the founder's son, is remembered as a man who personally shook each worker's hand on Christmas eve.

The stakes in the Hormel strike go far beyond Austin, however, and far beyond the question of whether a militant local with fewer than 1,500 members can stand up to a company that in fiscal 1985 had sales of $1.5 billion and turned in a record profit of $38.6 million. The P-9 strike has become an intralabor battle of enormous proportions. On one side stand the leaders of the 1.3 million member UFCW, who believe P-9 should have signed the concessionary contract they negotiated with Hormel in

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1984 on behalf of seven other locals. "Local P-9 has chosen the wrong target at the wrong time," the UFCW insists, and since rescinding authorization on March 14th of this year for P-9 to continue its strike against Hormel, the UFCW has made "poststrike" payments to P-9 workers dependent on their willingness to sign an unconditional offer to return to work and cross P-9 picket lines. On the other side of the dispute stands P-9, which charges that "UFCW leaders have sided with and apologized for the Hormel Corporation." P-9 is convinced that with help from friends inside and outside the labor movement, it can stop the givebacks demanded by Hormel.

An intralabor battle this dramatic would be news any time. But what has made this dispute so significant is that it has come to be seen as a test case for the labor movement in the 1980s. When the strike began, David Moberg observed in his *In These Times* account, "It is a shame that the international union has not responded to the militancy and initiative of Local P-9.... It is clear that they have an opportunity to win with a determined, involved local that epitomizes what union leaders have been saying they need." Since then, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* have described the strike in terms more appropriate to the obituary than the editorial page. "Less a labor action than a defiant shaking of fists at large economic forces," was the *Times*'s version of P-9's "highly publicized failure," and two days later the *Post* completed the postmortem. "The Minnesota strikers were forced to fight alone in a battle they couldn't win," the *Post* declared. They failed to realize that striking in the 1980s is a "lost cause" and must be replaced by "middleground survival strategies."

Questions of Strategy

WITHIN THE LABOR MOVEMENT, the divisions have been just as sharp. Those siding with the UFCW leadership see P-9's difficulties as proof that, in the era of Ronald Reagan, the only way for unions to survive is through a concessionary strategy. "I am entirely confident that the international union in this case has given wise and sound advice," AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland observed at the organization's winter conference in Bal Harbour, Florida, before going on to say he had nothing to add to or subtract from the UFCW's description of the P-9 leaders as "false prophets." Those unionists lining up with P-9 are, on the other hand, just as vehement in believing that the "No Retreat, No Surrender" slogan printed on its members' blue windbreakers represents a strategy P-9 should be allowed to follow. They are convinced that Ray Rogers, the labor organizer P-9 originally hired to carry out a corporate campaign against Hormel and First Bank Systems, is correct when he says, "You can create a moment in history, so people can turn to Austin and say, 'That's where they turned back the onslaught against the labor movement.' "

The UFCW defends its Hormel strategy by pointing out that beginning in the late 1970s it was faced with a meat-packing industry in turmoil. Master agreements—contracts covering an entire company and having a common expiration date—with Armour, Swift, Cudahy, and Rath were undermined as conglomerates moved into meat processing, taking over the industry's giants, selling off their assets, and refusing to modernize old plants. The result was an industry plagued with bankruptcies, plant closings, and an upsurge of small, nonunion packers paying wages as low as $6 an hour. Its only alternative, the UFCW argues, was to make midcontract concessions with the remaining giant meat packers and focus its efforts on raising substandard wages at new plants. "We cannot raise the roof unless our foundation is solid," UFCW packinghouse director Lewie Anderson insists. Anderson and the UFCW leadership also believe that the concessionary contract they signed with Hormel in 1984 would have been much stronger if P-9 had been with them in the final bargaining sessions. Hormel had not, they point out, acquired its less expensive FDL and Dold Pack processing operations at that time and was vulnerable to a united front.

THE UFCW HAS NOT, however, been content to makes its case and then let P-9 stand or fall by a militancy it disapproves of. Unions that have attempted to send P-9 money via the interna-

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tional have had their checks returned, and sympathetic locals have been pressured to remain silent. Most serious of all has been the public war of words between the UFCW and P-9. The UFCW says it went on the attack in response to P-9's provocation, but at this point the UFCW's savaging of P-9 has gone beyond mere counterattack. The UFCW's principal targets have been Jim Guyette, who in 1984 won the presidency of P-9 on the basis of his opposition to more concessions, and Ray Rogers, the head of Corporate Campaign, Inc., which P-9 hired in the fall of 1984 in anticipation of a long and bitter struggle against Hormel. Rogers is described by the UFCW as the "Ayatollah of Austin," and together he and Guyette are seen as having "successfully manipulated" a naive local through a "propaganda stream" that "would have made Joseph Paul Goebbels's Nazi propaganda ministry envious." In turn, the rank and file of P-9 are portrayed as "innocent victims of Local P-9's extremist actions," men and women trapped in a "hopeless cause" that in trade union terms amounts to "mass suicide."

The UFCW's contention that P-9 will finally have to make the kinds of concessions it does not want in order to settle with Hormel could, of course, prove correct. P-9 faces an uphill battle against a company ranked 235th on the Fortune 500 list, and in the absence of AFL-CIO support its problems have been made even harder. It is easy to see why Lewie Anderson fears that the end result of the strike could be a nonunion plant in Austin. But one can also see why the P-9 strikers are not persuaded by Anderson. They point out that if the UFCW had adopted their anticoncessionary position in 1984, a united front would also have been possible, and they are not convinced by the UFCW's argument that it has turned the corner by virtue of the fact that the contracts it has signed since 1985 call for wage increases. They see contracts such as the $6.65 per hour one signed by Swift Independent Packing in Georgia as painfully low, and when they look at the overall wage trend in meat packing, they remain understandably fearful. The Bureau of Labor employment and earnings statistics show a continuing drop in the average hourly wage paid in meat packing since 1982. From a high of $9 that year, it has gone to $8.85 in 1983, $8.17 in 1984, and $8.10 in 1985.

As far as P-9 is concerned, there is nothing suicidal or selfish in going on the offensive in the fashion it has. "Our strategy is to win exemplary contracts from the stronger, more profitable companies like Hormel, and then use them to pull up wages and conditions at weaker plants rather than take some abstract promise of better conditions in the future," Jim Guyette declared in response to Lewie Anderson's assertion that his "differences with P-9 are strategic," aimed at "trying to build a solid floor against concessions, shoring up the bottom at the weakest plants, and then raising everyone's wages together."

When you go to Austin, what lies behind Guyette's opposition to the UFCW's "controlled retreat" strategy becomes more evident. In Austin it is clear that P-9 is not engaged in a romantic crusade nor led by a radical leadership out of touch with the rank and file. It is the rank and file that voted in Jim Guyette, voted out an executive board that favored the UFCW concessionary strategy, and by a margin of 1,261 to 96 opposed settling with Hormel on the terms the UFCW proposed in 1984. It is also, despite crossovers, the rank and file you see on picket lines that, when they are thrown up, are highly effective in limiting production at a plant designed to account for between 40 and 50 percent of Hormel's processing.

The Road to Refusal

What brought P-9 to this position of defiance is a history that up to 1984 was anything but militant. Although P-9 came into existence in 1933 with a sit-down strike, it was able to avoid another strike for the next 52 years. There was a logic to that record. Working in Austin at a family-owned plant, it was possible to be both blue collar and middle class at the same time and to have one's labor valued. Under the founder's son, Jay, Hormel instituted a guaranteed annual wage, emphasized production quality and labor-management cooperation, and through the Hormel Foundation, which owns 45.6 percent of the company stock, poured money back into Austin.

When in the late 1970s Hormel told workers

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that it was going to leave Austin unless it received concessions that would enable it to build a modern $100 million plant, the announcement came as a shock. But P-9 was not prepared to resist Hormel's threat. Fearing the loss of their jobs and the devastation of Austin, P-9 members agreed in 1978 to the conditions Hormel set for remaining in town. To help build the new plant, workers agreed to put their incentive pay in an escrow fund that would provide Hormel with a $20 million loan on which the company would not have to begin repayments until the plant was completed. They also agreed to a seven-year, no-strike contract and a 20 percent speedup in production at the new plant. What P-9 got in return were job guarantees and a contractual pledge that wages in the new plant would not be lower than those in the old.

The average cost to each P-9 worker for the loan to Hormel was $12,000 to be repaid at 6 percent interest, but in a period of economic instability in the packinghouse industry, the tradeoff seemed worth it. In 1981, however, a year before the new plant was scheduled to open, Hormel again demanded additional concessions from all its workers. This time the company wanted a wage freeze and in return promised there would be no plant closings in 1982. Although by virtue of its 1978 contract P-9 was in a more secure position than other Hormel locals, it agreed. The new contract seemed to affirm the guarantees of its 1978 contract. In the summary P-9 was given by the UFCW, the opening sentence declared, "The cost of living adjustment which is now in effect will be incorporated into the rates, and there will be no increase or reduction in rates for the balance of the present term of the contract and for the 1982-85 term of the Agreement."

When the new Austin plant opened in 1982, P-9 believed that at last its period of sacrifice was over. The new plant was the most efficient in the industry with Hormel-designed machines and robots enabling workers to can 440 Spams a minute and bone 1,600 pork shoulders an hour. By 1984, despite a year of record profits and public admission that it would have no trouble coming up with another $100 million for additional acquisitions, Hormel was, however, again pushing its workforce for concessions. Citing a "me too" clause in the 1978 contract that allowed it to lower wages if there were a change in the national pattern of wages negotiated in the meat-packing industry, Hormel announced that it intended to lower its union wages 23 percent, from $10.69 an hour to $8.25.

The UFCW responded by calling on the workers at its eight Hormel plants to strike if a better arrangement could not be reached. Then the UFCW negotiated a contract in which wages were cut to $9 an hour (they have since gone up to $10), with a reduction in benefits as well. The UFCW saw Armour, which Greyhound sold to ConAgra in 1983 and which had cut wages to $6 an hour, as its priority target. "The clearest threat to progress comes not from the company paying the highest effective labor rate of the pork-packing firms," Lewie Anderson declared. "It comes from the company paying the lowest rate of the big packers."

For P-9, Hormel's 1984 demand for concessions added insult to injury. The demand made a mockery of the 1978 agreement by which the local had helped build the new plant and, worse still, gave no indication that Hormel was prepared to stop asking for givebacks. As Jim Guyette would later observe, "If the newest plant in the industry takes a cut in wages, then the other plants are going to say they can't compete. If concessions are going to stop, then they are going to have to stop at the most profitable company with the newest plant." For P-9, which according to the terms of its 1978 contract could not strike in 1984, the ideal solution would be one in which all the workers in the Hormel chain would join in opposing concessions of any sort. But in the absence of such concerted action, P-9 was prepared to go it alone and not hinder a settlement other locals wanted to make. P-9 was convinced that arbitration would support its claim that because of its 1978 and 1981 contracts it did not have to take a cut in wages. That belief proved wrong. In arbitration P-9 learned that the "me too" clause in its contract prevailed over any agreement it had that wages would be stabilized. P-9 also discovered that protective language in the UFCW's summary of the 1981 contract was not in the final version.

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Bitter Intraunion Relations

THE RESULT IS A STRIKE IN WHICH THE intralabor quarrel P-9 wishes it did not have to fight has taken up as much time as the battle with Hormel. Although the UFCW never did mount an organizing drive against ConAgra/Armour, it refused to support the P-9 corporate campaign against First Bank Systems, which holds Hormel stock and is represented on its board of directors.

Since that time, relations between P-9 and the UFCW have worsened. The need to go it alone has, however, forced P-9 to be resourceful in ways it might not otherwise have been. P-9 workers and their families have formed a United Support Group that not only distributes leaflets at other Hormel plants but tours the country talking about the Hormel strike. As a result P-9 has been able to get around the financial crunch imposed on it by opposition from the leadership of the UFCW and the AFL-CIO. Corporate Campaign has raised more than $1 million for P-9 and developed an Adopt a P-9 Family program that allows locals friendly to P-9 to sponsor a strike family.

Despite the UFCW leadership, there has also been support for P-9 from within the UFCW chain. At the Ottumwa, Iowa, plant, 511 workers have been dismissed for refusing to cross picket lines set up by P-9, and recently UFCW Local P-40 at the Patrick Cudahy Company in Wisconsin issued a handout that warned consumers, "The strike in Austin, Minnesota, by UFCW Local P-9 against Hormel (the most profitable meat packer in the country) is very much alive." Across the country locals have also come to P-9's aid. Thousands of unionists traveled to Austin April 12th for a mass rally there, and in other cities P-9 support groups have been started. A March rally at United Auto Workers District 65 headquarters in New York filled the building to overflowing.

The key ingredient in the strike is, however, the determination that has been fostered in P-9. The Austin Labor Center, where P-9 has its offices, is a low brick building that blends in neatly with the Veterans of Foreign Wars Hall down the block and the car wash across the street. On the inside, the Labor Center has the look of a union hall from the 1950s. On the front entryway hand-lettered P-9 posters share space with framed black-and-white photographs of Harry Truman, Hubert Humphrey, and Walter Mondale. But what is going on inside the Labor Center is anything but a throwback to the 1950s. The Center has the feel of a combat headquarters, and that intensity is made all the more dramatic because the combatants are not just the P-9 strikers but their spouses and children, for whom the Labor Center is also a gathering place.

The P-9 strikers believe they have a sound strategy that is hurting Hormel. Despite the hiring of 600 replacement workers and an estimated 400 P-9 workers who have crossed their local's lines, the Austin plant is not operating at anywhere near normal efficiency. As the company acknowledges, production has not returned to prestrike levels. When the plant reopened in January after being shut down for five months, Governor Rudy Perpich called in the National Guard. Now the Guard is gone, and P-9 is able to close down the plant—without using violence—whenever it is willing to take the arrests that follow.

P-9's most recent strategy combines sit-down tactics from the 1930s and civil disobedience from the 1960s. At 4 a.m. workers drive out of the Austin Labor Center and head for the Hormel gates. They arrive long before the Austin police and the Mower County sheriff's deputies or the workers on the 6 a.m. shift. The P-9 strikers then park their cars as close as possible to the Hormel gates and lock the doors, taking their keys with them. Next the strikers scheduled to be arrested that day wedge themselves between the cars and the gates. By the time the police and sheriff's deputies arrive in strength, it is after eight, and by the time the process of physically removing the strikers is completed, it is at least noon—too late for the early shift to get much done or for a plant with the technology for killing 750 hogs an hour to make up for lost production time.

For Hormel, these slowdowns are only the most obvious cost of the strike. The company is also paying increased distribution costs as well as between $600,000 and $1.2 million for special security. Most significantly, Hormel's biggest potential expenses lie in the future. The

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company, which has worked hard for brand-name recognition, is vulnerable to the kind of boycott the United Farm Workers achieved with California grapes and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers achieved against J. P. Stevens. Hormel Spam has a 73-percent share of the canned luncheon meat market. Its Dinty Moore stew has a 70-percent share of the canned stew market.

The real question is whether the threat of an expanded boycott and P-9's militance will be enough to force Hormel—which in the wake of its record profits raised its president's salary from $339,000 to $570,000—to back down. There is only a 69-cent hourly wage difference between what P-9 was asking for when it went out on strike and what other Hormel locals are currently being paid. But at this point, money is not the only item preventing an agreement. There is the corporate discipline this once-benign family business seems intent on exercising over its workforce. In the Austin plant the emphasis has been on speedy rather than safe production. "It was designed for the equipment, not the people," Kermit Thomas, a 38-year veteran of Austin's Hormel operations, insists, and P-9's analysis of Hormel's records backs him up. The union points out that there has been an injury rate 119 percent higher in the new plant than the old, with over a third of the plant's workers suffering time-lost injuries in 1984, the last full year of operations.

Some of these time-lost injuries have been minor, but in a plant where meat grinders, sausage stuffers, and skinning machines are standard equipment, many of the injuries are disfiguring ones that surgery cannot cure. A number of men have lost fingers on the new power equipment. There is also the ever-present carpal tunnel syndrome—a disorder that packinghouse workers are prone to as a result of the repetitive trauma of cutting meat and that ends in lost sensation and circulation in the hands.

P-9 is not going to settle with Hormel unless steps are taken to bring down the Austin injury rate. To help insure this, P-9 wants baseball-type arbitration on work schedules and standards as well as the 52-week layoff notice guaranteed under its old contract, and assurance that all strikers will get their jobs back.

What Lies Ahead?

AS SUMMER BEGINS, the immediate danger for P-9 comes, however, from the likelihood that the differences between it and the UFCW will encourage Hormel to stiffen its resistance. Charles Nyberg, Hormel's general council and a senior vice president, constantly reminds reporters that the international long ago stopped supporting its "maverick local," and Hormel has moved to make any strike settlement more difficult by insisting that the strike breakers it has hired since the Austin plant reopened are permanent rather than replacement workers.

Worse still, the differences between P-9 and the UFCW now seem about to be fought out in a long and bitter court battle. The UFCW fears that between now and September, when most of its Hormel contracts (the key exceptions are the Iowa plants at Ottumwa and Knoxville) expire, it will be facing a decertification election in Austin. On May 8th, the UFCW officially put P-9 in trusteeship, a step that, if upheld in the courts, allows the international to seize P-9's assets, suspend its officers, and run its operations. Under a trusteeship the UFCW could also go to Austin and renew negotiations on the terms P-9 opposes.

The UFCW's determination to take these steps was in evidence early in the spring, when Lewie Anderson said of P-9, "The strike is lost. Their actions are suicidal. The only solution is for them to end the strike, and I will try to get them their jobs back." The UFCW's April 14th trusteeship hearings in Minneapolis were held in an atmosphere designed to pave the way for the international taking over the local as quickly as possible. The hearings were held in the Minneapolis Public Library in a second-floor room that seats only fifty people. No tape recorders or cameras were allowed inside the room, and the press was barred as well. The scope of the hearing was equally limited. Although the UFCW constitution allows the hearing officer in a trusteeship case to formulate "whatever additional rules may be required to insure a full, fair, and expeditious hearing," hearing officer Ray Wooster made a point of limiting testimony to the question of whether P-9 had disobeyed the UFCW's order to end its strike with Hormel as of March 14th.

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The broader issues that P-9 wanted raised in order to explain why it had followed its independent course were never allowed.

For P-9 the only choice has been to challenge the UFCW's trusteeship takeover with a countersuit of its own. The suit, filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, seeks $13 million in damages from the UFCW for its "bad faith" campaign to undermine the P-9 strike and asks for injunctive relief from the imposition of a trusteeship. In the early rounds the victories have all been the UFCW's. Washington Federal District Judge Gerhard Gesell refused to block temporarily the UFCW's takeover of P-9, and in Minnesota Federal District Judge Edward Devitt issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting P-9 from removing any of its records or transferring money from its headquarters in Austin. How matters will go in the middle legal rounds now becomes the major issue. In its countersuit, P-9 has spelled out the stakes that lie ahead. "The imposition of a trusteeship in and of itself will have a crippling, if not devastating, impact on the ability of the local to carry out the will of the rank and file with respect to reaching a settlement with the Hormel Company," P-9 declared. "The membership will be hamstrung in their efforts to effectively organize and their bargaining position with the company will be severely undermined." A P-9 legal victory will limit this damage, but whether any victory that does not result in some reconciliation between P-9 and the international will be of practical use is open to question. At this point the P-9 strikers need—at a minimum—a benignly neutral UFCW that will let them carry on their struggle in Austin and use the militance that struggle has generated to work with other UFCW locals for a master agreement on the contracts that must be negotiated with Hormel by September. □

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Abraham Brumberg

Nicaragua: The Inner Struggle

Is There Still a Chance for Political Pluralism?

The first part of my report from Nicaragua in the Spring 1986 *Dissent* ended with a promise that I would deal with some of the countervailing forces that serve to moderate the centralizing tendencies within Nicaragua—what they are, and to what extent they are significant. I have chosen to examine this concatenation of forces with regard to one particular issue—the State of Emergency, imposed in October 1985, and still in force. An extremely controversial measure, the decree promulgating the State of Emergency, and its specific provisions, have been hotly debated within and outside of Nicaragua. I have chosen the State of Emergency as the lens through which to examine the Nicaraguan situation because of its sweeping nature, and because its provisions bear on the judicial and legal system, on the political opposition, on the ethnic minorities, and on Nicaragua's relations with the outside world. In the concluding segment, I shall examine that part of the draft of the Nicaraguan constitution—now under discussion in the National Assembly and the country at large—that deals with the power to promulgate similar emergency measures as one of the major clues to the future of the Nicaraguan political system.

Scope and Legality

On October 15, 1985, the Nicaraguan government decreed a State of Emergency, suspending for a period of one year nearly all the rights and guarantees contained in the 1979 "Bill of Rights and Guarantees of the Nicaraguan People." Both the manner in which it was announced (first on national television, by a grim-looking Daniel Ortega, flanked by the eight other equally grim-looking members of the National Directorate, and then on radio broadcasts repeated every few hours) and its magnitude produced tremors of shock, confusion, and outrage within the country and abroad. Among the rights formally suspended were the right to trial by jury, the right to free movement and choice of residence, and the rights to "individual freedom and personal safety." Two weeks later the decree was approved by the National Assembly, with some important modifications.

Examined coldly, the decree neither weakens nor strengthens measures already in force since the original State of Emergency of March 1982, which was enacted after a series of *contra* attacks inside the country and the disclosure of the *contras'* ties to the CIA. That decree instituted preventive censorship, abolished the right to strike, outlawed outdoor political rallies, and imposed restrictions on freedom of movement throughout much of the country. Worst of all, it suspended the right to habeas corpus of those arrested on suspicion of engaging in "counterrevolutionary" activities, and severely limited their legal rights in other ways as well. What the National Assembly passed, in November 1985, in effect reaffirmed the 1982 provisions, with two qualifications: strikes, public meetings, and demonstrations were permitted with prior authorization, and freedom of movement was restricted only in war zones.

The fact that the October 15 decree was substantially revised is not without significance. Nevertheless, it does not alter the sweeping and pernicious restrictions, nor does it explain why the Sandinista government believed the imposition of such restrictions neces-

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sary, especially on the eve of Ortega's trip to the United Nations.

All international legal documents on human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two U.N. Covenants on civil, political, economic, and social rights, as well as the American Declaration of Human Rights, contain a "derogation" clause that allows a government faced by direct military threats to suspend certain (but not all) civil liberties for a limited time, and for well-defined and patently compelling reasons. The first few emergency measures enacted by the Sandinistas in 1980 and 1981 in fact invoked this clause, as did the more comprehensive decree of March 1982. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan government has thus far observed the other relevant requirements of international law, such as informing the secretary-general of the United Nations of the specific reasons for enacting emergency measures, and the period they would remain in force.[1]

Organizations such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch, while severely critical of various abuses committed by the Sandinistas, never challenged their right to invoke the "derogation" clause as such. Yet it is notable that in 1984, when the numerical strength of the *contras* was at its peak (about 16,000, as compared with current figures of between six and nine thousand), and when the *contras* were inflicting heavy casualties on the Sandinista forces, the state of emergency was substantially relaxed. A year later, the Nicaraguan government claimed (and still claims) that the situation has vastly improved. A few hours before the decree was announced, Defense Vice-Minister Joaquin Cuadra asserted that the *contras* had suffered a series of major defeats, and that the present "correlation of forces" was wholly favorable to the government. Only five days earlier, the FSLN newspaper *Barricada* reprinted an extensive interview with Cuadra's boss, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, which had appeared in the *Washington Post* in September. "At this moment," Ortega said, "victory consists of the mercenary forces' inability to develop strategically into a military threat to the Revolution. . . . We have put them in a defensive position, which has no prospects for strategic, military, or political development because they do not have their own social base."

If these statements are true, how can the Sandinistas justify—to themselves and to others—the abolition of freedoms they had restored only a year earlier, when the country was under serious military threat? To dismiss it merely as one of those "blunders" that the Sandinistas maladroitly but frequently commit is little more than an evasion. The Sandinistas have indeed on occasion failed to appreciate the impact of some of their actions on public opinion at home and abroad (Daniel Ortega's purchase of designer eyeglasses comes to mind)—but a measure of such baleful magnitude could hardly have been made more palatable by being "handled" more skillfully.[2]

Targets and Victims

Before reviewing the possible reasons for this wave of repressive actions, let us examine its principal targets: members of the political opposition, the press, and the Catholic Church. During November and the first few weeks of December 1985, members of *Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado* (DGSE), a division of the Ministry of the Interior in charge of security cases, swooped down on perhaps as many as 400 people—leaders of political parties (including those represented in the National Assembly), trade union officials, and religious figures. Some were detained for a few hours, some for several days, and some for much longer. Some were released after vigorous protests from their parties.

The DGSE has been equipped, since March 1982, with the power to arrest political suspects without judicial warrant, and to detain them for an indefinite period of time before charges are filed against them. Such arrests did not mark a fundamental departure from the past. Yet the net was cast so widely, and the arrests came in such rapid succession, that there could be little doubt about their essential purpose: intimidation. Many of those detained for varying lengths of time were told they were suspected of crimes "endangering state security and public order" (that is, "counterrevolutionary" activities). Others were not offered any explanations—or presented with any for-

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mal charges—whatever. When I was in Managua in January of this year I heard of people forced to spend long hours in small, unlit cells, subjected to harsh interrogations and threats. Others told stories of being made to stand silently for many hours, of being deprived of sleep and family visits, of being deliberately "disoriented." None of the former detainees I myself—or the Americas Watch delegation—interviewed complained of physical torture. Indeed, as several human rights organizations have ascertained over the past few years, physical torture is not a method systematically employed by the security police. Moreover, in some cases (though not all), those found guilty of atrocities have been brought to trial. Given the treatment of political opponents in other Central American countries, this is something to be thankful for. But fear can be instilled by various methods—and fear, clearly, is what the DGSE intended to elicit.[3]

The second target of the new wave of repression has been the press, which means, above all, the single oppositionist newspaper in Nicaragua, *La Prensa*. Petty and arbitrary harassment of this newspaper, which makes no secret of its hostility to the Sandinista regime, and some of whose editors are patently sympathetic to the *contras*, has been going on for a long time. Until March 1982, censorship took the form of occasional suspension of the paper on the grounds that it disseminated false political or economic information that undermined national security and public order. Since March 1982, *La Prensa*—like all other media—has been subject to prior censorship. In 1984, when the state of emergency was amended, the government promised to censor only material of a military nature. According to the last Americas Watch report: "In the first nine months after the inauguration of Daniel Ortega as President . . . the extent of censorship suffered by the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* was less than in the period between March of 1982 and late 1984. In fact, what *La Prensa* was actually allowed to publish was the harshest criticism of its own government that could be read in any newspaper in Central America during 1985."[4]

But not any more. The state of emergency decree seemed to put the "Media Office" into a frenzy: as much as 60 percent of the copy submitted to the censor by *La Prensa*—according to its editor, Jaime Chamorro—has been excised, as compared to about 40 percent before October 15. Both figures may be slightly exaggerated. But indisputably there has been a significant increase in the amount of material deleted, and the censors have apparently abandoned any pretense of sticking to the letter of the law. According to a study conducted by two Norwegian journalists in December 1985, in which they examined the material censored from *La Prensa* for a period of two weeks (which is available to anyone who wants to see it), not only material bearing directly on military matters, and not only economic information bearing indirectly on security, but any items that reflect unfavorably on social conditions in the country have found their way into the dustbin. That includes, for instance, photographs of streets with no pavements (not a rare sight in Nicaragua) or of trucks in disrepair—anything, in other words, that contradicts the glowing stories and pictures, appearing in the Sandinista paper *La Barricada*, of happy workers paving the streets and smiling youngsters harvesting coffee and cotton under the blazing Central American sun.[5]

La Prensa has not been the only (though it is the main) object of reprisals. *Solidaridad*, a newsletter published by an anti-Sandinista labor union (CUS), has been suspended. A Communist party official told me that his newspaper, *Avance*, has been virtually "censored out of existence." In January, three newspapermen, two of them associated with *La Prensa*, were summoned before the DGSE and arrested for illegally circulating a one-page newssheet, *Prisma*. In November 1985, the Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) was informed that all of its publications must henceforth be submitted for censorship before publication—a step that would certainly curtail the dissemination of reports on human rights violations in the country. Although the three editors of *Prisma* were subsequently released, and Tomas Borge claimed when I met with him that his ministry did not wish to impose prior censorship on CPDH but merely to be provided with copies of its publications when they appeared, these actions obvi-

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ously marked another stage in the escalation of the assault on freedom of expression in Nicaragua.

Finally, the third target—the Church. The nature of the relationship between the Church and the Sandinistas is complex; I will examine it more closely below. But the effects of the State of Emergency on the Church were: the closure and confiscation of the first issue of *Iglesia*, published by the Archdiocese of Managua, in October, and the closure of *Radio Catolica*, also owned by the Archdiocese, on January 1. Open-air religious activities cannot now be held without prior permission. About 200 Catholic church workers, including thirteen priests, were detained for brief periods in October and November; they were fingerprinted and photographed, and in some cases warned about their alleged antistate activities. A number of evangelical leaders received similar treatment; they were arrested for allegedly distributing "counterrevolutionary" literature and for maintaining suspicious relations with certain members of the U.S. Embassy.[6]

Reasons and Pretexts

TO COME BACK, then, to the question I posed before—why? Why this sudden rash of intimidating measures? Why all this nasty and pettifogging harassment of parties that—with their small memberships, internal squabbles, and inability to elicit mass support—are scarcely in a position to threaten the government?[7] Why make life even harder than before for the country's single opposition newspaper? And what accounts for the new reprisals against the Church?

The government's standard explanation is that it had evidence that the CIA, having failed to turn the *contras* into an effective military force, was now determined to resort to "internal conspiracy, sabotage and social destabilization," and that the government considered it necessary to provide itself with "a strict juridical framework to control" this incipient threat.[8] Whether there was any substance to these allegations is one thing (which I shall deal with in a moment); the "juridical" argument, however, is too specious to be taken seriously. (Indeed, three high-ranking Sandinista officials told me that they regarded this claim as both "absurd" and "harmful.") To be sure, most governments—not excluding authoritarian ones—like to invest objectionable or unpopular measures with a cloak of legality. But the "juridical framework" had been in force for years; and the already existing "legal mechanisms"—such as the suspension of habeas corpus in cases of political offenses—could have easily sufficed to deal with any new challenges to the security of the state.

Was the new State of Emergency, then, perhaps simply yet another of those "salami tactics" employed by communist parties in Eastern Europe in their march to absolute power—which is to say, part of a grand design to emasculate and then liquidate the regime's political opponents?[9] I see little merit in this theory. As I noted in my first article, the Sandinistas' attitude towards their political opponents is one of suspicion at best, hostility at worst. Nevertheless, there is no discernible evidence that the Sandinistas are bent on destroying the political opposition; rather, their policies have been manifestly shaped by the exigencies of the situation and, frequently, by a desire to mollify both internal and external critics. The question, then, is not whether they stayed on course, but what made them depart from it.

In my attempts to get some answers to this question, I spoke to resident journalists, to diplomats, and to sources close to—but not speaking for—the government. Several hypotheses were advanced. One is that the emergency law was decreed in response to pressure from two of the top leaders of the National Directorate, Tomas Borge and Humberto Ortega. Borge wanted it because of his constitutional—or ideological—proclivity for harsh measures against real and potential "troublemakers," Ortega because of his hostility to the Church for its support of draft evasion.

A second possibility is that the Sandinistas had reason to believe that the forthcoming summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev would include discussions of "regional problems." If that were to translate into additional pressure on the Sandinistas to make concessions, the new decree could serve as a bargaining chip. Why not, for that matter, use

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it as a bargaining chip if bilateral talks with the United States resumed? (In early February Jimmy Carter visited Nicaragua; it is reliably reported that Ortega told him the entire State of Emergency could be lifted were Washington to stop financing the *contras*—a change from the previous position, which offered to trade an end to the emergency law for a complete halt to the war.)

Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the Sandinistas were genuinely worried that the *contras* (and the CIA), defeated on the battlefield, would indeed resort to acts of sabotage or to inciting public unrest. The Sandinistas themselves, after all, had used just such tactics against Somoza in the 1960s and 1970s: why shouldn't their enemies do the same? As one distinguished Western diplomat in Managua told me, there was at least *some* evidence that *contra* supporters within the country had been alerted to prepare "safe houses" and logistical support—including arms and explosives—for agents sent in from Honduras and Costa Rica. Whether this evidence was "conclusive," he said, was a different matter—but he added that the borders of Nicaragua were certainly porous enough to allow such infiltration.

Given the highly charged political atmosphere in Nicaragua, these explanations make some sense. Against the objections of those FSLN members who argued that the cost effectiveness of the new restrictions on civil liberties would be either zero or negative, the *comandantes* in favor of this measure asserted that Reagan, by the logic of his own words and actions, would be bound to embark on new efforts to destabilize the regime, and that plenty of evidence pointed in this direction.[10] Some certainly knew that sweeping arrests of oppositionists would cast further doubt on the FSLN's stated principle of political pluralism; they were overruled. There is certainly no dearth of political leaders who openly proclaim their sympathies for the *contras* and for Reagan's policies,[11] and people like Borge feel strongly that such leaders should be dealt with severely. Were they in power instead of us, he might say, they'd string us up from the nearest tree.

Comandante Bayardo Arce, another member of the nine-man National Directorate, might argue similarly about the increased censorship of *La Prensa*. In the 1970s when Arce worked for the paper, it actively conspired to overthrow the Somoza regime (for which its editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, was assassinated in 1978). As Arce's colleague, *Comandante* William Ramirez, said: "We know *La Prensa* is conspiring against us. I used to be a conspiring journalist myself. What they are trying to do at *La Prensa* we have already done. We know all the tricks."[12]

Much the same attitude characterizes the state's relationship with the Church—on both sides. Charges and countercharges are hurled, some true, some false. The Church, for example, charged the government with the forcible drafting of Catholic seminary students, contrary to its policy of exempting them from military service. There have in fact been no forced conscriptions of seminarians: in the only case about which the Church submitted a written complaint, the young men involved turned out to have been instructed by church authorities to pretend that they were enrolled in a seminary. In early March, at a luncheon sponsored by the Heritage Foundation in Washington, the vice president of the Nicaraguan Conference of Bishops, Pablo Antonio Vega, accused the Sandinista government of having murdered three priests—a charge that turned out to have no substance whatever. There have been, however, cases of petty and vindictive harassment: one of the more unsavory incidents occurred in 1982, when the government chose to display, on television, pictures of Monsignor Bismarck Carvallo—spokesman for Cardinal Obando y Bravo—caught in flagrante delicto with one of his female parishioners.

The political context in which these charges are made is, unfortunately, often ignored. And, in fact, the conflict is essentially political, not religious. The Church has been, for example, the single institution consistently critical of the draft, on the grounds that the army is used not to defend the country as a whole but the "Communist regime" ruling it. In pastoral letters and in homilies delivered by both the cardinal and local priests, Nicaraguans are urged to defy the government. Churches and church schools have given shelter to draft evad-

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ers and helped them leave the country. Before its latest shutdown, Radio Catolica was closed for two days last October as a warning to stop broadcasting appeals to young men not to serve in the army. The issue of *Iglesia* confiscated by the Sandinistas carried six articles criticizing the draft (in veiled terms); one piece referred to an induction center as a "concentration camp." *Iglesia*, incidentally, refused to register with the Media Office, claiming that it dealt exclusively (so Msgr. Carvallo, the Church's spokesman, told me) with church matters.

The Church believes—rightly—that its claim on the loyalty of most Nicaraguans, overwhelmingly and devoutly Catholic, is being challenged by another institution or power whose philosophy and program it heartily dislikes. Both sides exacerbate the tension. In 1983 the regime attempted to force Catholic schools—which educate about 30 percent of the nation's children—to accept the curriculum obligatory in state schools. The attempt was resisted so strongly that the government gave up its efforts. While Catholic school budgets are still underwritten to a large extent by government subsidies, now, in retaliation for the Church's refusal to adopt the national curriculum, all its school books must be bought out of its own funds.

Some of the reprisals taken by the Sandinistas have rebounded to the Church's advantage. Certainly its cause has been taken up vigorously by the Reagan administration, by the Pope, by *La Prensa*, by COSEP—the umbrella organization of large landowners and manufacturers in Nicaragua—and by various international human rights organizations. The tug-of-war played out by the two antagonists is sometimes comical, sometimes nasty. On his way home from Rome the newly-invested Cardinal Obando y Bravo stops off in Miami to celebrate mass with former Somocista leaders and *contras*; in interviews, he describes the government as "totalitarian," and in his frequent travels through the country, he delivers homilies and sermons in which he pointedly, and with copious quotations from the Gospels, attacks "tyrannical" and "unjust" secular leaders. In response, Daniel Ortega shrilly accuses the Church hierarchy of being "the internal force of American aggression," and Borge lets it be known that he and his colleagues have no intention of being taken for "idiots."[13] To make good on their threats, the Sandinistas then suspend *Iglesia* and Radio Catolica, and arm themselves with the "legal mechanism" to ban outdoor religious ceremonies. Yet in a manner that has become typical of this raging feud, the Church deliberately neglects to ask for prior permission, stages processions and outdoor masses—and more often than not gets away with it.

In addition, the Church's behavior strongly suggests that—despite its ringing appeals for "dialogue" and "reconciliation"—it is far more interested in keeping the pot boiling and thus, with the active support of the American administration, preserving its aura of martyrdom.[14] In February of this year, for instance, the Sandinistas sent two letters to the Conference of Bishops, asking for a meeting at which all outstanding issues, including the banning of the radio station and newsletter, would be discussed. As of this writing, the bishops have yet to respond to this offer.

Parts of the Puzzle

THE RECENT STATE OF EMERGENCY, then, can be explained in part as a reflection of the polarization of Nicaraguan society, in part as a typical overreaction to real or perceived dangers, and in part as a tactical weapon designed to strengthen the Sandinistas' hand in case of a resumption of direct negotiations with the United States. To call attention to the polarization of the country is neither to minimize nor to condone the Sandinistas' contribution to it. It is merely to register the obvious, if melancholy, fact that a siege mentality invariably spawns an ambience in which suspicion, paranoia, and unbridled hostility flourish. Under such circumstances, the question of who is really an enemy and who a stubborn critic tends to become moot. Discovering evidence before dragging someone into jail and subjecting him to harsh interrogation takes a back seat to flaunting one's machismo and showing the world that you are tough, vigilant, and alert to potential conspiracies.

The picture presented by the State of Emergency is grim—but not unremittingly so;

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gloomy—but not monochromatic. Indeed, countervailing forces operating within Nicaragua manifest themselves dramatically in precisely this context. To begin with, for example, the decree was greeted not only by a storm of protests outside Nicaragua, but by bitter objections within the FSLN's ranks as well. The *comandantes* found themselves faced with a remarkable show of resistance, in particular on the part of the nation's Supreme Court, most of whose members—including its president—are party members. In a conversation with the Americas Watch delegation in late January, the president of the Court made no bones about his and his colleagues' serious reservations about the decree. On the very day the decree was announced, he called the Court into permanent session. Shortly thereafter, he informed Ortega that in the unanimous opinion of the Court, many of the decree's provisions were decidedly "unjustifiable and wrong."

At the same time, the national assembly of the FSLN met in what I was told was a "stormy session," with numerous rank-and-file members forcefully demanding that the decree be either withdrawn or at the very least significantly altered. Six days later, in what was clearly an attempt to pour oil on troubled waters, Vice-President Sergio Ramirez appeared at a televised news conference. He admitted that the original wording had been drafted "in haste," and that the government would use its powers "selectively," so as to avoid creating "panic and apprehension." In the meantime, the opposition parties, too, went into action. For the first time, they all united in condemnation of the decree, demanding that it be immediately abrogated. (They continue to be united and outspoken on this issue.) The result, as noted before, was that some of the most objectionable features of the decree were indeed eliminated. What is not without significance, also, is that in the final vote not only did the opposition in the National Assembly maintain its stance, but that a number of Sandinista members also registered their opposition, if not by voting against it, then by abstaining.

Four months later, the decree remains in force—but often unenforced. By January, the wave of arrests had come to an end. Contrary to reports disseminated by the Reagan administration, the number of political prisoners remains the same as in the past.[15] The political parties—including those not represented in the National Assembly—continue to function, though under conditions that severely restrict their ability to broaden the base of their support. The conflict between Church and state continues unabated—though in this case, as noted before, the government has indicated a readiness to come to an accommodation. Should the bishops finally respond to the government's overtures, it is likely that Radio Catolica and *Iglesia* will be allowed to resurface. The reports of the CPDH, the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, have now been exempted from censorship. But the one issue on which the Sandinistas have given no quarter whatever is that sturdy and persistent adversary, *La Prensa*. That the government's attitude towards that paper is dictated more by animus and pique than by rational considerations of "national security" is illustrated by the fact that the government allows much more latitude to the six independent radio stations in Nicaragua, which have a far greater audience than *La Prensa*.[16]

There have been some more disturbing developments, too. One of them is the renewed outbreak of hostilities on the Atlantic Coast, after a year in which the Sandinistas had clearly demonstrated a willingness to make amends for past outrages, and to come to terms with the disaffected Miskito population.[17] Perhaps even more disturbing, in the long run—and more germane to the subject of this report—are some of the provisions in the draft of the constitution, which is now being debated in the National Assembly and in various "public forums" throughout the country, and which is to be voted upon this coming January. The most contentious and potentially alarming issue is that of the powers to be vested in the executive branch (for which read: the president). Until now, the president, not bound by any constitutional restraints, has had the power to announce a state of emergency, though formally with the assent of the legislature. Furthermore, these measures—for all their reprehensible features—have observed at least the letter of international law.

According to the present draft, however, the

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president's power to announce a state of emergency will no longer be subject to the three conditions stipulated by the International Covenant—namely, "necessity, temporarity, and proportionality." In other words, the constitution would allow him to justify its necessity not, as the Covenant requires, on the grounds of a clearly defined and verifiable "threat to the life of a nation," but merely on the arbitrary grounds of a "threat to the security of the state" (i.e., the Sandinista government). Moreover, he would be able to extend it for an indefinite period of time (with the Assembly not having to ratify it for ninety days), and for the country as a whole, even though the putative "threat" might apply (as it frequently had in the past) to only one part of the country. Coupled with some other powers to be vested in the presidency (such as control over the budget, declaring war without even consulting the National Assembly, and ruling by decree when the Assembly is not in session, which is to say for a good part of the year), the document certainly would go a long way towards turning the legislature into little more than a rubber stamp.

At this point two questions arise: First, of what importance is a constitution, particularly in a state ruled by a group of men determined to preserve their power? To which the answer is that if the constitution is ratified in its present form, the opportunity for the evolution of Nicaragua toward a freer and more pluralistic direction would be decisively squelched. But if the powers of the president are curbed, and if the legislatures's powers (as well as, incidentally, the power of the Supreme Court) to overrule the president are sanctified by law, it would be infinitely more difficult for those forces straining to push the country in a more authoritarian direction to have their way. In addition, this would provide the opposition with greater opportunities to participate in the political process, to restrict the power of the FSLN, and to press for gradual liberalization and democratization of the system.

The second question is: How great is the likelihood that the present provisions to which the opposition objects will actually be incorporated into the final document? Here, I think, there is considerable ground for optimism. The opposition has in fact put the FSLN on notice: if it goes ahead with the present draft, it may precipitate an internal (and by extension an international) crisis. All six opposition parties may withdraw from the Assembly and, in the words of one of the leaders of the Democratic Conservative party, Eduardo Molina, announce to the world that "political pluralism in Nicaragua is dead." There is very little evidence that the Sandinistas would like to bring such a situation about. It would clearly expose their claims to "political pluralism" (not to speak of a "mixed economy" and other declared features of their political system) as a flagrant hoax. Popular discontent, now largely apolitical and under control, would burgeon, threatening the very legitimacy on which the Sandinistas stake their rule. Whatever support they still enjoy abroad would collapse. The Revolution would then stand naked and demonstrably betrayed.

It is precisely because the Sandinistas wish to avoid this somber eventuality that they are most likely to yield to their critics (among them not a few party members), and that the final draft of the constitution will turn out to be significantly different from its present version. For as in so many respects, so in this one, too, the Sandinistas have demonstrated a determination to preserve their hegemony—but not their monopoly—of power; an ideological belligerence combined with a dose of pragmatism and flexibility; a mistrust of political alliances, yet also a desire to forge alliances and to placate and accommodate their allies; a tension between suspicion of, and often remarkable susceptibility to pressure; above all, a desire to maintain mass support as the source of their domestic legitimacy, as well as the goodwill of the world outside as the source of their international legitimacy. They have presented a draft of the constitution to a special committee of the National Assembly (consisting of members of all opposition parties as well as the FSLN), and engaged in vigorous and frequently acrimonious debates with their critics, while maintainng that they wished to arrive at an agreement "by consensus." As a result, about two-thirds of the 221 articles—some of them changed to accommodate the opposition—have already been ratified by the committee. On April 18-20, several

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members of the comittee met with a group of American lawyers at an open forum in New York. The provisions concerning separation of powers, especially the respective roles of the executive and the legislative branches, were subjected to merciless criticism, both by the American participants as well as members of the delegation. The response? Grudging concessions by the Sandinistas that many of the criticisms were "just," and that they were prepared to compromise on these crucial issues.

The debates, the bargaining, the give-and-take arrangements that comprise the sine qua non of the political process, therefore, go on. And as long as they go on, the prospects for a gradual evolution towards a more open and pluralistic system in Nicaragua cannot and must not be ruled out. It only remains to be said that as long as these prospects exist, the wisest policy the U.S. could follow would be not to abort, but to encourage the ongoing political process; but alas, this seems too much to hope for. □

Notes

[1] Amnesty International, *Nicaragua—The Human Rights Record* (London: Amnesty International, 1986), p. 6.

[2] Interestingly, my European and American sources in Nicaragua believed that Ortega's Moscow trip—often cited as one of those "public relations" blunders—was unavoidable. Announced only a few days after the U.S. Congress voted down Reagan's proposal for more lethal and "humanitarian" aid to the *contras*, the trip shocked many representatives and outraged the American public; its effect was a dramatic congressional reversal on the aid issue. According to my informants, however, Ortega had no choice but to accept Moscow's invitation, and to leave as scheduled for a trip planned months earlier. The reason was economic: Nicaragua's oil reserves were nearly depleted. Its usual suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, were in economic straits and unwilling to sell their oil for soft currency; only the Soviet Union agreed to sell Nicaragua oil on a barter basis. The disastrous impact of the trip might have been reduced had Henry Ruiz, another member of the National Directorate, replaced Daniel Ortega; Ruiz reportedly urged Ortega to let him go, but the latter refused. Personal honor, not for the first or last time, seems to have triumphed over political prudence. It is, however, doubtful that the substitution of Ruiz for Ortega would have satisfied the House, which had defeated Reagan's original package by only a few votes.

[3] On January 24, while I was in Nicaragua, the Ministry of the Interior held a press conference in which it produced four men accused of having joined a twenty-five man network tied to the Democratic National Force (FDN). Three of them admitted membership; one, Jose Altamirono Rojas—a leader of the trade union organization CTN—vehemently denied any involvement with the group, claiming he had been repeatedly asked to join it but had consistently refused. He was released a few weeks later. The security police have on several occasions produced "self-confessed spies." The Supreme Court has protested this practice, and is attempting to secure constitutional jurisdiction over the special courts that try defendants accused of serious political crimes (*Tribunales Populares Antisomocistas*—TPAs). The head of the Supreme Court is a distinguished lawyer and member of the FSLN.

[4] Americas Watch Report, *Human Rights in Nicaragua, 1985–1986* (New York: Americas Watch, March 4, 1986), p. 47.

[5] The censorship practices continue. See "Nicaragua: What Censorship is Really Like," by Horacio Ruiz (managing editor of *La Prensa*), the *Washington Post*, May 6, 1986. In a response, the Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States, Carlos Tunnerman, accused *La Prensa* of engaging in lies about the situation in Nicaragua and Ruiz of lying about the real reasons for the state of emergency. He also stated—in line with numerous similar statements made by Nicaraguan leaders over the past few years—that as soon as the U.S.-sponsored aggression against his country ends, the government will lift the State of Emergency (*Washington Post*, May 11, 1986). Thus far, Washington has not been willing to call Managua's bluff—it's much easier to keep this low-cost war going, thus "proving" Nicaragua's "Communist," and the administration's impeccably "anti-Communist," credentials.

[6] According to a detailed report circulated by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (New York, March 6, 1986), only six evangelical ministers were briefly detained and interrogated in Managua in November 1985. All of them belong to the CNPEN (Evangelical National Conference of Nicaraguan Pastors), an aggressively anti-Sandinista group, which has openly called for draft evasion, and in some cases has been known to provide evaders with shelter and financial assistance for illegal passage out of the country. At least one member of the U.S. Embassy in Managua has maintained close links with the CNPEN, participating in some of its meetings, and facilitating its members' frequent trips to the United States.

[7] The one party that enjoys a significant measure of popular support is the Democratic Conservative party, a moderately left-wing offshoot of the traditional Conservative party of Nicaragua (now split into four separate factions). In the 1984 elections, it won more votes than any other opposition party, and now occupies fourteen seats in the National Assembly. An important clue to the future of opposition parties in Nicaragua, incidentally, and to their ability to carry out any meaningful activity under the restrictions imposed by the emergency regulations, will be the municipal elec-

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tions, to be held either in the spring or summer of 1986.

[8] "Behind the State of Emergency," *Envio* (Managua), November 1985, p. 11a. *Envio* is a monthly publication of the Central American Historical Institute (with a chapter at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.), a Jesuit body, which, although it provides useful data and analysis, is manifestly sympathetic to the official Sandinista position. Compare this statement with the one made by Vice-President Sergio Ramirez in the same article: ". . . What we are doing is precisely making use of the legal mechanisms that the laws themselves give us, through exceptional measures, to be able to confront these situations." (p. 14a).

[9] To my knowledge, the term "salami tactics" was first used by Matyas Rakosi, the late and notorious Stalinist head of the Hungarian Workers' (that is, Communist) party, in a speech delivered on February 29, 1952, explicitly describing the methods employed to eviscerate the still existing opposition parties in 1945-46. See my article "Matyas Rakosi on Bolshevist Strategy and Tactics," *Problems of Communism*, 4: 1952, pp. 28-36.

[10] However reprehensible the method of producing "self-confessed spies," it seems perfectly plausible that at least some of the *contras*' sympathizers within Nicaragua would be prepared at least to provide them with useful logistical information, and that the CIA would maintain a network of informants in the country.

[11] I have spoken to several opposition leaders in Nicaragua who made no secret of their sympathy for the *contras* and for Reagan's policies in general.

[12] Quoted in John Spicer Nichols, "The Media," in *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, Thomas W. Walker, ed. (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1985), p. 187.

[13] *Barricada* (in English), Managua, January 16, 1986.

[14] The Reagan administration has taken up the hierarchy's cause with a vengeance, often charging the government with a concerted campaign to "eradicate religion" altogether. In a statement delivered to the House Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs on December 5, 1985, for instance, Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, charged that the Sandinistas "use force to prevent the public from attending the Cardinal's masses." As anyone (including myself) who has been present at Obando's masses can easily testify, this is humbug.

[15] Memorandum by *Americas Watch*, May 16, 1986.

[16] According to the *New York Times's* correspondent in Managua, Stephen Kinzer, an editor of one of these stations told him that "we are able to broadcast just about anything, even saying that the Sandinistas are terrible administrators or that there needs to be more freedom in the country . . . .There are only two important taboos. We can only report official information about the war and we can't put anyone on the air who advocates dialogue between the government and the armed rebels." ("Sandinistas Are Often Tough, but the Political Debate is Lively in Nicaragua," *New York Times*, March 20, 1986, p. A8.)

[17] Important though they are, the intricacies of the Miskito problem are beyond the purview of this article. Suffice it to say that the sudden eruption of hostilities between the Sandinista troops and one of the Miskito anti-Sandinista groups, KISAN, in January and March of this year, threatens to upset not only the fragile truce that has been in force for more than a year, but perhaps more important, the negotiations about the autonomy of the Atlantic region, where several indigenous peoples—besides the approximately 120,000 Miskito Indians—reside. It is generally conceded by most outside observers, as well as by the Moravian Church that claims the allegiance of most of the Miskitos, that after the initial outrages committed by the Nicaraguan government in 1981-82, the government has made serious attempts to undo the damage, initiating talks with Miskito representatives and allowing about 14,000 Miskitos to return to their original homes along the Rio Coco, from which they had been forcibly evacuated in 1982. By April of this year, about 8,000 of them had crossed over to Honduras, after several clashes between Sandinista and anti-Sandinista forces. A careful study by Americas Watch (*With the Miskitos in Honduras*, April 11, 1986) concluded that the flight did not result from any abuses committed by the Sandinistas, but from a deliberate effort by KISAN, abetted by the U.S. government, to exploit the fears of the local population for its own purposes and possibly "to help persuade the U.S. Congress to fund the *contras*." The increased presence of Sandinista forces along the Rio Coco, incidentally, may well have resulted from genuine fears that KISAN and the CIA were planning to stage a massive military operation in that region.

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Denis Healey

Beyond Nuclear Deterrence

MP for Leeds East and the British Labour party's spokesman on foreign affairs, Denis Healey gave the following text as the Fabian Autumn Lecture in November 1985. It was issued as a pamphlet by the Fabian Society of England and is reprinted here with its kind permission.—Eds.

This article is an attempt to explore the nuclear dilemma which faces the world forty years after the first atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima. In the course of it I shall try to put some flesh on the bones of the Labour party's policy for defense and disarmament. It will be based on texts drawn from remarks by President Reagan and his Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger.

In his seminal speech in March 1983 when President Reagan launched his Star Wars concept, he said: "The human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations by threatening their existence"; and he made it clear that he did not believe that peace could rest much longer on the threat of mutual suicide. I agree with him.

Secretary Weinberger carried the logic of Reagan's remarks further in a speech he made on October 9, 1985: "The world has changed so profoundly since the 1950s and 1960s when most of our strategic ideas were formulated, that many of these concepts are now obsolete." He specifically rejected NATO's current strategy of flexible response by saying . . . "our position on the uses of military power represents a rejection of received wisdom about limited war and gradual escalation." And he described what he saw as the Reagan administration's commitment to make conventional deterrence work.

The insights and objectives thus described by the president and his defense secretary are very much those on which the Labour party bases its policies for defense and disarmament. Unfortunately the policies developed over the last few years in Washington, far from fulfilling these objectives, move in precisely the opposite direction. For example, the deadlock at the Geneva Summit over President Reagan's Star Wars program now threatens the world with an accelerating arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons. And this is something which the president warned his hearers very firmly against in his initial speech. In March 1983 he said: "If defensive systems were paired with offensive systems they could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and nobody really wants that."

Yet the United States is now committed to pursuing its Star Wars defensive program simultaneously with introducing new offensive nuclear weapons into its arsenal, such as the D5 submarine-launched missile, the MX ground-based missile, and perhaps the Midgetman mobile missile. The administration has said that the period in which "defensive systems will be paired with offensive systems" may last for several decades or longer. Indeed no one has yet suggested how it could be brought to an end once it gets under way—short of a nuclear holocaust. Mr. Gorbachev has made it absolutely clear that the Soviet Union sees no alternative but to follow suit in both defensive and offensive systems.

I believe nevertheless that it is both possible

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and necessary to carry the logic of the American statements I have quoted to a conclusion in practical policies for defense and disarmament. . . .

The Roots of the Nuclear Problem

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE NOT PREVENTED war outside Europe, even wars in which the superpowers were involved, like the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the American war in Vietnam and the war between China, North Korea, and the United Nations in the 1950s. At this very moment, fighting is going on in the Gulf between the Iraqis and Iranians which some believe has already cost a million lives.

Nevertheless it is difficult to believe that the post-war settlement in Europe would have survived so long without the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Yalta and Potsdam divided this historic continent into two against the will of most of its peoples along a line that ran through the middle of Germany, its most powerful state. Yet that settlement has already lasted twice as long as the 1918 settlement. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons must have contributed to this result.

Despite this, there have been growing doubts, not just in the unofficial peace movements but right at the heart of the NATO institutions, both about the strategies on which nuclear deterrence is based and about the role of nuclear weapons in relations between Russia and the West. These doubts have a long history, reaching back to the end of the Second World War.

When the leaders of the United States and Britain began to realize that it might be possible to use atomic energy as the basis for a weapon, the debate at that time was in many respects rather similar to the debate surrounding President Reagan's Star Wars policy. In Britain there were powerful figures in Churchill's cabinet, some on the right wing of politics like Lord Anderson and Professor Lindemann, who tried to persuade Churchill to tell the Russians about the atomic bomb before it was used. He refused.

But before long the Russians had been given the secrets of the bomb by their spies in Britain and the United States. The fact that they were never approached by their Western allies on a weapon which they knew to be under development may have been one of the factors which helped to produce the cold war after 1945.

After the bomb had been used against Japan, the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, warned Truman: "Relations with Russia could be irretrievably embittered if we fail to approach Moscow now on limiting the bomb as an instrument of war." A year later the Acheson–Lilienthal report proposed "a plan under which no nations would make atomic bombs or the materials for them." This plan foundered when Bernard Baruch insisted it should be backed by "swift and sure punishment" for violations of the treaty.

Then as now Washington was divided on nuclear weapons. In April 1945 America's secretary of state, James Byrnes, told Truman that the atomic bomb would allow the United States to dictate its own terms at the end of the war. He was later to admit: "The Russians don't scare easy."

Perhaps we can learn something from the mistakes of those early years. As it was, by the end of 1946 the pattern of the cold war had set and strategic considerations dominated nuclear thinking on both sides.

The Nuclear Arms Race Under Way

WHEN THE WAR ENDED, all the Red Army needed to reach the Rhine was boots. The United States was pulling its troops out of Europe very fast. Britain was demobilizing. No other Western European country was providing significant forces and Germany was disarmed. Four years later, the United States was persuaded to extend its nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, through NATO. That has been the foundation of Western European security ever since.

During the early post-war years, the possibility of actually dropping nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union before Russia had built up a nuclear stockpile of its own was discussed in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff produced plans for attacking the Soviet Union which, thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, are now available to the public. In 1948 they had a plan for dropping nuclear weapons

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on twenty Soviet cities. In 1954 they had a plan for dropping a thousand nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union. Yet the American government never adopted these plans, even at a time when it had a near monopoly of nuclear weapons.

By 1955, ten years after Hiroshima, the Russians still had only twenty nuclear bombs. Thereafter Russia's nuclear arsenal expanded very fast—in some fields faster than the Americans'; it was the Russians who first put a satellite into space. By 1960 they had intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 300 nuclear bombs.

Although at that time the Americans still had twenty times as many nuclear weapons as Russia, Christian Herter, who succeeded John Foster Dulles as America's Secretary of State, said in public that the United States would never actually use its nuclear forces against the Soviet Union unless its own survival was directly at stake. In other words the nuclear deterrent was already unreliable so far as America's allies were concerned. Until President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger, no American statesman since then has expressed such doubts while in office although many have done so after retiring—notably Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara.

Meanwhile both sides have enormously increased the number of their nuclear weapons, especially in the ten years between 1970 and 1980. The United States increased the number of its strategic warheads in that decade from 4,000 to 10,000, and the Soviet Union from 1,800 to 6,000. In 1985 America had 11,000 strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union 9,000. On top of that, both sides have a great number of tactical nuclear weapons. The total nuclear stockpile of the two great powers together is now over 50,000—the equivalent of well over a million Hiroshimas.

There has never been a period during this long, miserable story in which either side seemed likely to have a meaningful superiority over the other in the strategic nuclear field. All the experts including even Richard Perle, the Pentagon's prime hawk, agree that there is now effective strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the arms race continues unabated. By 1990, unless there is agreement on stopping the race, each side will have over 13,000 strategic nuclear weapons, if they observe the SALT II agreement; if they do not observe it, each side will have about 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

The Fear of a First Strike

MANY YEARS AGO Winston Churchill asked what was the point of buying more bombs simply to make the rubble bounce. We must ask today why on earth both sides are acquiring these colossal arsenals when they could not actually use them without committing suicide. Scientists now agree that the explosion of all these nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter in which human life in the northern hemisphere would become extinct. Depending on the nature of the targets attacked, the height of the bursts, and the weather, the explosion of even a small fraction of existing weapons could have a similar result.

Yet the reason for the continuing arms race is all too obvious. Whatever the original reason for the increase in stockpiles, it has led some people on each side to shift from the idea of having nuclear weapons in order to deter a war to the idea of having nuclear weapons in order to fight a war—in which, to use the American word, their side can "prevail."

An absolute precondition of victory in a nuclear war would be the ability to destroy the enemy's retaliatory forces in a surprise attack—or "first strike." The technical feasibility of a successful first strike may appear closer today in theory. Both sides have discovered how to pack a lot of warheads into a single launcher. In 1945, it took 700 pounds of nuclear explosive to produce a kiloton explosion. By 1972 it took only eleven pounds for a kiloton explosion. No doubt the miniaturization of nuclear weapons has gone further since then.

On top of this miniaturization, the multiple independent reentry vehicles (or MIRVs) which can be packed into a single nuclear missile are quite extraordinarily accurate. An increase of 10 percent in accuracy is equivalent to an increase of 100 percent in destructive power against a hard target. In fact it is now technically possible for each side to plan for carrying out a first strike against its enemy's fixed bases on land.

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Thus each side thinks it has an incentive to increase the number of its nuclear missiles so as to have too many targets for an enemy first strike to cover, or so as to be able to destroy the increasing number of enemy nuclear weapons in its own first strike. And each side can avoid the vulnerability of fixed bases on land by making its land-based missiles mobile or by putting its missiles at sea or in aircraft. Moreover, the moment either side thinks its enemy might be on the point of acquiring the capability for a first strike it may be tempted to preempt that first strike.

In my opinion the idea that any government would authorize a first strike even with the weapons which may soon be available, never mind with its existing weapons, is a fantasy. A first strike at present would require the explosion of at least 1,000 warheads on land, with a high probability of causing a nuclear winter. Even so, it would leave undamaged sufficient enemy missiles to wreak intolerable retaliation. The whole of his submarine-based missiles as well as most of his airborne missiles would escape entirely; these alone would suffice to blow up the world several times over.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency for the military on each side grossly to exaggerate the enemy capability because it is the best way of getting money for themselves. The United States Air Force first sought to deceive public opinion on this issue as far back as Eisenhower's time by claiming that Russia had 300 ICBMs, when the Samos satellite showed it had only 60. President Eisenhower, however, had sufficient experience to be deeply distrustful of the "military-industrial complex." He was not taken in.

Institutional and Technological Dangers

UNFORTUNATELY, NUCLEAR STRATEGY in the West today tends to be determined by tiny elites of middle-ranking bureaucrats and staff officers who have no personal experience of world war and are obsessed by esoteric theories—any civil servant or service officer who, like me, went right through the last war was forced to retire at least five years ago. These elites are predominantly civilian and are under no effective political control, partly because of the enormously rapid turnover of defense ministers in most countries. The Tories had nine in thirteen years between 1951 and 1964; since 1979, they have had four in six years.

Effective political control of nuclear strategy requires not only that the minister should work at the problem himself. He must also engage the interest of his prime minister and other key members of the cabinet, which is not always easy. President Reagan has often shown ignorance of the most fundamental facts on which nuclear strategy must be based. My impression is that the Soviet leaders keep themselves far better informed.

So far this bizarre comedy has not had any catastrophic effects in the real world because till now the strategic nuclear balance between Russia and the USA has been invulnerable to quite large variations in their relative capability, and to big differences in the composition of their forces. But the new weapons already under development on both sides, and in some cases already deployed, could upset that stability.

Each side depends for knowledge of its enemy's capacity and for early warning of attack largely on spy satellites; but each side is trying to develop systems for destroying spy satellites—"Asats"—which would rob the enemy of his eyes and ears and greatly increase the chances of carrying out a surprise attack. Secondly, many of the new missiles can hit their targets so fast that the decision on how to react to them will have to be taken not by human beings but by computers; this would be particularly true of the U.S. Star Wars systems.

The first time a possibly ambiguous warning that missiles were on their way hit the monitor screens there would be no time for the base commander at Molesworth to consult his own president, never mind for President Reagan to consult Prime Minister Thatcher. A situation in which the survival of the human race depends on the microcircuits of the computers rather than the human brain is a worrying one for anyone who knows how often computers can go wrong—the episode of the Korean airliner being one recent example.

Both sides are also producing a large arsenal of new weapons such as Cruise missiles which are designed to carry both nuclear and conven-

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tional warheads. If either side detected 100 Cruise missiles on its monitors it would have to assume they were carrying nuclear warheads rather than conventional ones and react in kind, because if it waited to find out it might be dead. Another danger of Cruise missiles is that they are easily hidden—particularly at sea—and would make it much more difficult to verify a disarmament agreement.

The third dangerous new development is the attempt to produce a comprehensive defense against strategic nuclear attack. The only man in the world who believes that Star Wars might make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" is President Reagan himself. None of his officials working on the Star Wars project believes that. What they think it may be possible to do—perhaps within ten years—is to produce some defense for most of America's land-based intercontinental missiles against a Soviet first strike, although that defense would probably be based at first on land rather than in space.

The State Department's official pamphlet about Star Wars says that its purpose is not, as President Reagan claims, to replace the nuclear deterrent, but to strengthen or "enhance" it. The possibility that Star Wars may have this limited ability for defending missile sites is an incentive for the other side to increase the number of its own missiles.

In any case, if America is really worried about the vulnerability of its ICBMs, it would be cheaper simply to scrap them and follow the advice of the poet: "Put these missiles out to sea/Where the real estate is free/And they're miles away from me."

The main reason why they do not take this obvious step is that American defense policy is still dominated by interservice rivalry. The U.S. Air Force does not want to give up part of the strategic triad in favor of the U.S. Navy. Star Wars is only one of the malign consequences of this rivalry.

Unfortunately, some Russians seriously believe—as President Reagan warned they might—that the purpose of Star Wars is to protect America's land-based missiles against a ragged response by the Soviet missiles which survived an American first strike. In other words, they suffer from a mirror image of American fears of a Soviet first strike. Moreover, American scientists now suggest that the sort of space-based systems America is trying to develop could be used as easily for attack as for defense. Indeed, if the laser weapons were used to incinerate cities, they could produce the equivalent of a nuclear winter no less than nuclear weapons. That is why Russia insists so firmly on implementing the Shultz-Gromyko agreement to prevent the arms race in space.

The Case for a Nuclear Freeze

IF YOU TAKE THE RISK OF INSTABILITY seriously, by far the most important task in the field of disarmament is to stop the nuclear arms race in its tracks immediately by halting the modernization of nuclear forces.

Stupendously excessive as they are, the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are not likely in themselves to produce a war. But the weapons on the way could well destabilize this situation. That is why in the Labour party we so strongly support a freeze on nuclear weapons as a first step to their reduction. We want a freeze on the testing and deployment of all new systems both offensive and defensive. We think it could be achieved by some fairly simple technical methods if the two sides agree on the objectives and on the cutoff points.

The first step would be a comprehensive test ban treaty which would prevent either side from testing new types of nuclear warheads. Scientific advances have made it possible to detect and measure nuclear tests even down to a few tons in yield, especially if you can put some of the new sensing devices in Soviet and American territory, where they could be staffed by neutrals. Six nonaligned countries, including Sweden and India, have already offered to staff such stations. The other way to guarantee the freeze is by banning all tests of the components of new nuclear delivery systems which can be observed by so-called "national means," for example spy satellites.

Gorbachev and his chief of staff, Akhromeyev, have both suggested in public statements that they would be prepared to permit research in laboratories providing there was a ban on observable tests. As far as I know the Russians have not yet put this proposal for-

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mally in the arms talks in Geneva. I very much hope they will.

A ban on such testing would let Mrs. Thatcher off the hook on which she unwisely impaled herself by agreeing to support Star Wars research, in the mistaken belief that it was impossible to monitor any sort of research.

If there were an agreed freeze, backed by a ban on the testing of new delivery systems and a ban on all nuclear tests, then it would be much easier to attack the problem of cutting existing arsenals. Both sides have already agreed on a 50 percent cut in existing strategic weapons, although each side's specific proposals are heavily slanted to favor its own particular interests. The job of negotiations would be to reconcile these differences.

Must NATO Use Nuclear Weapons First?

THIS BRINGS US TO A PROBLEM which directly affects Britain's security. NATO is likely to continue to need to possess nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attack so long as the Soviet Union possesses them. But, suppose there were a ban on the modernization of nuclear weapon systems and on strategic defense together with a big cut in existing arsenals which institutionalized nuclear parity at a much lower level: could America's remaining nuclear forces continue to deter a purely conventional attack on her European allies?

It is worth noting that the allies seem less worried than the U.S. about the effect of deep cuts in nuclear weapons on their own security. And all the European governments secretly share President Mitterrand's hostility to Star Wars. Indeed, the Europeans take the prospect of another world war less seriously than the Americans—something which is already causing trouble in the U.S. Congress.

In fact there has been no time since the end of the Second World War when Western intelligence believed that the Russians were planning to launch an all-out invasion of Western Europe. NATO has always believed that the real danger of war with the Warsaw Pact lies not in an attack out of the blue in Central Europe, but from the spillover of a conflict between Russia and the West in some other area, like the Middle East, or of internal fighting inside Eastern Europe, like the Berlin uprising or the invasion of Hungary. In such a situation nuclear deterrence is of limited value, because once the fighting has begun, deterrence has failed in its main purpose. The risk of relying on nuclear deterrence is that you might be involved in a conflict which nuclear weapons have not deterred, and to which a nuclear response is not appropriate.

Recent students of Soviet strategic thinking, like C.N. Donnelly, of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, reach the same conclusion by a different route. He argues that Russia is pursuing its aim in Europe by all means short of direct armed conflict, but that if war were to break out unexpectedly, Russia is determined to win quickly without using nuclear weapons "before sufficient time has elapsed for the United States to commit itself to a strategic nuclear war."

The possibility of war in Europe is there, however small. NATO must have a military strategy for reducing that possibility to the minimum and for stopping the fighting without a nuclear holocaust if war should break out.

Over twenty years ago, when I became British defense secretary, NATO was committed to a "tripwire" strategy under which the first significant movement of Soviet troops across the dividing line would trigger all-out nuclear war. My American colleague Robert McNamara and I sought to find a strategy which would be morally more acceptable and politically more credible.

We persuaded NATO to adopt a strategy of "flexible response" under which, if Western forces faced defeat in conventional fighting, NATO would introduce nuclear weapons in discrete steps, giving the enemy the chance at each stage to stop fighting rather than invite escalation to the next rung on the ladder which led to all-out strategic nuclear war. At the time this was at least an advance over the tripwire strategy, which Germany was reluctant to abandon. Moreover, the nuclear threshold had already been raised much higher by very substantial conventional forces of which by far the majority were provided by the European allies.

Over the last two decades, however, several factors have undermined the feasibility of flexible response. We now know that the electro-

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magnetic pulses emitted by nuclear explosions could make communications between the battlefield and the high command difficult if not impossible. There is no evidence that NATO governments have yet agreed on any guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons under flexible response. For both these reasons it would be impossible for NATO to control escalation as flexible response requires.

Statements by leading Americans have cast doubt on the readiness of the U.S. government to authorize even the first use of nuclear weapons. Other American statements appear to contemplate a nuclear war which is limited to European soil. For Germany even the limited use of nuclear weapons would mean the nuclear holocaust. And since the Warsaw Pact now has parity with NATO at every level of nuclear warfare, it cannot be assumed that it would pay NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at any level.

It is not surprising that many of those generals who have had responsibility for planning to fight a war in Europe have become highly skeptical of existing NATO strategy. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has made it clear that he is doubtful whether the NATO governments would ever authorize any use of nuclear weapons in a European war. He has complained that they appear to want him to take the fateful decision and he is rightly unwilling to assume a responsibility which must belong to governments. He has also recently stated that he does not think it would be possible to keep a nuclear war in Europe limited; on the contrary, he believes it would escalate very fast into a general nuclear exchange.

On the other hand, he says he would be forced to use nuclear weapons in the first few days of a large-scale conventional war because NATO is so inferior to the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces.

This view is widely disputed. The International Institute of Strategic Studies says again in its latest annual survey of the military balance that Russia's conventional superiority is not sufficient to tempt her to risk an all-out conventional attack on Western Europe. New estimates by the CIA of Soviet defenses are much less frightening than they were a few years ago. And NATO's new estimates of the ready forces on both sides are much more optimistic than they used to be.

However, to judge the relative capability of the opposing forces in an actual war it is necessary to carry out a far more sophisticated analysis than a simple count of weapons and manpower. Experts who have attempted this, notably Kaufman, Mearsheimer, Mako, and Cordesmann, all suggest that NATO forces could provide an effective defense against even an all-out Warsaw Pact attack if comparatively small and inexpensive changes were made in their organization, equipment deployment, and strategy.

The Road to a Non-Nuclear Strategy

NATO ITSELF HAS RECENTLY been discussing important changes in its conventional strategy. I believe, however, that the approach favored by NATO officials of striking deep into Eastern Europe, perhaps with very expensive and sophisticated new weapons, is inappropriate, both because it could provoke a preemptive attack and because Soviet strategy and deployment are changing so as to provide fewer targets for such Western weapons to hit.

In any case, there is not much point in being able to hit targets 300 miles behind the front line if the Red Army can puncture the front line and then spread out widely in West Germany. Moreover, the air-land battle strategy which the American forces in Germany have adopted unilaterally involves the use of nuclear and chemical weapons as well as conventional weapons, so it is quite inconsistent with a strategy of conventional deterrence or defense.

There is now a growing feeling among military experts that NATO must look in a different direction—towards a nonprovocative strategy of conventional deterrence which could protect NATO territory without using nuclear weapons if deterrence should fail. We in the Labour party share this feeling.

The first step would be one which already has wide support—from the Palme Commission for example. All nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from a strip, say, 150 kilometers deep on both sides of the dividing line. NATO commanders have long been worried by the

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presence in the front line of nuclear weapons which are inconsistent with any attempt at conventional defense and might be overrun in the first hour or so of a conflict; they talk of the "use or lose" dilemma.

Beyond this precondition for moving to a non-nuclear strategy lie three main fields for action to make better defensive use of NATO's conventional forces—reserves, barriers, and equipment. Each of these would require some change in NATO's present tactical doctrines.

The most important would be to make better use of NATO's existing reserves of trained manpower. If NATO's European reserves were organized and equipped even as well as those of neutral countries like Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland, the European allies could double their present contributions on the Central Front. Andrew Hamilton, a leading American analyst, calculates that Britain could in this way double its ground combat power in Central Europe for the cost of the Trident submarine program alone.

Other analysts calculate that the defensive capability of NATO's existing forces could be increased some 40 percent by the preparation of defensive positions in peacetime. I recently discussed with a Soviet general in Moscow General Rogers's proposal for laying pipes underground in West German territory which could be filled with an explosive slurry to create wide and deep tank traps in case of war. The Soviet general opposed it on the grounds that it would provide NATO forces with "an inviolable sanctuary"—the best recommendation possible, I would have thought!

The third main area for action would be the exploitation of the new technologies to improve defensive weapons. This would be far better than to develop expensive new weapons which may not work for deep strike against targets which may not be there. Already the Apilat Slingshot antitank missile can penetrate thirty inches of steel with twenty pounds of explosive at a range of 1,000 meters.

No one like me who, after six years as a soldier in war and six years as defense secretary in peace, has had the opportunity to discuss these problems with Russians and neutrals as well as with our allies can fail to conclude that security in the nuclear age will depend on working with one's political opponents as well as with one's friends.

This obvious fact is almost universally accepted so far as disarmament and arms control are concerned. Every negotiation on arms control implies a readiness by each side to limit its own defense efforts for the sake of cooperation with its opponent.

I believe that the same insight should also be applied to defense itself. Indeed, the Stockholm negotiations on Confidence Building Measures—which were singled out at the Geneva Summit as a field for early progress—involve mutual notification and observation of military maneuvers.

Even the slightest acquaintance with the nuclear problem rams home the fact that each side is driven by fears which are the mirror image of the other's. Would it not be possible to exorcise those fears by openly exchanging knowledge of one another's defense preparations—which is largely available in any case by satellite photography and signals interception? Then defense policies could be adjusted to minimize unnecessary fears.

Let me cite another idea from the speech by Secretary Weinberger on October 9, 1985. He then said that there should be regular talks between the military leaders of each nation and regular meetings at the highest levels of the Departments of Defense and State with their Soviet counterparts. On his side, Mr. Gorbachev has proposed that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should have such contacts.

This is an area where an honest exchange of views can do nothing but good. If at present neither Moscow nor Washington is prepared to respond to the other's invitation, Britain and Western Europe should take the lead in pressing for military discussions between the two alliances. Mutual confidence is the only basis for real security in the nuclear age. □

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Theodore Draper

Long Ago and Far Away

My book, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, was first published a quarter of a century ago. Its republication has made me think back to the circumstances that helped to bring it about. As I have reread it after all these years, I have felt that I would not do it differently if I had to do it over again. No significantly new material has been found; no attempt has been made by anyone else to go over the same ground.

This has also seemed a good a time as any to answer questions which I have sometimes been asked: What was my own personal connection with the Communist movement? Did it have any bearing on this book? I have no intention of trying to relive an experience now almost a half century away, but some of the main circumstances may still hold some interest.

I was active in and around the Communist movement in the 1930s. I was around it before I was in it. My initiation came in the National Student League, which I joined in 1930 as it was being formed during my first year at the College of the City of New York, better known as City College or CCNY. Most of its leaders were members of the Young Communist League, but I was not. I preferred being a "fellow-traveler," which was how I came to be around it. I was enough of a true believer to be convinced that, whatever its faults or shortcomings, only the Communist movement was capable of making the "Revolution"; a revolutionary, therefore, had to be close to it. Nevertheless, I was unwilling to give up a measure of freedom or absence of discipline, such as I could enjoy as a fellow-traveler.

This organizational distance did not seriously hinder me. The NSL was not an official party organization. It was a "mass organization," as the Communists liked to call it, or a "Communist front," as anti-Communists preferred to put it. My status as a fellow-traveler may even have helped me, because it could serve to show that one did not have to be a card-carrying Communist to hold a leading position in the NSL. In any case, I served as editor of the *Student Review*, the NSL's official organ, a role that I could not have played without the approval of the Communists higher up in the organization. The NSL was my first school of politics and the *Student Review* my first school of journalism.

A "front" organization, such as the NSL, prepared many of its members for taking the next step into the Communist movement. The line between one and the other was sometimes so thin that one behaved in the NSL the way a good Communist was supposed to behave. I still recall one such action with particular pain. I was inordinately proud and happy to have been admitted to City College, the only institution to which I could possibly have gone. I was glad to spend the hour or so that it took for the trip from Brooklyn, where I lived, to the uptown campus. Unfortunately, the newly-formed NSL was top-heavy at City College and weak or nonexistent elsewhere. At one meeting, the Communist party's mentor in the NSL, an older assistant professor of economics at Columbia University, deplored this uneven state of affairs and announced that a decision had been made to distribute the City College members. One was to go to Cornell, another to Wisconsin, and so on. I did not realize what was in store for me when he asked those who lived in Brooklyn to raise their hands. Dutifully I raised my hand. He pointed to me and said: "You'll transfer to Brooklyn next year." I was

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stunned; yet I transferred to what was then the Brooklyn branch of City College. It was one of the saddest days of my life. By 1933, when I graduated, the NSL at the then recently upgraded Brooklyn College was so large and influential that it could virtually close down the school on May Day.

This is not the place to go into all the circumstances of those years—the very bottom of the great depression, the overhanging sense of pre-New Deal social and political breakdown, the predicament of poor, intellectual, Jewish boys, and all the rest, often described by now. Much, though not all, of my own story is that of part of a generation.

The second half of the 1930s took an unexpected and yet explicable turn for me. In my first year in graduate school at Columbia University in 1934-35, I happened to find myself at some social gathering standing next to the foreign editor of the *Daily Worker*, the official Communist organ. Though I had never met him before, to my astonishment he told me that he was looking for an assistant editor and that I could have the job. I asked for some time to think it over; I was after all starting on what I hoped might be an academic career, though academic jobs were then in very short supply; my entire life was sure to change drastically if I accepted his proposal. Yet such were the times and my own deepest inclinations that I decided to take the job on the *Daily Worker*. I stayed there as assistant foreign editor for two years, and then spent two more years as foreign editor of the *New Masses*, the Communist intellectual weekly. Virtually my entire experience in the Communist movement was thus journalistic rather than organizational; they were the years of the Popular Front during which discipline was more relaxed and the political line more tolerant—within well-understood limits.

I left the *New Masses* early in 1939 to go to Europe to write a book on the coming war. Again the circumstance was somewhat fortuitous. I had made my first trip to Europe in 1938 for the *New Masses*, spending most of the time in Paris during the crisis of its Popular Front, in Czechoslovakia during its crisis preceding the "Munich Agreement" between Hitler and Chamberlain, and in Spain towards the end of its civil war. When I returned, the editor of a new fellow-traveling publishing house, Modern Age Publishers, asked me to go to lunch. After listening to some of my stories, he asked me point-blank whether I believed that war was coming. I confidently answered: "Yes." He then proposed that I should go back to Europe and write a book on why war was inevitable. He offered to pay my expenses for several months—I think the sum was $1,000; I was tired of working on the *New Masses* anyway; I accepted his offer and promptly left for Paris again. This book was never published; I wrote and rewrote it three times in the next three years; its fate was bound up with my own in the Communist movement.

I came back home in November 1939, two months after the outbreak of the war. I rewrote the book the first time to make it show why the war had broken out, not why it was going to break out. Just then my world came apart with the fall of France in May-June 1940, though it took me two more years to see that I was never going to put it together again. I had been able to go along with the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939, because I interpreted it in terms of ruthless Soviet *Realpolitik*; if that is what it took to protect the Soviet Union from a Nazi attack, so be it—an agonizing move in an agonizing world. It was the only way I could defend it from a still pro-Soviet point of view. By the same line of reasoning, however, I came to believe that the pact had outlived its usefulness as a result of the French collapse. The pact had sent the Nazis westward; with the Nazis triumphant in the West, it was now purposeless. The pact, as I saw it then, had lost its *raison d'être*. As I look back at it now, this reasoning was at best a rationale for what may temporarily have been good for the Soviet Union, not for what was good in the long run for both the Soviet Union and the rest of the world threatened by a rampant fascism—but even my constricted perspective was enough to get me into deep trouble.

I was still writing from time to time for the *New Masses* from the outside whenever the editors thought that I had something useful to contribute. As France was falling, I received an urgent request to interpret its significance. The

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only article of this entire period that I can reread without wincing appeared in the *New Masses* of July 9, 1940. It began:

> The French breakdown has transformed the balance of forces which existed in Europe and in the world at the outbreak of the war last September. Therefore, we now face new problems and new conditions.

I cannot any longer be proud of the article as a whole, but what got me into trouble was where it was right, not wrong. The editors entitled it "New Moment in Europe," some evidence that they understood something of what I was trying to say. I tried to hint that the Soviet Union was apt to be next by arguing that the Nazis were driven to move in "an ever widening circle of expansion for easy booty" and that the French defeat was only "a phase in a complex and continuous struggle."

The article was delivered just before the deadline and must have gone in without much editorial deliberation. With everyone stunned by the French debacle, and no party line on it immediately established, my article had squeaked through. I was asked to write another article on the same subject for the following issue and attempted to say the same thing in even stronger form. But this time the party line caught up with me as a result of word from Moscow. The Soviet press let it be known that nothing had changed, there were no new problems or new conditions, no "new moment in Europe." The Nazi-Soviet pact was said to be still in full force and ruled out any change in policy. My second article was never published. It was the first time that any article of mine had been rejected. I was suddenly faced with the kind of personal political crisis that so many had confronted before and were to confront afterwards.

It may appear strange in retrospect, but the issue as it presented itself to me then was not the pact itself. I had had no sympathy for the England of Chamberlain or the France of Daladier; I was willing to believe that they had been negotiating with the Soviet Union in bad faith; I could tell myself that the Soviets had been forced to protect themselves by making a pact with the Nazi devil as the Western powers had done at Munich not too long before.

Now, however, a different issue had emerged. Ostensibly it was over a matter of political judgment about an immediate situation. With France crushed and Britain almost mortally wounded, what was going to be Nazi Germany's next move and what bearing did it have on the status of the Nazi-Soviet pact? Was there or was there not a "new moment in Europe"?

I thought there was, and the party line said there was not. The real issue for me was whether to change my mind or at least stifle what I believed. If I gave way now, could I ever think for myself and still remain a Communist? Others had reacted differently to the pact and had made it the immediate cause of their disenchantment. For better or worse, I did not go that way. My course was more convoluted and took somewhat longer. I refused to write any more articles after 1940, but to avoid a total break I wrote some book reviews in 1941 and two or three in 1942, after which I cut myself off completely. I took some temporary jobs to earn a living. All the while a full crisis of conscience was upon me. I could not or would not change my mind, and I made no secret of my heterodox view. An editor of the *New Masses* called me in and warned that "that was the way Trotsky and all the renegades had gone." I did not go the way of Trotsky, but he was not altogether wrong. After the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, an emissary came to see me and said in effect: "You were right. Now you can come back." But I couldn't.

Yet the "break" had not been simple and easy. Strangely perhaps, it came for me after the Soviet Union had been attacked and the wartime Soviet-American honeymoon had begun. The reason for this cross-grained decision was that I had had about two years to think things over. I had come to see that I could get into the same trouble again if ever I disagreed strongly enough with the party line. The first crisis of conscience in the Communist movement is always the most difficult; it is then that one must decide whether to follow the party line wherever it may lead and at whatever personal cost. Once having made that decision, the next crises, which almost always coincide

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with changes of line, are more and more easily overcome. My friends of that period went through their own final crises of conscience a decade and a half later; it was far more difficult and costly for them. I was more fortunate; I was young enough at the age of thirty to start all over again and to look back at the experience of the previous twelve years as an inestimable, if costly, lesson. The lesson, I told myself, was to think for myself and never again get caught in the coils of a party line. Never again was I able to join a party or even a group of any kind. When I was inducted into the U.S. Army in 1943, I was saved from thinking any more about American Communism, at least for the next three years.

This bare sketch of those years may help explain something about my need or motivation years later to write the two volumes of American Communist history.

In 1950, I began to write for *The Reporter* magazine, founded in that year by the late Max Ascoli. It was not a full-time job; some time afterwards I began to think of writing a history of American Communism. It was probably a way of settling accounts with my own past, now far enough away to be less disturbing, but also a reaction to the kind of treatment which had been given to the subject. No more than two or three books of any consequence had as yet been devoted to it. Much had been published that was little more than anti-Communist propaganda. The curse of "McCarthyism" was then at its most virulent. From the outset, I wanted to do something that may have seemed to be quixotic or far-fetched at the time. It was to be a "traditional" history, such as one might write about any other political party or movement, based on as much documentary material as possible and satisfying normal scholarly standards as far as I could manage. It was not to be autobiographical at all, because my own experiences had in any case been too limited and specialized. Yet I hoped that those experiences might give me a sense of how the party functioned that rank outsiders might lack.

As I was plodding along, because I was working slowly and fitfully in my spare time, Whittaker Chambers's book, *Witness*, came out. Peculiarly, it had the effect of reinforcing my original plan. I read the book with more than ordinary interest and had known some of the characters in it, though not the way Chambers had known them. I had no trouble believing that Chambers was telling a true story to the best of his ability. Yet that story was a very special one, very far from my own experience or that of anyone I had known. Underground Soviet "couriers" might be recruited in the party but they did not work in the party; they were few in number and hardly represented the typical Communist such as I had known. It seemed to me that a serious, scholarly study of the Communist Party as it operated above ground and in ordinary circumstances with ordinary people was more necessary than ever in order to understand its program, policies, and members.

I had never met Chambers and had known nothing about him other than what he told about himself in his book. By chance, however, our paths once crossed as a result of my research and his book.

One of my favorite characters had come to be a Hungarian Communist who was known in Moscow as Joseph Pogany and in the United States in the early 1920s as John Pepper. He was considered to be the Comintern's representative from 1922 to 1925 and behaved as the *éminence grise* of the American party. I began to look for people who might have known him in his American incarnation—not an easy task a quarter of a century later. Suddenly, I was startled to come across a reference to Joseph Pogany and his alleged brother. It turned up in, of all places, the *Saturday Evening Post*, which was serializing Chambers's book before its appearance. One sentence leaped out of the page at me—that a well-known artist and illustrator, Willy Pogany, was supposedly the legendary Joseph's brother. The sentence does not appear in Chambers's book, for good reason.

How to find Willy? I asked dozens of people who might have known him for any scrap of information. No one seemed to have heard about him for years. Then I had an inspiration that had worked for me in the past. I looked in the New York telephone book. There was Willy Pogany, listed living not far away from

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me in Manhattan. I immediately picked up the phone, called the number, and heard a richly Hungarian voice on the other end. It was Willy. I did not think it prudent to tell him the whole story on the phone; I merely said that I wanted to talk to him about his brother. At this, Willy seemed to take as much interest in me as I was taking in him. He told me to come right down to see him.

I found Willy in a well-known residence for artists at Central Park West and 72nd Street. I came into a huge studio—paintings all around, someone posing in the distance for one of Willy's illustrations. Willy was a type-cast Hungarian as well as the seemingly typical artist of long ago. He quickly brought me to a far corner, where we spoke in whispers. I explained to him what I was doing, how I had read about his brother Joseph in Chambers's article, and why I wanted to know more about him. Willy listened gloweringly. When I had finished, he burst out to this effect: "Oh, that terrible man Chambers! He has cost me a million dollars! I am suing him! He can't do this to me!"

It turned out that Chambers had made a mistake. Willy did have a brother, but he was a specialist in Hungarian folklore and had never left Hungary. Willy claimed that he had lost a million dollars in commissions as a result of Chambers's mistaken identification of him as the brother of the infamous Comintern agent, Joseph Pogany. Willy won me over completely as he looked me straight in the eyes and said with a sincerity that clearly came from the heart: "I am an artist. I care only about money, not politics." That endeared him to me; Willy was obviously a man who could be trusted.

UNFORTUNATELY, I WAS NO MATCH FOR WILLY. One day, as I was looking up someone else in a book of the 1920s, *American Labor Who's Who*, edited by Solon De Leon, my eyes fell on a totally unexpected entry. Almost half a column was devoted to none other than Willy Pogany. It clearly indicated that he had once been interested in left-wing causes and politics, both in England and in the United States, instead of, or as well as, money. I immediately realized that Chambers had had some reason to associate Willy with Joseph, though Chambers had assumed too much or had vaguely recalled the similarity of their names. In any case, the reference to Willy as Joseph's brother was no longer without reason or malicious.

IT WAS TOO GOOD A STORY TO KEEP TO MYSELF; I could not resist telling it to some friends, one of whom was by chance a friend of Chambers. He straightway told the story to Chambers, who quickly tried to get a copy of the book. It had been long out of print; Chambers called to ask if he could borrow my copy. He came for it early one evening, expressed his gratitude and asked whether he could do anything for me in return. Unfortunately, it was dinner time, and I began to receive frantic signals to get rid of our guest or risk losing dinner. I chose dinner, regretfully, and missed my one chance to have a good talk with Chambers. I later learned that his lawyer had presented the page on Willy in *American Labor Who's Who* to the judge and that it had helped to convince him to dismiss the case. I wish it could be said that I had saved Whittaker Chambers a million dollars, but I doubt whether Willy had a case that could have brought him a million or a thousand cents. Willy at that stage of his life was long past his prime, and his loss of a million dollars in commissions must have been wishful thinking.

Too much research can ruin the best of stories. I later learned that Joseph's name had not been Pogany at all; it had apparently been Schwarcz; he had adopted Pogany during his revolutionary career in Hungary and the name was something like the Hungarian equivalent of Smith or Cohen. If I had known that, I would never have called Willy in the first place. I sometimes wondered whether Willy was a real Pogany, but I never did any more research on him.

Yet Chambers's book continued to serve a negative purpose. I was still determined to write an altogether different kind of work on the American Communist movement, one far more recognizable by the hundreds of thousands of people who have passed through it and far more relevant to their everyday activities. I could not hope to match Chambers's sensational story, but I might produce something of greater historical interest as the political mood of the 1950s receded and faded away.

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Meanwhile, I was not making as much progress on my history as I would have liked. Earning a living still came first, writing a book was a luxury at my own expense. At this point, a deus ex machina appeared to save me.

It was the Fund for the Republic, which had been set up in 1952 as an autonomous organization by the Ford Foundation. Three years later, it undertook to sponsor a large-scale study of American Communism under the direction of the late Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University. He gathered together a group of scholars and assigned them to write on various aspects of American Communism. The history was entrusted to Professor David A. Shannon, then of the University of Wisconsin, who had written a well-known work on the history of American Socialism. One of Rossiter's group was Professor Daniel Bell, then at Columbia University, who knew of my own project. I think it was Bell who persuaded Rossiter that it was pointless for two people to be working on the same subject at that time and suggested that I should be brought into the group. In any case, I met with Rossiter and Shannon; it was amicably agreed that I would write the history from the origins to 1945, as I had intended, and that Shannon would take on the post-war, post-Browder story after 1945. Rossiter gave me two years to do the whole job. I was now free to devote myself wholly to the book on which I had been working without as yet being able to see the beginning of the end.

Freed from other cares and diversions, I now really dug into the period that had come to interest me the most—the formative period. I suppose that formative periods have a special appeal for historians; the roots are more deeply and secretively revealing than the trees. I was drawn to the formative period because it became clear to me, as I studied the 1930s, that the old-timers who still dominated the party in every way had been molded politically in the previous decade and were responding to a doctrinal discipline that had been instilled in them in the past.

Two years later, I finished a book, but not *the* book. Unfortunately, it was the wrong book. I woke up one day to realize that I had written a book which ended in 1923, a turning-point in the story. It had been a job of historical excavation, because I had known nothing about it and some of the most important figures in it had been wiped out of the party's historical memory. I was faced with a problem; 1923 was too far from 1945 to make up a plausible alibi. I could not expect anyone else to know what the significance of 1923 was and why it had become my stopping-point. Yet, somehow, without intending it, I had produced a book on the formative period of the formative period; it had a beginning, a middle, and an end; it was a book, I knew, if the wrong one.

It was useless for me to explain in advance what had happened and why. Only if Rossiter could be made to read the entire manuscript without prejudice was he likely to accept it as an accomplished fact. I telephoned him and simply announced that I had finished a book. He was delighted. I received a call from him a few days later. "You bastard," he shouted, "you've deceived me." I pleaded guilty; there was nothing else to do. After he had calmed down, I gently enquired what he thought of the manuscript as it stood. His tone changed as he said: "You were right about it. There's nothing you can do with it now. Let's publish it. But don't do it again!"

It was my luck that the Fund for the Republic and Rossiter's project desperately needed to show some signs of life. My book was the first to be finished; no other was likely to come forth for some time, perhaps for some years. Thus *The Roots of American Communism* appeared in 1957. It was favorably reviewed, especially by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in the *New York Times Book Review* of March 10—the first "systematic effort to weave all aspects—doctrinal, organizational, personal—in a coherent critical narrative . . . careful and exhaustive job . . . indispensable foundation for any understanding of American communism." But a strangely hostile news article, filling all of one column, signed by Will Lissner, appeared in the *New York Times* the very next day. It hinted that there was something sinister about my references to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which was hardly my subject. Lissner referred to some mysterious research by the U.S. Air Force and unnamed important foundations as evidence of my heresy.

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This surprise attack from an unexpected quarter brought a letter of protest from George F. Kennan, whom I then did not know personally. Kennan objected that the news story "gives the impression Draper has challenged respectable interpretations of the Russian Revolution and that this was in some way connected with his former connections with the Communist movement." In Kennan's opinion, "Mr. Draper has done his work and presented his findings with scholarly detachment and restraint," and he called for judging the book "as historical scholarship not just an item in current political controversy." Lissner replied testily in another letter that I had "ignored" various theories about the Russian Revolution and that he did not accept Kennan's "uncritical appeal to his own authority." A much more vicious campaign against me was launched by the Hearst press and elsewhere, without making any visible impression on the Fund for the Republic or me. Rossiter, an Eisenhower Republican, did not make the slightest concession to this incitement. The incident is worth recalling to recapture something of the still charged political atmosphere in which the first volume appeared.

Rossiter agreed to give me two more years to finish the original plan. The goal was still 1945. I worked and worked—and to my horror again produced the "wrong" book. This time I managed to get to 1929, another turning-point in the story. Again I sent it to Rossiter without an explanation; again he must have shuddered, again he protested, and again agreed that it should be published. *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, which at least covered the entire formative period, appeared in 1960. I hoped and intended to go on, if only the Fund could continue to support me financially. Unfortunately, Rossiter had by now run out of funds. I agreed to wait a year before giving up. The year ran out without result, and I spent the next five years working on Castro's Cuba instead of on American Communism. In later years, I tried twice to return to what was darkly referred to as "Volume Three," but I could never manage it to my satisfaction. I had lost the momentum of the first two volumes; my life and mood had changed too much; I finally decided that someone else would have to take on the task of filling in the missing years. Yet I seemed to block the way, because I had amassed much of the documentary material necessary to do the job.

In subsequent years, I was busy with other things and paid little attention to the vagaries of American Communism, which had shrunk to a small, minor sect. After its flirtation with the Browder heresy, it seemed to have become inoculated against any unorthodox ideas. Of all the Communist parties in the West it remained most subservient to the cult of the Soviet Union. Right-wing demagogues did not even bother to attack it any more.

Still, my failure to finish the task that I had taken on rankled. I did nothing about it, beyond hoping that someone would somehow turn up to make good my malfeasance. Some time in the 1970s, someone did. He was Professor Harvey Klehr of Emory University, who had written a book on the "cadre" of the American Communist movement that had impressed me. His book, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade*, appeared in 1984. I had made my documentary material available to him but otherwise had nothing to do with the way he went about his work.

Klehr was not the only young scholar who in the 1970s had been taking an interest in American Communism. Indeed, a new generation of younger scholars or would-be scholars had made the subject something of a lively academic growth industry. Klehr's book, and his well-known association with me, which he clearly explained in his preface, brought new attention to my own previous work. The old issues were raised anew, but now in a different light.

After watching the development of the new school for some time, I decided that I could no longer ignore it. My reaction to it took the form of a long article, published in two parts, in the *New York Review of Books* of May 9 and 30, 1985. It seemed to be a fitting epilogue to the present work, though most of the argument is about the 1930s rather than the 1920s. Yet the line between the two decades is not a hard and fast one; the earlier in my view explains much

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about the later one, especially why the latter turned out the way it did. It is, moreover, a mistake to think of the Communism of the 1930s as if it were a monolith; the first half was distinctly different from the second half, though some writers on the 1930s came of age politically in the second half and have given it undue emphasis as if it were typical of the entire decade. I happened to have come of age politically in the first half of the 1930s, a circumstance that perhaps explains why I was so deeply interested in its roots in the previous decade and why I was willing to spend some years trying to understand it. □

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A Man With Many Names

From Hungary's Buried Past

The following interview with László Rajk *was conducted by a German writer,* Hans-Henning Paetzke. *It has been slightly condensed for reasons of space.* — Eds.

Hans-Henning Paetzke: Mr. Rajk, you were born on January 26, 1949. Your father, after whom you are named, was minister of the interior and later foreign minister in the post-World War II regime of the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi. You were four months old when your father was arrested by the Hungarian secret police, the ÁVH. He was to be the first "imperialist agent and traitor" condemned to death in Hungary's first Stalinist show trial. He was executed on October 15, 1949 and buried in an unmarked grave. On October 6, 1956, after his posthumous rehabilitation, he was given a new burial, with honor, at which some 250,000 people showed up.

At this point, however, I would like to ask: What happened to the son of an executed state official?

Laszlo Rajk: My mother was arrested two weeks after my father. I can only relate what she has told me, since I was only four months old at the time. First, my mother and my grandmother were put under house arrest. And then, after my mother was taken away, they "naturally" removed my grandmother too. I was abducted, simply gone. No one knew where I had been taken.

At the age of 16, in order to obtain the usual identity papers, I had to go to the registry office to get my birth certificate. The registrar took a volume from the shelf and opened it to a page with a pasted-in postscript that folded out like an accordion. It read: "László Rajk. Born on January 26, 1949. Father's name: László Rajk. Mother's name: Julianna Földi." And then, for May 1949, when I was four months old, there was another thin, glued-in strip that read: "The Hungarianization of László Rajk, at his own request." That is how I became István Kovács. "Father's name: László Kovács. Mother's name: Julianna Földi." My mother's name wasn't changed.

P: You mean to say that as an infant you had applied for the "Hungarianization" of your name?

R: Yes. And you should know that István Kovács is one of the most common Hungarian names, much like the German Müller or Schmidt. I couldn't even keep my first name. When I was about one and a half years old, the register entry continued, another "Hungarianization" of my name took place. I then became László Kovács, again "at my own request." I had won back my own first name. Father's name: László Kovács. Mother's name: Julianna Földi. After that, my name went through two more changes; László Kovács became István Györk and, finally, my own name, László Rajk, was returned to me.

In 1956, when my mother requested the return of the name Rajk, she had to obtain my birth certificates at the registry office. This is every citizen's normal right. Nonetheless, it seemed absurd that I had so many birth certificates! Today I possess a collection of documents that attest to the metamorphosis of my own names as well as those of my mother. Even one of my father's death certificates is issued under a false name. . . . Strange things happen between heaven and earth. . . .

But now I was standing in the registry office; I was 16 years old. The registrar, an old man, was shifting his weight from one leg to the

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other. As we were talking, I sensed he wanted to tell me something. It finally came out that he was ashamed to stand there before me because he had come by his job after his predecessor refused to forge the first entry of my name. He had said that a name was something holy, something a man couldn't tamper with, and he was fired.

In the children's home where I spent my first years, I went under the names of István Kovács and László Kovács. This was one of the most modern children's homes in Hungary, a good place. It was full of children whose parents had been put in prison. During the entire time I spent there, neither my mother, her mother, nor her sister had any idea of my whereabouts. I simply had vanished. But being strong-willed, they hacked at the party bureaucracy, demanding my return—which in those days was a rather dangerous thing to do. They insisted that a child could not be raised responsibly away from his home.

After Stalin's death in 1953, I was returned in a way befitting my abduction. My aunt received news that she should go to the corner of Bulcsu utca and Lehl at eight o'clock in the morning. She went at the appointed time, and a black Pobeda with the usual dark drawn curtains came to a stop and let out a child. The car sped away. I was that child. When I didn't respond to my name, my aunt and my grandmother began guessing—more or less the way you would guess how best to talk to a dog who has come to play with you. I responded to the name of Pista, the diminutive of István.

Not knowing whether my mother was dead or alive and having received no news from her, my aunt adopted me. This was necessary in order to receive food coupons. Hungary was rationing everything then. Another document in the birth registry attests to the fact that László Kovács was adopted by such and such a family, becoming István György. István, because the György family already had a son named László. (My adoptive parents were registered as Lajos György and wife.) This remained the case until my mother's release from prison in 1954. Even then we didn't get our names back immediately. For a long time to come, my mother's identity papers were issued under the name of Julianna György. And with the state bureaucracy's usual muddling, our electric bills continued to come addressed to this name until 1963, although everyone knew by then who we were and what was behind it all.

□

P: Politically, the years 1953–54 brought the first thaw in Stalinist Hungary. . . .

R: During that time I grew up in our family believing that my aunt was my mother and my uncle my father.

P: Weren't you informed of the real facts?

R: No. I don't imagine it's easy to tell an adopted child the facts. Besides, the adoption wasn't merely an administrative procedure. I was sure, quite simply, that my aunt and my uncle were my parents. I found out the truth after my mother was released from prison in 1954. She went to the only safe place she had, her sister's apartment—not knowing I was there. They simply set her free—put her out the prison gate—and she made her way home to the tiny flat where my aunt and my uncle, their two sons, my grandmother, and I lived. Months passed during which I ran to my aunt instead of my mother when I wanted comforting.

P: I still don't understand why your aunt couldn't find the courage to tell you the truth.

R: I believe that at first she honestly didn't know whether my mother was alive or dead. The fact that mother had received a five-and-a-half-year sentence was published nowhere. Those on the outside knew nothing about those on the inside, in the prisons. For anyone who wasn't politically astute, the situation in Hungary didn't look as if much was changing. My adoptive parents may have decided that, for my own protection, it was better not to tell me the truth. Both had suffered bitterly as the result of what had happened to my father and mother. Blacklisted and forced to live on various marginal jobs, they kept their distance from politics.

P: Can you remember when your mother told you who she really was?

R: We went on vacation together—just the

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two of us. During the train ride to Lake Balaton, she told me who she was. She must have been quite hurt when I simply declared: "Good. From now on I'll call you 'mama,' and I'll keep calling mother 'mother.' " The whole business was settled for me, and to this day I still call my aunt "mother."

P: In a novel, Magda Szabó probes the reasons why your mother never remarried. How do you interpret her staunch fidelity to your father, beyond the grave?

R: As an adult, I still wonder about it—why she had no man friend or lover. Others widowed by a similar destiny had either remarried or had a steady friend. Poor uncle Sanyi always told my mother to remarry.[1] Why she never did, I don't know. Before her death, I tried to question her about this matter but her illness interfered. I was then trying to break through her usual anecdotes, the way she spoke about her life together with father and about her own life later on. I was looking for half-truths, for truths—some way to understand how it was really possible to love a man so ardently and only know half of his life. Concerning his party work, she was completely unaware and uninformed. It is well known that my father was certain he would be arrested. Yet, to my mother, it came as a complete surprise.

I'll never know why she chose her role and stuck to it for 30 years, I'll never know why she chose to illuminate the darkness surrounding my father. If Antigone is an archetype, then my mother was a sort of 20th-century Antigone.

P: Even if your mother's life was dedicated to the sole aim of upholding your father's reputation, it seems that she possessed a rather moral understanding of politics.

R: My mother's grasp of politics was instinctual rather than intellectual—and her instincts worked unbelievably well. In 1956, when a tug-of-war developed over my father's funeral, she surely was aware of what was happening. After his rehabilitation, the government made her an offer—to bury my father in a proper cemetery, with only the immediate family attending. The newspapers then reported that not only my father and three of his fellow sufferers who also had been buried in the woods but many others, too, were slated for reburial. My mother refused the government's offer, insisting that if her husband's death had resulted from a show trial, then this entitled him to nothing less than a show funeral.

The negotiations took months. Toward the end of summer, many young intellectuals of Imre Nagy's camp and some of the older ones who had been released from the prisons implored my mother to give up the battle. They argued that it was tactically unwise to provoke the Soviets. But the battle between my mother and the state had become so intense that she refused to attend the funeral unless it was declared to be a public ceremony. She demanded that workers be allowed to take off from work to attend, and that the government arrange their transportation to the funeral.

P: Béla Szász, subjected to five years in prison as a result of the Rajk trial and rehabilitated in 1954, wrote the following in his book *Volunteer for the Gallows*: "After Gerö's return,[2] Rajk's funeral was arranged for October 6. The Hungarian party chiefs had not only continued to postpone the date but were openly haggling [about the arrangements] with Mrs. Rajk as well. . . . Julia Rajk had insisted that not only official party representatives should speak at the funeral, but one of her husband's fellow defendants as well—and for this service, she called upon me."

The party made a desperate attempt to prevent a mass demonstration at the funeral. Béla Szász wrote: "Although many district party secretaries and industrial functionaries bowed to orders from above, they could not persuade their flocks in the factories and offices to stay away from the funeral. . . . A quarter of a million people turned up."

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[1] Sándor Haraszti—born in 1897, was a Communist since his earliest youth. Jailed in 1951 with János Kádár, he received a long sentence. He was rehabilitated in 1954. Because of his activities on behalf of the Imre Nagy government, he was thereafter jailed again. His case was reviewed and he was granted amnesty in 1960.

[2] Ernö Gerö replaced Rákosi as first secretary of the party in July 1956.

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R: The demonstration was quite spontaneous. No one paid any attention to the fact that the cemetery was crawling with cops.

P: The atmosphere at the Rajk funeral must have been highly charged, foreshadowing the coming revolution. Even the official party newspaper, *Szabad Nép* ("Free People") reflected this in its report on October 7: "Workers had left their factories in their blue work clothes, carrying their tool boxes. University students came with their briefcases, in groups of twos and threes . . . soldiers and civilians came, wearing black armbands . . . children came holding their mothers' hands—children strangely moved by the sight of a seven-year-old-boy standing beside his father's casket, also holding his mother's hand. That was Láci Rajk, who had been merely a baby, barely aware, when his father had been dragged to the gallows and his mother locked in prison."

R: There's another interesting story about this time. When it became known that Rákosi was returning to Hungary from the Soviet Union, only one person dared to file legal proceedings against him—my mother [for having been instrumental in arranging the show trial]. She made no protest over his return; she didn't go and appeal to the party. Instead, she sought out a hack lawyer to whom she could present the facts of this scandalous affair, and asked that he try to find some paragraph with which to nail Rákosi. This lawyer actually found something. There is a paragraph in the Hungarian legal code through which a person can be brought to court for a former action if there is public knowledge of it. The lawyer told her that, if she pursued this matter, he didn't know what could happen, he was only a lawyer and not a politician.

My mother simply did the following. On one occasion, in a speech before some 10,000 people in the Budapest Sports Stadium, Rákosi had said: "I spent many a sleepless night figuring out the solution to the Rajk case." Citing this sentence, my mother accused Rákosi of murder. She didn't deliver the charge to the Politburo or the High Court; she brought the case to the lowest court—to make sure that the whole business would ascend through normal bureaucratic channels, so that everyone would hear about it. She knew that no low-level prosecutor would dare to take the responsibility of squelching the case, and that it would simply continue, proceeding from one level to the next. It was a good tactic. Yet, luckily or unluckily, Rákosi died early in 1971. I believe that those who were charged with settling this matter with my mother were greatly relieved that nature had lent them a helping hand.

□

P: But then on October 23, 1956, two weeks after the ceremonial funeral of László Rajk, the revolution broke out in Budapest. To this day, of course, the Hungarian CP still officially regards it as a "counterrevolution." Yet others, such as the philosopher Agnes Heller, consider it to be the first purely political revolution in the world. The results are well known. It was crushed by Soviet force on November 4. What is less well known is that together with Imre Nagy, Julianna Rajk and her seven-year-old son László were given asylum in the Yugoslav embassy.

R: At daybreak on November 4, someone came to our apartment to tell my mother that her name was on the list of persons selected by the Yugoslav government to receive asylum. She turned down the offer. Shortly thereafter this courier came a second time with the message that Uncle Imre [Imre Nagy] had requested that my mother go to the embassy.[3] She spoke at length with my grandmother, and then decided to accept the offer, taking me with her. She wasn't about to lose me for a second time. Later we found out that Uncle Imre hadn't sent this message. Whether it was a deliberate trick to save my mother's life, no one knows. In any case, whatever is behind this story, I believe that what was done was well intended.

At the embassy I met a lot of children. There were the two children of Ferenc Donáth—the third was born later, in Roumania; there were Imre Nagy's two grandchildren, Géza Loson-

[3] Imre Nagy—the Communist leader who broke from the Soviets and formed a coalition government in behalf of the '56 Hungarian revolution. He was executed by the Russians in 1958.

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czy's daughter, Miklós Vásárhelyi's three children, and three of József Szilágyi's children.

P: József Szilágyi would later die.

R: He was executed.

P: It is said that Géza Losonczy died under mysterious circumstances. That it could have been suicide or murder.

R: Suicide or murder—nobody knows for certain. He was force-fed during his hunger strike in prison, and it was during this force feeding that the tube entered his lungs instead of his stomach. Since then, many have come forward as witnesses to the fact that this was a deliberate "accident." Now, getting back to the Yugoslav embassy, I think that one could say that nobody, including the Yugoslavs, was very comfortable with the situation.

P: Do you have any recollection of the incident concerning an embassy secretary who allegedly looked like Imre Nagy and was shot by a Soviet sniper as he stood at a window?

R: Yes; but I believe this incident was trumped up. It was probably really an accident. We children were well aware of the fact that an accident had taken place. We were quartered in the reception hall of the embassy. There we lived under tables, on top of tables, on mattresses, on the floor, and under a piano. It was a situation straight out of the war. Uncle Imre had an extra room. We were on the ground floor and the incident happened at the window on the top floor overlooking Heroes' Square. On the day after we had taken refuge in the embassy, the building was surrounded by Soviet tanks. No one could come or go. Despite this, one of József Szilágyi's sons managed to flee in the trunk of an embassy car.

Yet, for us children in the embassy, it was all a marvelous game. Our parents were scared to death because we were always standing by the windows to watch the tanks and the soldiers. My mother and I lived under the piano. That was our little home.

P: A pact was concluded between the Yugoslavs and the Kádár government whereby the refugees were to be given safe conduct to their homes, where they were to remain under provisional house arrest. On November 22, 1956, at 6:30 PM, Imre Nagy and the other refugees left the embassy. What happened next?

R: What took place after that is extremely unclear. To this day it remains uncertain what sort of agreement was reached between Nagy, Yugoslavia, and the Kádár government. One thing is certain—Imre Nagy was double-crossed and disappeared and the rest of us with him. We were led into a bus. The convoy consisted of three buses flanked by two armored cars. Russian soldiers entered the buses and threw out the Hungarian driver and guards. We were then driven to Mátyásföld, where we were put up in state security barracks. On November 25 we were put on a plane that took off into the great unknown. Everyone was convinced we were being flown to the Soviet Union. To our surprise the plane landed in Roumania. There, Nagy, Losonczy, and Donáth were immediately separated from us. We were taken to a government resort near Bucharest. The others, we later found out, were quartered in small villas not far from us.

For us children, this was the beginning of a particularly important way of life. Our parents organized a school, and we were given formal lessons every morning. Our lessons followed a rather incredible curriculum; none of the adults were trained teachers, or at least not elementary schoolteachers. Two years later, when I returned to Hungary, I possessed a very peculiar sort of education indeed! There were subjects about which I knew a fantastically great deal, and others about which I didn't have the faintest notion.

In the spring of 1957, all the men were arrested, leaving only the women and children behind. Time passed and our lodgings were changed frequently—each time for the worse. Strangely enough, each move brought us closer to the Hungarian border. We were now very close to Transylvania.

Again, my grandmother and my aunt were not informed of our whereabouts. Rumors were circulating in Hungary that placed us in Sochi or in the Crimea, so my relatives once more began the same old routine of visiting government offices, writing letters, and making phone calls—just as they had done while my mother

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was in prison. There was actually one part of our family that did know where we were. This was the family of my father's sister, who lived in Transylvania. The story is typically Middle European. The woman who brought my father's sister in Székelyudvarhely her daily milk had a sister who was the maid in the house of a functionary in Bucharest. This functionary worked on our case. It was through this contact that my aunt in Transylvania found out where we were.

P: Were you allowed any contact with the outside world?

R: No. We were under house arrest, in a house with a garden. We could use the garden, but it was patrolled by guards and dogs. We received mail for the first time in 1958. From then on, my mother agitated for the return of the children to Hungary. This led to heated discussions among the women, and my mother was the only one who argued that it was important for the children to grow up in the same environment as all the other children in Hungary, and not in complete isolation.

Finally, my mother received an offer allowing me to return home. She accepted it on the condition that I would live with her sister—that is, my adopted mother. Soon after this agreement came the inevitable black car with its dark drawn curtains . . . the car we had seen so many times. And that was the end of our stay in Roumania.

□

P: What became of a child with such a past? I know, after studying in Budapest and in Canada, you now are an architect and a stage designer. And since the strengthening in 1979 of Hungary's democratic opposition, you have become widely known as one of its most important representatives. During the years 1981–83, you maintained the so-called Rajk Boutique in your own apartment, selling illegally printed material—newsletters, journals, books—right under the eyes of the police. The business hours of your Boutique were even published openly in Western emigré journals and over Radio Free Europe. And a year and a half ago, the police brought this operation to an abrupt end.

How did you develop the courage to practice civil disobedience? Considering your childhood experiences, wouldn't fear be a more appropriate reaction?

R: My deepest and most formative experience to this day remains our stay in Roumania. Strange as it may seem, for me it was no tragedy but a great adventure. I still feel this way, and it's still a joy to hear someone calling me Pista. I respond to this name as I do to the diminutive of my own, Laci. I have classmates from elementary school who knew me as István Györk and still call me Pista.

P: Isn't that a rather schizophrenic situation?

R: No. I don't experience this as really schizophrenic. It is, I think, the sort of schizophrenic condition that people the world over are living with today. I believe, and this is an important point, that I have learned to live and deal with this condition early enough to overcome it, remaining alive and sane. And I don't necessarily see a parallel between my childhood and the developments of my adult life. I think that my mother played an important role in this respect. She never tried to fill me with the terror of the past.

P: Why is it that you have chosen to take part in the opposition?

R: This stems from my adult experience. I have a peculiar occupation—I am an architect. And so, in my work, I am confronted quite directly with a lot of the social and cultural injustices that exist not only in Hungary but throughout the world.

During my studies, I became involved with questions of housing distribution, housing policy, and the housing of industry itself. In Canada I wrote my dissertation on the housing policies of the United Nations organization. As a result of this study, it became clear to me that housing policy, regardless of in which country, is merely a political weapon, and has nothing to do with equity and the people's welfare. Practically every government exerts pressure to control the politics of building. In this context, it's irrelevant whether the housing industry is state controlled, as in Eastern Europe, or indirectly controlled, as in the West.

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P: You have been described by various sides as being the only member of the Hungarian opposition whose job has not been taken away, as someone who has no problems with the authorities, is something of a "sacred cow."

R: Yes, I'm a colorful topic of conversation. But . . . the fact is that my flat in the city, the one in which I ran the Boutique, was taken away from me. Of course, they found a legal way to do this; a legal way can always be found for everything. I still have my job, but attempts have been made in the last two years to create conditions under which I myself would decide to quit. I have not obliged. I intend to play out my role to its end. My salary matches the lowest basic level in Hungary—4,600 forints. That's tight.

P: You are also known in Hungary as a good stage designer. Are you also limited in these artistic activities?

R: As there's a tug-of-war between what's being officially printed and what my name stands for, I can no longer openly work in the theater and in films. For a year I was allowed to work under supervision, with a front man; but then I was put on ice. I felt as if alarm sirens went off when I entered the studio—it was a difficult time. Rather than penalizing me, those who wanted to offer me work were penalized or threatened with a penalty.

P: But you still want to continue your various kinds of work. Why?

R: I belong to a generation that was only indirectly touched by the murderous years that we've discussed here. I can no longer put up with people lying—with "facts" that are lies. And I say this in a very general sense—just as I would say that our elders have lied to us. They don't speak about 1956. They don't speak about the Rajk trial. They don't speak about anything. Muteness reigns. I believe that this muteness will only stop if we form a truly independent culture. At least we can try. What I tried to do with the so-called Rajk Boutique was, I believe, a step in the direction of an independent culture in Hungary. □

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Peter Glotz

Forward to Europe

A Declaration for a New European Left

Peter Glotz is the national secretary of the German Social Democratic party, a member of the Bundestag, and author of the recent book Manifest für eine Neue Europäische Linke (Berlin: Siedler, 1985). *This article has been translated into a number of European languages and has provoked a good deal of discussion within the European left community.*—Eds.

I: The Helpless Continent

The 40th anniversary of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences has left us with a hard, cold bottom line: Europe is going down the drain. The region's economy, during this second great standstill of the 20th century, is one of falling employment and rising protectionism; and "real socialism" is spared nothing of what transpires in "socialized free-market economies." Militarily old Europe is a deployment zone for the superpowers; ecologically it is a small, exhausted region where forests are browning out before the eyes of its horrified or indifferent citizens; and both its workers' and its capitalists' kids have begun to suffer from a disease that by a strange circuitous route has come to be ironically tagged with the name of one of the great German capitalists: pseudo-Krupp.

The disease struck like a sudden choking fit. But intellectual and moral asphyxiation is certainly no sudden development for Europe's elites; Hofmannsthal, Musil, and Paul Valéry, or Ernst Bloch and George Orwell for that matter, saw the spasms coming decades ago. Now they are here, and we're gasping for air. We can see no further mission for Europe, we formulate no policies, we mirror the conflicts of superpowers that emerged from our two damnable wars in half a century.

If things continue as they are now, by the 50th anniversary of Yalta we will be nothing but a museum of shades visited by groups of American, Soviet, Japanese, and, in due time perhaps, Chinese tourists whose package includes the Italian Renaissance, the Giudecca of Venice, Paris as Europe's metropolis, Prague's Malá strana (Lesser Quarter), Auschwitz, and Rothenburg ob der Tauber. We will be as the Greeks were to the Romans, *graeculi* (little Greeks), so to speak: private tutors, actors, kept boys, wandering philosophers, and orators, several of whom by the way have had stunning successes. What a prospect—and who can say if our children may not relish it?

Of course, let us not exaggerate: Europe is still an important economic factor. We have inventive engineers, highly skilled workers, creative entrepreneurs (in both capitalist and socialist guises). We still occupy top spots in the rankings. But how all this will look *after* the third industrial revolution will hardly be decided in Europe.

Microelectronics, communications engineering, and integrated optics will either make

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millions of jobs obsolete or will make radically shortened workweeks possible. The thrust toward individualization—whether as a form of liberation or isolation—is at full throttle, and no one is ready for it, neither the employers nor the unions, nor the state bureaucracies—and certainly not those affected by it. Only psychologists can rejoice at the prospect of full coffers. Once this development reaches its high point, Europe—if it remains passive—will be colonial terrain, important and lucrative as a proving ground for young talent, a reservoir of recruits for American and Soviet science, but with no history, and so no future, of its own.

This is not an indictment of the superpowers. It is stupid to reproach Americans for being more vital than we are or for having a social order that in all its simplicity is more adaptable than that of socialized European states. It is unhistorical to reproach the Soviet Union, because Hitler forced upon them a "war for the fatherland" out of which even the Stalinist regime could catch fire and enkindle patriotism.

We Europeans are complacently wearing ourselves out in the intricacies of our constitutions and traditions. The only interesting question is: Have we—as actors in history—truly and irrevocably made our final exit or can we still assume a historic role? If not—the mourning and the feast at the wake can be postponed; we know only too well how to do that and have all the solemn trappings on hand for the ceremonies. This is the issue now before us: Is the patient still twitching or is the matter settled?

This is not intended as a fair, impartial analysis but rather a bitter message, born of disappointment and designed in part to provoke friends and adversaries in Eastern and Western Europe alike. Its message is: Europe is going down the drain. Either we build a new, historically viable European leadership that vaults old national borders and camps, or we shall end in pandemic disgust at our own survival, touchy and demoralized—at best a satirical resistance movement.

□

IN THIS ESSAY, I will attempt to justify the following demands and answer the following questions:

FIRST • The old continent must make yet another contribution as a supplier of ideas to global politics: to appropriate, consolidate, and revitalize what has developed on European soil over the last four centuries—since Hume and Locke, Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and Kant—out of the loam of 3,000 years and terrible sacrifices. But that means: not to run away from the spirit of rational individualism, at precisely the moment when a new electronic phase of civilization has begun to revolutionize human labor, but rather to further the modern enterprise. It means adopting an enlightened, antiheroical, unwarlike program based on the intellectual foundation of experimental science. (A program, for instance, that—for the first time in history—includes the possibility of equality of the sexes.) And it means incorporating what we have learned from the agonizing experience of recent decades: the struggle against destructive growth, against power-conscious, international oligarchies and other new forms of caesarism that can arise out of economic collapse. In a word, to develop capitalism, itself a product of Western rationalism, further toward *social democracy.*

SECOND • This does not imply a pointless attempt at matching the big boys inch for inch, at making a superpower out of Europe. It is totally absurd to vie for glory on every possible battlefield, contesting the overwhelming superiority of the Americans and the Soviets—to be first, for instance, in space technology. But how would it be if Europeans could boast of having maintained the greatest variety of plant life, the liveliest market for books, the most rational system of social security? European culture, from Niccolo Pisano to Goethe to Soren Kierkegaard, from Fritz Lang to Niels Bohr, has often emerged from political states that were second-class powers. Europeans ought to squander at least one thought on the question of where we would be if that thug Hitler and his henchmen had *not* cast the Jewish culture of Europe to the four winds, if Albert Einstein, Paul Lazarsfeld, Leo Löwenthal, and Paul Carnap, if psychoanalysis, logical positivism, quantum physics, and so many other movements of European science had not been driven out of Europe. Europe could be

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powerful, if it did not see power in MIRVed rockets—and if it roused itself to a new self-awareness.

In the Middle Ages, Western culture went on crusades to demonstrate an awareness of its unity. Through councils, monastic orders, universities, and far-reaching judicial codes, the Catholic church created a supranational ideology. Crusades are passé in the 20th century; our strongest glue may be our *classical European culture*. Italy owes its economic success of the last 35 years not so much to technology and science, to the cleverness of its entrepreneurs or to the fighting spirit and solidarity of its trade unions, as to *design*—that wonderful ability, nourished by centuries of experience, to shape industrial products according to aesthetic standards. What objection can there be to this "Italian strategy"?

THIRD • Europe, with its history to back it up, can only then become a political rather than a geographical concept if Europeans respect an incontrovertible *minima moralia*: social justice. The appeal that Europeans can still create is the appeal of persuasive patterns of social life.

The neoconservative leadership of West European states has handed Western Europe over to American hegemony, not because those leaders are in any sense foreign agents, but because they could not picture the design of a *functioning political economy* for Europe. They want to treat the laws of the marketplace as if they were laws of nature, and in so doing they have made an unhistorical retreat to a time before the European socialized state. The result is the Arthur Scargill effect: What do we need the Americans for?—we're strong enough to enfeeble ourselves. The last true conservatives left the bridge with de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan. And the petite bourgeoisie that rules the conservative apparatus these days—with Margaret Thatcher as figurehead—is historically sterile. They simply can't "picture it."

No European will-to-live can be founded on new poverty and broken social contracts. Since 1798 too many people in Europe have died for *the unity* of liberty, equality, and fraternity; whoever hopes to dissolve that formula, and dump equality as a goal, will find himself dumped into a nameless grave of social trench warfare.

FOURTH • The powers of old Europe will lose even their third- or fourth-place role in world politics if they do not succeed in building an *industrial Europe*. If Europeans want to emerge as producers, not just consumers of microelectronics, telecommunications, and biotechnology, they must conduct joint scientific research and forge a common industrial policy. Moreover, in planning for and providing energy and raw materials, no single country alone can bear the risks involved. The first step toward creating a supranational organization for Europe's science and industry must be attempted within the European Community. Even if it fails, almost any configuration leading to supranational institutions that could make structural decisions and adjust tariffs would be better than ineffectual summit conferences with their demagoguery, theatrics, pomposity, and helplessness.

FIFTH • Europe will only be able to play a more self-assured role if it can bring about a new partnership between Western and Eastern Europe. The basis for such a partnership is: guaranteeing existing borders, with no ifs, ands, or buts, and abandoning the notion of restoring capitalism in Eastern Europe, while at the same time realizing that the desire of its peoples for freedom and dignity has not been extinguished. Foreign policy of the Reagan/Weinberger ilk—which has sacrificed all sensibility for the interests of the old continent in favor of a new American self-confidence—is anti-European precisely because it robs East European states within the Soviet fold of all freedom of movement. We need a *phase-two Ostpolitik* that for the first time will give Europeans breathing space by reducing the cost of arms *in both East and West*. This second Ostpolitik must: (a) operate on the basis of the Western alliance and (b) not attempt to destroy or fragment the Eastern alliance. But it must try to *change* both alliances.

No doubt, by now there are cautious partners for such a policy within the Communist parties of Eastern Europe. But a *phase-two*

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Ostpolitik can originate only in Western Europe; it need not in any way interrupt the *ideological* debate with communism, but it must not play the ceremonious, huffy renegade and confuse ideology with policy.

It is patently clear: the far-flung Soviet Union has not truly "digested" the expansion of its zone of influence to the middle of Germany. It would be difficult for it to execute a military operation that included armies of Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians. Many East European nations are gaining political clout of their own; German-German relations are proving especially malleable. Above all, in both West and East European societies a new kind of cultural self-affirmation is emerging—including aggressive disassociation from one's own superpower. "The flat map of Europe on the wall is regaining its contours" (Willy Brandt). The task is to reshape this unconscious cultural trend into conscious policies.

SIXTH • If Europe's right wing is stumbling into the debilitating quicksand of social conflict, then the decisive question is: Can the European left—with all its fragmentation—overcome the intellectual and moral suffocation we suffer from? Can it free itself from the tragic insight that thus far democracy and "strict socialism" have not been realized together? Can it overcome its deep-rooted prejudices against what it considers dangerous entrepreneurial fantasies and against the creative havoc unleashed by new ideas and products? And can it also get capitalism, which by no means is at the end of its tether, to commit itself to a new *formula for investment*, a *strategy for qualitative growth*, and a *balanced ecological account book*?

Can the European left overcome the old bunker mentality and ally itself with both new social movements and the core leadership of Europe's productive working capital? Can it create a new basis for prosperity, a new set of goals, a new system of priorities, which will finally get us out of the trough of economic standstill and underemployment? And can it summon the charisma and talent to excite the thoughts and emotions of European youth?

SEVENTH • Europe can only become a viable political power if the European left and its coalition partners assimilate the great historical lessons of the last few decades. Will we have the nerve to learn just as much from the collapse of the confrontational socialism of Salvador Allende as from the volleys fired by the Soviets, Hungarians, East Germans, and Bulgarians—or from the tanks in Prague in 1968 and the compromises the Communist General Jaruzelski has made with the Catholic church of Poland in the '80s? Will we have the decency toward those involved, the victims, to stifle all our "I-told-you-sos"—and then pursue our own political course? In other words: Will we be strong enough to pursue policies that are without illusions, do not disavow genuine contradictions, do not fear a break with our own past, and stand firm against the hatred of our opponents, so that we can win over a European youth that now—as it swings back and forth between idealism and apathy—is on its way to settle for a world without history?

All this is uncertain. What is certain is: Europe is at present the helpless and mute continent, without social vision and without a historical mission. A sleeping giant, but one that is shrinking as it dozes.

II: Recent Developments in Capitalism

So what is the situation today? The foundations of our much admired and much sung postwar prosperity were an "interior colonization," by which traditional sectors (farming, handicrafts, family retail trade, services, domestic work) were displaced as routine providers for the majority of the population, and—above all in the '70s—we've had a creeping inflation. The absorption of cheap new labor from the traditional sectors (in large parts of Western Europe) and a flood of refugees from the East (especially in the German Federal Republic) were also a tremendous impetus for growth. The '50s and '60s saw the yearly gross income of the average West German worker increase in real D-marks by 250 percent, a season of growth far outdistancing all other periods of prosperity. During the great economic expansion from 1875 to 1913 (a period

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of almost 40 years), not even one-third of the real increase in income of the '50s and '60s was achieved.

As this process came to a halt, continued growth could be achieved only by large investments of capital. The upshot can be read in Marx or Hilferding, and in the works of the great bourgeois economists as well: When the time it takes for capital to turn over grows and when additional investments lead *at once* to surplus income and thus to additional demand while the economic capacity created by those investments develops more *slowly*, then increased demand meets head-on with stable supplies—and prices soar.

And there was the motor that drove the long postwar "recovery"—low prices for raw materials and almost laughable prices for energy. All of this came to an end in the early '70s. European colonialism had lost its punch, the nations providing raw materials struck back—and Europeans experienced as a "shock" something socialists had been prophesying for decades as a coming crisis. After that, growth was achievable only by increasing the money supply still further. The result? Inflation.

Then came a decade of "stop-and-go" economic policies, a dreary, enervating wobble—first putting on the brakes and then stepping on the gas. On the one hand there were restrictions on credit volume and on margins allowed banks for increasing the money supply, and on the other hand public employment programs, investment allowances, and better tax breaks —all this accompanied by singsong debate chanted to ideas dredged up from the great Lord Keynes. And from year to year it sounded more like Pavlov than Keynes—an argument with Pavlovian sound effects. No doubt about it—as the debate lingered on, sucking ever-increasing numbers of European nations into stagflation, the tone of leading politicians became ever more petulant, the possibility of *antagonistic cooperation* between social classes ever less likely. Cracks were also increasingly evident in the superstructure; Western civilization finally laid aside its Christian garb. Robert Musil called it "clique collectivism" or "an urge for metaphysical hullabaloo." Meaningful debates, for instance concerning the relationship between what is technically achievable and ethically desirable, hardly begin—and poof! they are over. What remains is the dubious tolerance well-trained spouses show for one another's habits—trench warfare.

The economic development of industrial capitalism, which leaves neither the socialist states nor the countries of the Third World unaffected, can be discussed under a few headings. Some of them apply globally, some only to Europe.

• *Globally, individual ownership* has won a structural triumph. To be frank: never in history was it so clear that major societies are perfectly willing to accept 10 percent unemployment, but under no circumstances 10 percent inflation. And the left should not dupe itself into believing that this is only the result of the evil machinations of high finance. It is, in fact, the result of a broad redistribution of property within major industrial societies that has brought about a merging of minds of the petite and grande parts of the bourgeoisie. In the public's perception there is an apparently indissolvable union of very different interests, so that the skilled worker who is paying off his home and whose financial reserves consist of three months' wages, the merchant's widow with her fixed-rate bonds and apartment building, and the small number of truly moneyed folk all scream bloody murder in concert whenever a tax on basic sources of income is about to be introduced.

High inflation rates over a long term during the '70s meant a loss in net interest earned. That experience has now made it impossible to expect another generation of savers to hand over capital at negative net interest under the illusion of "seeing their money grow." But it also means—and the left had best chisel this in stone—that, in pursuing inflationary policies, high finance and central banks can depend upon a coalition spanning virtually all social classes, *even if the result of those policies, though not their goal, is a high rate of unemployment.*

• *The second worldwide development* has been a loss of power by individual nations—that is, their political bureaucracies have lost out to central banks, banks operating interna-

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tionally, transnational finance markets, and multinational corporations. There is a name for this: *the collapse of a central pillar of nationhood, the Lebanonization of the economic function of the modern industrial state.*

Here is an almost inexhaustible source for making democratic governments—whether of the left or the right—lose credibility. When they are in opposition, they promise to end unemployment, lower the inflation rate, or promote robust economic growth, and once in power they can often effect none of it. When Chancellor Helmut Schmidt regularly pointed out that even if he could apply the instruments of national economic policy all on his own and with no need for compromise, he would still be able to control at best merely 30 percent of economic events, he was not being too self-effacing. Such realism during elections and before assuming power is rare, however, and unpopular. In fact, the least surprising cause for national governments' loss of power is the concentration of international capital and the resulting economic interdependence, which, as goods, services, information, and technology were exchanged during the period of prosperity following World War II, expanded beyond anything previously considered possible. Yet Marx predicted it long ago.

Today 4,534 multinational corporations with headquarters in 9 countries of the European Community control about 50,000 factories outside their home countries; and 300 of the 2,500 largest American corporations are associated with dependent firms in more than 20 countries. Anyone who has worked only a few days in a government bureaucracy knows that many of these corporations can plan and act more easily than the average ministry of economics or social services.

More profound and surprising, however, were the developments in financial markets. At the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, the United States had created a marvelous system both trimmed to fit its own interests and at the same useful to other capitalist countries. At the time 44 nations agreed to create an International Monetary Fund and a World Bank. Member states obligated themselves to tie their own currency to gold or to the U.S. dollar—though it must be kept in mind that at the close of the '40s the United States controlled about 70 percent of the world's gold reserves. Later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was added, making protectionist measures more difficult for poorer, less technologically developed countries, insuring somewhat more liberalized world trade, and releasing the energies of modernization. Behind their barricades, the planning systems of the East lay unawakened by these dynamics—both to their advantage and disadvantage.

In the Western scheme of things it was clear who was in the driver's seat, but there were certain mechanisms for control and a reasonable confidence in economic prognoses. In 1973 this arrangement collapsed; the central banks of countries that were not part of the dollar bloc broke their leash and refused to continue to buy dollars inflated by the Vietnam War at a fixed price. They wanted to protect their own investors and allow for national anti-inflationary policies.

The result of flexible rates of exchange was, first of all, the loss by governments of a thick, juicy chunk of power to the central banks. Second, with lightning swiftness there arose transnational financial markets (for instance, the European Credit Market), independent of the control of national banks of issue. This changed the situation completely. Responding to free rates of exchange and variable rates of interest, internationally mobile capital produced not only gargantuan loans to developing nations—which, should they collapse, could pull down millions of German and American investors with them—but also the destruction of every *nationally directed Keynesian system.* This must be made clear to the left once and for all. *The minimum yield offered for inducing investors even to consider productive investment of capital—and with it the creation of job opportunities—is now influenced less than ever before in economic history by the policies of individual nation-states.* The maneuvering room of the national governments and banks of issue has not been eliminated, but is infuriatingly small. Statesmen can still make a great many "meaningful gestures," but it is all more theater than politics. Their influence on economic events is at best marginal.

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• *The third worldwide trend* is the normal but painful necessity for restructuring industrial capital investment. Ships and mass-produced steel can simply be produced more cheaply over the long run in Taiwan, South Korea, or any other emerging nation around the Pacific basin than in Hamburg, Kiel, Bremen, Tokyo, or New York. *The major industrial powers must convert from production industries to design and information industries.* The consequences are: disparate paths of development for the industrial core and those sectors subject to crisis, the decline of entire regions, and the rise of others (for instance, the shift to the Sunbelt in the United States and, to a lesser extent, from the North to the South in Germany), and the development of ever *more disparate living conditions.* The industrial nations are under the whip of structural change.

But in answering the challenge of structural change, the situation is different for Europeans than for their American or Japanese competitors. This is the root of European constraints, particularities, and insecurities.

When it comes to matters of raw materials, ecological devastation, and the treatment of industrial waste products, Europe's position is profoundly different from that of the superpowers. Europe has no deserts, no Texas, no Siberia, where the trash of a new period of growth can be shoveled under. Europe has no rapid deployment force that can intervene in the Near East or Africa to insure the flow of raw materials. And the attempt to acquire one would end disastrously. This continent is smaller, more vulnerable, and—because it bears the burden of the first and earliest industrialization—also more badly defaced than the others. Its citizens—for a thousand historical reasons—are more easily disturbed by nightmares of global destruction. Can the old continent convert these weaknesses into strength or will it slowly fall apart in the vain attempt to wear Texas-sized boots or to play Japan?

In addition, there exists in Europe—in contrast to the United States, or even to Japan with its single-firm unions—a *relative equilibrium of the classes.* This means that although in all major European nations (with the exception of Austria and Sweden) the forces of capital are far better organized and more powerful socially than the unions and other bastions of worker power, every European welfare state (and not just the German Federal Republic) has a tighter, more integrated structure than its competitors among the world powers. And since the governments have proved in every instance too weak to guarantee the unions something in return for even the most cautious policy of concessions, the danger is great that the European continent could bleed to death in the trenches of a war presaged by the massive strikes of German workers for a 35-hour workweek, the dispute between the socialist government of France and the CGT, and the English coal-miner strike.

• *To quantify all this:* whereas between 1970 and 1984 total employment in the United States grew from 80.1 million to 106 million, in the European Community it fell from 107 million to 106 million. Why? For a very simple reason, say capitalist editorializers: wages are lower in America. (They use the words "more flexible.") The American "employment miracle" of the last few years occurred in the service sector; and while the rising star of the computer world, Apple, created around 4,000 (well-paid) jobs, Godfather's Pizza created 14,000—poorly paid and with no job security, naturally.

The economic danger is that in developing new products and laying the foundations for new industries, Europe will find itself, even more often than in the past, lagging behind in the inventive, creative utilization of new technologies. At the same time, bound as it is to its own social history and high standard of social benefits, it will be unable to maintain social equilibrium—certainly not with "low-cost" service jobs. The political danger is that neoconservative leaders may get caught up in a con-

Coming in the Fall:

China at Bloomingdale's and the Met

by
Debora Silverman

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flict with the labor movement that could lead to the decline of Europe.

III: Individualization and Segmentation

Into such a world, the third industrial revolution has broken. It will demand one thing above all else: individualization. And everyone knows that can mean two possibilities: a new mobility or a new isolation, the multiplication of opportunity or a barrier to every kind of cooperation. Individualization brings with it the opportunity for freedom from the constraints of workplace, family, and workaday culture, but also the danger of estrangement, loneliness, and shattered solidarity.

The process of individualization is a radical one. While at present the citizens of most parts of Europe are still being reached by three or four television channels—or, put another way, a politician can reach these citizens by appearing on three or four channels—the next decade will see a Babel-like profusion of voices clamoring for citizens' attention. Video recorders, CB radios, new radio networks with special programming for diverse groups, video games, local newspapers instead of mass-circulation dailies—information structures will be upended.

Theoretically, the individual will be able to evade the standardized visual tidal wave of manipulative mass media—but also every tremor of reality. It remains unclear what messages and pictures will penetrate the minds of Europe's workers via the intricate networkings of the future. In Europe, and in every industrial society, single-person households are growing at an explosive rate (in the United States 25 percent of all children do not live in nuclear families but in new forms of family groupings)—and no one knows how families of the future—these new variations of the family—will process the signals impacting on them.

The most important change, however, will be in employment and work. An electronic civilization will eliminate millions of jobs in existence today. The '70s were the "contagious stage." The hour of technological fever is upon us. The modernization of industrial production will bring with it a net loss of jobs, but at the same time it could mean not only a reduction in jobs but also in raw materials, energy, and capital.

The modernization of industrial production offers us a chance to overcome a system of production for the sake of production, to transfer hard, dehumanizing work to machines, and to set ever-expanding amounts of time free and available for workers. Workers whose lives today are determined by the rhythm of work, and for whom free time is nothing more than "recreation" time, relaxation and amusement time, could find a new sovereignty over their lives that they have never known before, and without the prologue of revolution and counterrevolution, when hate sinks its fangs in deep and compulsion becomes permanent. The only question is whether the political culture of Europe is stable enough to deal with this challenge or if it will drown a melancholy death in the pool of conflicts now welling up.

These changes have been coming for a good while—and they are earth-shaking. A new mobility is churning up people's lives and forcing them to leave familiar roots, their neighborhoods and towns. Whoever refuses becomes a case for the department of social services. Those parts of town that over the years have become familiar landscapes, the turf of working people, are being destroyed. More education gives each individual the opportunity to go his or her own way, but with new opportunities come new restrictions. Increased competition, previously unknown between the children of different classes, can lead to isolation and personal breakdown.

To put it another way: right now, as the great postwar prosperity runs down, an immense process of liberation has fragmented social milieus, put class solidarity in question, and forced politicians to toil at merging discrete groups into temporary "majorities." As time on the job decreases, while part-time work, flextime, shift work, and decentralization of spheres of employment (for instance, cottage industries in the service sector) increase, the push toward individualization grows, destroying traditional workers' virtues and introducing a new form of industrialization. True, work

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remains an important sphere of action shaping people's identities. But ever more powerful influences are suddenly coming from totally new directions. What now?

In typical fashion, the European labor movement is more poorly prepared for this development than a bourgeoisie ostensibly so shy of central planning. Many trade unionists are asking themselves if it may not be possible simply to block these technical innovations—at least for a few decades—much as East European industrial societies have done thanks to their closed-off economies. Others are considering policies of legal proscription: prohibition of cottage-industry jobs, delaying tactics for part-time work, blocking staggered shifts and other such innovations.

At first glance, such an impulse to maintain qualified and disciplined skilled workers as the backbone of the labor movement is understandable. But the chances are remote that a national labor movement in one of the large West European industrial nations could successfully make a defensive circle of its wagon train. The division between blue- and white-collar workers has long since grown too permeable. Hundreds of thousands of workers now demand individualized work time; the labor market is characterized by increasingly ugly competition between marginal and core employees, between *those who are profiting from these changes and those tolerating them.* The old structures will break. The question is: Will the European labor movement be able to organize these new workers? Will it be able to hold onto its influence in the factories, in the centers of production, and extend it into the tangled world of modern communications and the world of leisure time?

To put it more pointedly: Will a self-confident European left be capable of giving *social direction* to the process of innovation? Or will it be paralyzed by fright and be gobbled up like a rabbit staring at a snake?

To reiterate: the second standstill of capitalist economies in the 20th century will not end in fascism. There are no rootless soldiers returning from the Great War and unable to find a place in acquisitive bourgeois society—to form the core of fascist militias. Moreover, the welfare state, in particular its unemployment insurance, is too well established. Only if that system of insurance were to collapse, and once again masses of impoverished petit bourgeois and laid-off workers found themselves out on the street, would we need to fear fascist tendencies. In addition, the civil service in several European states employs so many true democrats that a repetition of the Italian and German developments of the '20s and '30s is unlikely. Even the international network of high finance has had dubious success with fascist and semifascist oligarchies—from Chile to Greece to Turkey. Only rather unimaginative prophets consider history to be a Xerox machine.

• *The most likely development* will be the formation of a *two-thirds society.* And that would come as the result of neoconservative politics. In two-thirds societies, the leadership is willing to accept the social decline (not the absolute pauperization) of the weakest third of the society—the unemployed, the odd-jobbers, the elderly of the lower classes, the migrant workers, the physically and mentally handicapped, the teenagers who cannot find their way into the job market, and so on. This means that the leadership is more or less consciously engaged in mobilizing the forces of individual ownership, including a "workers' aristocracy," in *mobilizing core employees against marginal ones.* The goal is clear: don't look down, look ahead. And the situation is perplexing.

The left has to bring together a coalition in which the greatest possible number of the strong identify with the weak—against their own interests. For strict materialists, who believe self-interest is a more effective tool than ideals, this is a paradoxical task; but it is our present task, nevertheless.

Even the most passionate clinging to yesterday's and the day-before-yesterday's analysis of class structure and the most touching invocation of the common interests of "all wage earners" cannot gloss over the fact: modern industrial society is following a path of segmentation. That is the dark side of individualization—the freezing of social movement and formation of new quasi-classes.

Never have the differences of status within the working class been so great as they are

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today. The most probable development within the core sectors of industry (automobiles, chemicals, machine tools) will mean ever more highly skilled workers and more uniformly patterned tasks. Those who are already in the system remain in it, and if they accept the norms of the firm, they will even get promoted. Whoever is working in sectors subject to recession, however—in the shipyards, for instance, or as an odd-jobber (as a manual laborer with no qualifications, a packer, for example) leads a risky life. Every third gainfully employed person—in total, 12.5 million people in the German Federal Republic—was unemployed at least once during the years of the current recession. Here lies the starting point for the growing cleft between social and cultural groups within the population. The blueprint has been drawn for *a society with disparate ways of life and living conditions.*

Without a doubt, the concept of a two-thirds society can become a reality. The left will then be amazed that its passionate scolding about 10, 15, or 20 percent unemployment does not mobilize the masses. But the left will not really have grasped that even with 20 percent unemployment, and 80 percent of the gainfully employable employed, a great number of these employed (in the core sectors and as a result of greater seniority) still have faith in their own job security, and that in those crisis sectors that do not have to be shut down totally, the old game of divide-and-conquer has a good chance of success.

To be sure, effective and creative labor movements can mobilize a counterforce to such coalitions of fear, as shown by the successful Swedish battle for a workers' fund (in effect, a "socialization of the investment function"). But it is also possible to lose the fight against such coalitions—as Margaret Thatcher's second electoral victory in England made clear in 1983.

Only one thing will not be achievable with a two-thirds society: the ability of Europe to hold its own in economic competition with its overseas rivals and so to preserve a unique historic role for older nations—let alone the achievement of a new impulse for Europe. For no matter what, the labor movements of Europe (with the exception perhaps of a few countries on its southern rim) are strong enough for trench warfare, which will decisively impair *the results* of all economic and political competition with the Americans or Japanese. This is, after all, simply the relative equilibrium of the social classes that Otto Bauer, the great Austrian labor leader, diagnosed for Europe as far back as the 1930s.

• *Even now we can coolly predict:* the political leaders of the European bourgeoisie, aided by a notion of "leadership" imported from the United States, are about to toss their penultimate reservations overboard (for instance, Margaret Thatcher's battle against the "wets" or the mud slung by economic liberals at the labor wing of the German Christian Democrats). They will achieve none of their secret goals: neither the rebirth of the virtues of the workingman, nor the reinstatement of the subordination of those below to those above, nor the restoration of England or France as a world power—not to speak of Germany. They will achieve what is already within view: at home, a touchier, more irascible public climate, new forms of class struggle, an atmosphere of small, uncontrolled aggression, and a worsening of conditions for capital growth for their own people. And in the wider world it will mean: to the tune of all the old hymns, Europe will totally decline. Glory, glory, hallelujah.

IV: Social Democracy as a European Idea

The time is past for the self-perpetuation of the European nations, despite what a few intellectuals who are perplexed by the current economic situation—or a few European politicians who want to play de Gaulle in the '80s—may say. The only form in which Europe can flourish as a politically viable unit is as a social democracy.

What does this mean: "social democracy as a European idea?"

Western Europe must, and can, build on the foundations of capitalist civilization. For those who are uncompromising in their condemnation of capitalism, the *Communist Manifesto* is suggested reading. In it Marx and Engels

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have high praise for the achievements of capitalism—for instance, that it has rescued a significant portion of the population from "the idiocy of rural life." Whoever wants to overcome a social structure must first have understood its achievements. Capitalist civilization erected its edifice in the spirit of rationalist individualism and as a systematic plan for the economic utilization of the world's resources.

From the very beginning capitalists, in contrast to aristocrats, have done without a mystical and lordly air. Capitalist civilization has always been antiheroic, although it has also unloosed a dreadful and untamed armaments industry. But as Josef Schumpeter already pointed out, modern pacifism and even modern international morality are nonetheless products of capitalism. And capitalism has also been the first social structure to create the economic prerequisites for the emancipation of women. Social democracy can build upon all these elements, which grew out of a grueling 400-year process.

AS THE 20TH CENTURY DRAWS TO A CLOSE, however, profound changes in certain of its biases must occur if this form of civilization is to survive—especially in four areas:

FIRST • Now that humanity has created the means by which the entire enterprise of civilization can be undone in mass destruction, the idea of *mutual security*, born out of the precarious state of European borders, has become inescapable.

SECOND • Within the capitalist civilization we have inherited, there is a penchant for abusing nature and exploiting raw materials, energy, and other resources, which in the foreseeable future will inevitably wreck or ruin the European continent, *unless economic structures adapted to ecological realities* can be developed.

THIRD • European history—from the Thirty Years' War to the waves of refugees that Hitler's war set into motion—leads inevitably to the ideas of *social peace* and the *pattern of a European socialized state*. Against the background of European history, it is impossible to allow 35 million people to live below the poverty line, as is the case in the United States. Whoever would attempt, given current economic pressures, to undo the social rights won only in a long, painful social process (such as offices to aid the unemployed, and unemployment benefits, and disability insurance) will drag Europe into enervating, murderous trench warfare.

FOURTH • Several developments over the last few decades—such as the pollution of air and water, real estate speculation and its destructive effect on our cities, the unchecked exercise of the profit motive for every form of land and property, and the recent commercialization of new forms of media—endanger Europe's most important possession: its cultural heritage. Europe's chance for life depends on its thread of memory not being broken. The architectural monuments, paintings, and the master designs from its past must not be destroyed. The achievements of European culture must not be repressed or forgotten. To put it simply: Europe must remain this endangered world's memory. Therefore social democracy is inseparable from the idea of *historicity and identity*.

□

WHAT, THEN, DOES SOCIAL DEMOCRACY MEAN as a program for a new Europe?

1. A policy of détente created by and for Europe with the goal of radically reducing the cost of armaments in both Eastern and Western Europe.
2. Institutional reform of the European Community by strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, particularly by enlarging its legislative competence and establishing majority rule in the Cabinet.
3. Industrial and structural policies that are coordinated and goal-directed.
4. A unified European currency.
5. Control over investment and speculative capital; increased yield on invested European capital.
6. A coordinated policy for reducing the workweek to 30 hours.
7. Ecological modernization by means of thoughtful, systematic augmentation of the

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environmental demands, when necessary, on the part of both producers and consumers.

8. Equal rights for women, by affirmative action and quotas if necessary.
9. A campaign against the domestic colonialization of Europe, if necessary by measures protecting Europe's culture and media.
10. Europe as a partner of the Third World—out of self-interest, not philanthropy.

□

NO ONE CAN DENY THE DANGERS inherent in the project of modernity. We have not merely been dreaming our nightmares for a long time now, we have had them analyzed as well: technological mass-unemployment, a glassy-eyed and manipulated humankind, the disintegration of the labor movement, a starved Third World, nuclear holocaust. It would be irresponsible to ignore the fact that the dreams dreamed by an endangered culture mirror reality. The stuff of the dreams is real, only the staging is fantastic.

But these dangers are unavoidable if Europe now gets dizzy, as it spins around quibbling about its own apocalypse. The development of the individual is an ancient European tradition —ever since Greece countered the theocracies of the East (Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Persia) with the *polis*, where social classes and cities competed among themselves. Modernity has incorporated all this. And now that it is possible to free individuals from difficult, onerous labor, to give them sovereignty over their own time, to make wide knowledge available to many, and to make use of the possibilities of the explosion in richly diversified communications—is Europe now to cast aside the idea of progress and take up Eastern meditation?

Europe must move beyond the idea of *quantitative progress* and replace it with *qualitative progress*. That means *a social and ecological revision* of our understanding of progress. Once in power, right-wing liberalism is incapable of such a revision. Here precisely is the chance for the European left. But it is the chance for a left that clearly understands that *no retreat* is possible and that the promise made to each individual with the slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity must be fulfilled. Therefore: individualism—*from the left*. And because that cannot be realized in the broken vessels of Europe's nation-states, we must make the leap toward Europe.

Of course, a new European self-awareness is unlikely, since it demands of Europe a new ability to cooperate. The easiest thing will be for everyone to keep dragging on—the French and English dreaming of their own past and playing at being world powers, the Germans fantasizing half-heartedly about reunification, the Italians leaving the rest of the world behind while struggling with their pathetically powerless state—and on and on. The most likely thing, of course, is always the continuation of present miseries.

Americans consider us Europeans "tragic" and "cynical." That touches a sore spot: the result of our deeds and misdeeds is a "European neurosis." But must we go bankrupt under the banner of "concocted optimism" carried by the right? Must we be sucked under by the impotent pessimism of many leftists? Or will we find the strength for a *healthy lack of illusions*, through which a vision for Europe really becomes possible?

We have problems enough. If our low birthrates do not rise, Europe will become the world's half-vacant old folks' home. Until now there has been no historical example from which we might learn how to deal with the geriatrification of an entire society. More than the battle between left and right, labor and capital, the survival of European society is threatened by the superannuation of its citizens.

Or will democracy suffocate beneath the "power of the majority" (de Tocqueville)? Will that power drive minorities to despair and violence? Is it inevitable that equality in living conditions gives birth to an omnipresent state that, even when it does not employ force, ends in a dogged and petty despotism? Europe is a region in which the welfare state and the infrastructure state (not the state that acts as industrial planner) claim the greatest portion of the gross national product. At the same time, this state—though the left denies it—is all too frequently quite clumsy in using productive resources. The civil servants are powerful, the civil services often overpriced. Will the left manage to modernize such a state? It isn't likely. But what is "likely" is not the only possibility.

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The utopian goal would be *a new Europe in high relief:* a Western Europe of social democracies that plucks up its courage to act on its own; not a third superpower but capable of defending itself; not innocent but eager to learn; with no imperial ambitions but with a certain appeal for its East European brothers.

"Europe, the poor continent"—as Walter Dirks put it in 1946 after a bloody war—"will only find its place and maintain it if it pulls itself together and systematically organizes its natural resources, its means of production, and its labor force. That means an end to the idylls of Europe." And he continues,

> We have lost our peace of soul by becoming modern men. We can regain our balance if we become more modern still—and to be sure if, and only if, the entire process is in our own hands and subject to our will. European freedom and independence will not be preserved by an insistence on their right to exist, but by voluntary limitations of their scope. That is true for individuals, for groups, and for whole peoples.
>
> — Walter Dirks, "Die Zweite Republik," *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1946, no. 1.

All this is as true now as it was 40 years ago. Therefore *no* Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, *no* "Silesia still is ours," *no* dreams of reparations for lost Thuringian industries. But rather a Europe of decreased armaments and increased multiple contacts, a Europe of ecological precautions and humanized work, a Europe of free, urbane traditions and ironic individualism—and perhaps, as the utopian impulse demands, a Europe of free travel from West to East and East to West, a Europe with little barbwire.

The boundless optimism of the right may keep it in power for a while yet; at any rate, knee-jerk pessimism is no answer to the current gung-ho mood. But, beyond optimism or pessimism, for one last time the question is posed: Can Europe use its rich experience to master the challenges of a third industrial revolution?

Whoever hopes to prevent the strangulation of minorities (the segmentation of European industrial society) must bring about *an alliance for enlightenment*, right across the old classes. Whoever wants to help the weak must be strong with the strong.

THE EUROPEAN LEFT can blast apart the bulwark of the longtime propertied and upwardly mobile, if it puts new technology at the service of an individualization that balances social, ecological and economic interests. Its motto: Freedom and Mobility for Everyone—with Social Responsibility.

Translated from the German by JOHN E. WOODS □

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J. Michael Luhan

AIFLD's Salvadoran Labor Wars

A Painful Record of Political Arm-Twisting

In September 1985 *Reader's Digest* published an article that paid glowing tribute to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the AFL–CIO's labor arm in Latin America, and to its executive director, William Doherty. "Bill Doherty's Blue-Collar Freedom Fighters" described a heroic struggle AIFLD has waged over the past twenty-three years throughout the continent against phantom elections and communist penetration in unions and for the right of labor unionists to decide their own destiny democratically.

In El Salvador, however, AIFLD has resorted to dubious tactics in the past eighteen months to *prevent* Salvadoran workers from making their own democratic decisions. Since mid-1984, AIFLD has rigged union elections, intimidated labor leaders and used ham-handed methods to destroy a special pact El Salvador's largest democratic workers movement signed with the Christian Democratic party of President José Napoleón Duarte, under which Duarte pledged among other things to pursue dialogue with the country's leftist guerrillas. The U.S. Embassy has at times acquiesced in AIFLD's activities but mainly remained a passive bystander, despite AIFLD's misuse of millions of U.S. taxpayers' dollars in these activities.

The AIFLD campaign is all the more shocking because it follows several years of successfully organizing the Salvadoran labor movement behind U.S.-supported economic reforms and elections—an effort in which two AIFLD advisers, Mark David Pearlman and Michael Hammer, gave their lives. The Institute has since squandered much of its goodwill with its Salvadoran colleagues.

AIFLD's loss of face has resulted from its decision to transfer its support for the broad-based workers' movement, the Unidad Popular Democratica (UPD), to a new organization created by AIFLD in December 1984. Resentment at the change turned to outrage at the flirtation by leaders of the new organization—through the matchmaking efforts of AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy—with right-wing political and business personalities associated in the recent past with violence against the labor sector. Behind those efforts was an apparent desire by AIFLD and the Embassy to forge a conservative alliance between labor and business against the more statist-oriented Christian Democrats, and to undermine UPD efforts to promote dialogue with the Salvadoran armed guerrillas.

This assessment is angrily contested by AIFLD officials and a group of faithful labor leaders in El Salvador who say the change was necessary to maintain labor's independence from the government. But the Institute has been uniformly criticized by the U.S. Embassy, Salvadoran government officials, and some of its own people for heavy-handedness that undercut support for President Duarte at a critical time in his fledgling administration. In the resulting conflict, in fact, all sides have lost—except the armed left, which traditionally benefits from instability and captures the flag of anti-Yankee sentiment.

The UPD, composed of six organizations loosely representing some 300,000 peasants and workers (see box), had from its founding in September 1980 been a supporter of U.S.-promoted elections and a bulwark against domination of the labor movement by the militant left. Virtually alone among their working-class peers, UPD leaders publicly endorsed the

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controversial March 1982 elections for a constitutional assembly as the "beginning of a possible solution for the problems of the working class," but refrained from supporting any political party. The victory of a right-wing coalition headed by Roberto D'Aubuisson's ARENA party, however, convinced the UPD to openly support the more progressive—although from the UPD's viewpoint, less-than-perfect—ticket of José Napoleón Duarte in the presidential elections two years later.

Throughout this 1982-84 period, AIFLD strengthened the UPD with literacy and leadership training programs, logistical resources, and vital political protection. AIFLD operated on a hefty $2 million annual budget—nearly all U.S. tax dollars channeled through the Agency for International Development (AID). Indeed, AIFLD virtually designed and implemented a portion of the land reforms, the land-to-the-tiller program, with the contracted aid of Roy Prosterman, a land reform expert who had provided similar services in Vietnam. When the right-wing ARENA party led a rollback of the reforms after the 1982 elections and stepped up violence against peasant and labor leaders, AIFLD took UPD representatives to Washington to denounce the ARENA campaign. Their testimony moved the U.S. Congress to slash $100 million from the 1983 Reagan arms budget for El Salvador, a sanction that persuaded the military to put peasants back on lands from which they had been dislodged and to keep the modest reform program intact.

AIFLD's status in El Salvador began to deteriorate at the moment of Duarte's victory. The new president promised to consolidate the reforms and give labor a direct role in shaping the political future of the country.

THIS ROLE WAS CARVED OUT prior to his election in what was dubbed the *Pacto Social*, or Social Pact, with the Christian Democratic party. In return for their indispensable support in Duarte's campaign, UPD leaders signed an agreement with the party guaranteeing the inclusion of a four-point UPD program in Duarte's "government plan for 1984-89": 1)

Unidad Popular Democratica (UPD)*

Unión Comunal Salvadorena (UCS):
Largest *campesino* organization in El Salvador. Mostly Phase III ("Land-to-the-Tiller") beneficiaries. Claims 270,000 members; may well influence that many. Strong AFL–CIO links. Post of secretary-general is disputed by Samuel Maldonado and Ramon Mendoza. (Now split between the CTD and UPD.)

Federación de Sindicatos de la Construcción, Transporte y Similares (FESINCONSTRANS):
Largest legally recognized labor federation in El Salvador. Mostly construction workers, with some white-collar workers. Strong AFL–CIO links—22,286 members. Secretary-general: Ricardo Soriano (previously Salvador Carazo). (Now split between the CTD and UPD.)

Sindicato de Unidad de Trabajadores de la Construcción (SUTC):
Largest single union in El Salvador, mainly construction workers. Part of FESINCONSTRANS until June 1985, with more than 90 percent of that federation's total membership, but broke away to become separate member of the UPD—20,597 members. Secretary-general: Jésus Amado Perez Marroquin (previously Salvador Carazo). (Now split between the CTD and UPD.)

Central de Trabajadores Salvadorenos (CTS):
Public and municipal employees organization, including workers of the ministries of agriculture, public works, and tourism. Left UPD in August 1985. Linked to CLAT, the worldwide confederation of Christian Democratic labor—10,000 members. Secretary-general: Miguel Angel Vasquez. (Now back with the UPD after a temporary pullout.)

Asociación de Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria Integradas (ACOPAI):
An association of twenty-five agrarian cooperatives and individual campesinos—17,000 members. President: José Orlando Arevalo. (Now split between the CTD and UPD.)

Asociación Nacional Indígena Salvadorena (ANIS):
Ethnic (Nahuatl) association of cooperatives run on the old communal system—8,000 members.

Total Membership: Roughly 300,000. (Figures and descriptions courtesy U.S. Embassy.)

*Membership as of September 1984

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dialogue to seek a political solution to the civil war; 2) prosecution of human rights violators, particularly in several flagrant and well-documented cases involving army officers and right-wing figures, such as the killings of Pearlman, Hammer, and a major Salvadoran peasant leader in the Hotel Sheraton in early 1981; 3) appointment of UPD candidates to key positions in government institutions dealing with the land reforms; and 4) broadening of participation in the democratic electoral process to all political tendencies, which meant including the left.

That the *Pacto* was a reiteration of the founding principles of the UPD is an important point to remember. AIFLD later cut its aid to the UPD and tried to destroy it on the grounds that it was "too left" for pushing Duarte on the issue of dialogue. It was, in fact, AIFLD which had moved to the right—the UPD was merely following through on what it had consistently stated all along.

The negotiations over the pact were highly conflictual, as Duarte's party did not want to have its hands tied by written treaties. But the UPD feared a handshake agreement would soon be forgotten by Duarte and therefore insisted that his electoral promises be put into black and white.

AIFLD's director in El Salvador at the time, Rupert Scofield—a former Peace Corps volunteer who had worked with peasants in Guatemala—helped the UPD during the negotiations over the *Pacto Social*. He also provided critical mediation in the UPD's incessant inner squabbling. Additionally, the CIA channeled an estimated $200,000 to the UPD for its campaign efforts, part of some $2 million of CIA money given to the Christian Democrats and other, smaller parties on the right to offset the immense financial advantage of ARENA.[1] Duarte's victory, then, seemingly was AIFLD's as well. It also enabled the Reagan administration to successfully lobby Congress for huge increases in economic and military aid to El Salvador that headed off, for the moment at least, what appeared to be an impending guerrilla victory.

The celebration was short-lived. After months of unsuccessful post-election meetings with Duarte urging him to meet with guerrilla leaders, UPD leaders appeared on Salvadoran television on August 30, 1984 and published a newspaper ad the following day criticizing him for stalling on his dialogue pledge under the *Pacto Social* and for overseeing a new military buildup. Duarte shortly thereafter flew to New York for his famous UN peace address and by mid-October was talking with rebel leaders in La Palma.

AIFLD'S REACTION WAS EVEN SWIFTER. The popular Scofield had been replaced in February 1984 by Bernard Packer, an old-line AIFLD hand. Packer frequently expressed his opinion to colleagues that Scofield had been "too soft," and that the *Pacto Social* was a mistake because it tied the UPD too closely to the Christian Democrats. Yet when the UPD published its attack on Duarte—a patent demonstration of its independence—Packer called its leaders on the carpet, attacking its communiqué as "an insult" to AIFLD and ordering them to repudiate it in a letter to his superiors in Washington. He then sent armed AIFLD security agents to the office of Miguel Angel Vasquez—the most vocal UPD leader on the dialogue issue and head of a large organization of public sector unions—to repossess at gunpoint a vehicle and radio unit loaned to Vasquez's organization by AIFLD in 1983. This episode shocked UPD leaders and sparked what quickly became a heated issue between them and Packer—the freedom to call their own political shots.

"When we signed the *Pacto*, we didn't sacrifice our right to confront the Christian Democrats—to the contrary, we signed it to make them live up to their promises," said José Orlando Arevalo, a top UPD spokesman at the time. "And when we accepted AIFLD's money we didn't exchange our sovereignty. We respond to only one voice in making our decisions, and that is the voice of our bases."

The UPD was still smarting from those actions when Packer announced a major policy change in early September 1984—AIFLD's decision to form a new labor confederation. As Packer explained it, the new project would entail reshaping all of the AIFLD's current

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member organizations (minus one—Vasquez's), together with several new groups, into a more formal, vertically-structured confederation that would be directly tied to the AFL–CIO. Although two UPD affiliates already had this status, the UPD as a whole was independent. The UPD would remain as the "political arm" of labor, said Packer, while the new organization would concentrate on "bread-and-butter issues" such as contract negotiations and technical training. This was also the rationale in a U.S. Embassy report on Salvadoran labor in August 1984, when the idea for a new confederation was still in the discussion stage.

Participation was mandatory; if the UPD did not go along, its member groups would have their AID support money cut off by the Institute, despite having signed covenants that guaranteed funding through June 1985. The threatened aid cutoff was a strong inducement, since by now all of the UPD organizations had been weaned away from reliance on their internal dues structure in favor of handouts from AIFLD. Every single UPD organization, save Vasquez's, was now at least 80 percent dependent on AIFLD for equipment, vehicles and administrative expenses—even FESINCONSTRANS, for 30 years the country's largest and strongest labor federation.

But the plan suffered from several deficiencies. Packer had the confidence of few UPD leaders, most of whom considered him insensitive and dictatorial—a view shared in the political section of the U.S. Embassy. UPD leaders felt the project involved them in an undesirable circle of control and lacked common sense.

"Why do we need another organization when we've struggled for three long years to build the UPD and have finally attained unity?" said an embittered Adrian Esquino Lisco, a UPD leader. "Why fix something that isn't broken? How is it that after being in El Salvador for a few months this Packer thinks he can make such decisions for Salvadorans?"

Suspicions increased when Packer, threatening to reduce or cut off their funding altogether, leaned on UPD leaders like Esquino Lisco and Arevalo to vote for his own handpicked slate of officers to run the new organization, christened the Central de Trabajadores Democraticos (CTD). When Esquino Lisco defied Packer's wishes and ran for president of the CTD, Packer reduced Lisco's organization's take by 25 percent.[2]

The most controversial of Packer's agents was Tito Castro, a longtime AIFLD loyalist. In 1977 he had been found solely responsible for the bankruptcy of a large rotating fund for agricultural production cooperatives run by the Inter-American Foundation, a scandal that shattered the unity of a budding peasant movement that AIFLD itself had built. The audit that found Castro culpable was commissioned by the Foundation and conducted by University of Wisconsin Professor John Strasma. (AIFLD had, in fact, recruited Castro in the early 1970s fresh out of jail, charged with having misdirected foodstuffs while working for the Catholic Church but later cleared.) AIFLD defended Castro in the Foundation scandal but agreed to transfer him out of the country.

Yet one of Packer's first moves upon taking over from Scofield (who had determinedly kept Castro out of El Salvador) was to sign Castro to a year's contract to work as his chief Salvadoran agent. And despite Castro's dismal track record in such matters, Packer entrusted him with the disbursement of AIFLD's funds to the CTD and its affiliated groups.[3]

The CTD elections on December 8, 1984 were so blatantly stage-managed by Packer that the Salvadoran unionist chosen by the participating organizations to chair the assembly left the auditorium, leaving Packer to swear in the new officers, thereby depriving the whole affair of any legality under Salvadoran labor law.[4] Adrian Esquino Lisco, meanwhile, had switched candidacies and won the treasurer's slot; Packer then informed him that AIFLD (meaning Castro) would now handle the CTD funds directly and instructed CTD organizations to pay their dues directly to AIFLD.

That fiasco was quickly followed by several others that strained relations to the breaking point. In late January 1985 another major scandal erupted during the elections of El Salvador's largest single union, the SUTC,

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which represented construction tradesmen and was a key UPD affiliate. Dissident members complained that the incumbent for secretary-general—Salvador Carazo, Packer's hand-picked president of the CTD—trucked in crowds of peasants to vote for him who were not union members, allegedly with money provided by Tito Castro. Carazo's re-election in the SUTC was vital to securing its participation in the new CTD and preserving his power base as CTD president. The dissidents' complaint was upheld by the Labor Ministry and Carazo's recognition suspended until new elections were held. He was finally removed from office in a subsequent election ordered by the Labor Ministry months later to clear up the lingering dispute.

The Carazo scandal added to the UPD resentment over the whole course of the CTD's development and prompted its leaders to write a letter to AIFLD Executive Director Doherty on January 21, 1985:

> The direction of the Institute in the formation of the CTD has been absolutely shameful in promoting its creation from the top down, with manipulation, causing the organization to lose its representativeness. If to this we add that [Packer] has promoted the participation of suspicious persons and mini-organizations which have attempted to destroy the unity of the UPD and obstruct its activities, one sees a very serious situation that damages the democratic process of El Salvador. . . .
>
> We do not believe that this is the position of the . . . AFL–CIO. Therefore, before this problem extends to our bases, other sister organizations, and to our government, we wish to speak with the true representatives of the workers of the AFL–CIO. . . .

Within a week, Doherty jetted in to El Salvador and held a meeting with the squabbling UPD and CTD leaders. The UPD representatives told Doherty they were particularly concerned that the inclusion in the CTD by Packer of tiny right-wing unions such as the *gastronomicos* (waiters) and the musicians' guild was a veiled attempt to *derechizar* (move politically rightward) their labor movement. Packer had given these groups the same vote in the CTD founding congress as UPD groups hundreds of times their size, even though one of his earliest declarations in promoting the new scheme was that representation in the CTD would be determined by relative size, making it more "democratic" than the round-table decision-making style of the UPD.

Doherty dismissed the UPD concerns as groundless.

"He told us, 'If the UPD dies, I die,' " said Esquino Lisco, echoing the recollection of several other UPD leaders in the meeting. "He said we were the people who had made him look good in Washington and that he would never abandon us."[5]

A Doherty aide, Roberto Casares, then made an enticing offer to end the dispute. If the two groups agreed to bury the hatchet until after the upcoming elections for a new National Assembly and 262 town mayors in March 1985, AIFLD pledged to give them $160,000 for their own election campaign. The same offer had earlier been mentioned by Packer but then dropped when Esquino Lisco won the CTD treasurer's slot. The offer was accepted and the UPD and CTD signed a "unity pact."[6]

Less than a week later, however, Ramon Mendoza, a popular UPD figure who had grown increasingly critical of Packer and Castro, was suddenly notified by his large peasant organization, the UCS, that he had been removed from his position as deputy chief for "misrepresentation." The ouster was widely interpreted as enjoying at least the collusion of AIFLD, which had founded the UCS in 1968 and funded it ever since. Mendoza's expulsion, coming on the heels of the Carazo scandal, so enraged the UPD that it demanded that AIFLD remove both Packer and Castro from El Salvador. It also requested another urgent meeting with Doherty to discuss the deteriorating situation. In a letter to AIFLD/Washington dated February 25, 1985 the UPD stated:

> The Political Commission comes to you again and in the most energetic fashion manifests its protest of these agents [Packer and Castro] whose actions we hope are not endorsed by the AFL–CIO. We are sending you two documents that . . . relate the utilization of AIFLD funds to "arrange" the last elections of the directors of

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the SUTC . . . and the same action in celebrating a false congress in the UCS to displace our companion and brother Ramon Mendoza. . . .

The simmering conflict suddenly exploded into Salvadoran public life as well. The UPD published full-page newspaper spreads accusing AIFLD of attempting to undermine the *Pacto Social* by "tele-directing" the union movement through "corrupt and feeble pseudoleaders"—and also hinted that the Christian Democrats tolerated these actions in order to weaken the UPD's ability to demand Duarte's compliance with the *Pacto*.

Duarte thus unwittingly found himself in the crossfire. Its timing could not have been worse for him. Press reports were consistently predicting a decisive win by a new ARENA-led coalition in the all-important March 1985 elections. Without a Christian Democratic majority, Duarte's reform agenda faced collapse. To worsen things, with the election less than five weeks away, Duarte's main labor base, the UPD, was now riven with divisions. Duarte pleaded with the UPD during a meeting in the first week of March to keep the confrontation private and promised to resolve it after the elections.

A week later, however, Duarte called the UPD into his office to discuss the crisis and a new dilemma he faced. Several days before, he said, Salvador Carazo and the AIFLD-aligned figure who replaced Ramon Mendoza as the deputy chief of the UCS peasant union had come to him with an offer. Carazo said he had control of $160,000 for the Christian Democrats' uphill campaign, but that it would be dispensed only on condition that he, Duarte, authorize Carazo's election and the replacement of Ramon Mendoza. The pair made the same offer to Duarte's top aide, Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes. Duarte told the UPD his response to Carazo was that these were autonomous decisions of his labor minister and the internal affairs of the unions in which he could not get involved. No one ever saw the money.

Carazo himself later explained the episode with surprising candor to a reporter from the *Christian Science Monitor*:

> Carazo said that Doherty told him "I will insist that the money will come." Carazo said that in the last elections, funds were channeled directly to the Christian Democrats, which disbursed them to the unions but that "this time they (AIFLD) promised that the money wouldn't be channeled to the party, that the [unions] would manage it directly."
>
> Carazo said "Mr. Doherty told us that someone from the U.S. would come—but not from the Institute, not with funds from the Institute." Carazo was told that the mysterious man from the U.S. would come March 5, but he never showed.[7]

That same week, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering told reporters that the U.S. was not intent on "supporting or opposing any party in any way" in the elections. When asked to explain the contradiction between Embassy policy and AIFLD's aborted election fund offer, a senior Embassy official replied, "AIFLD has a lot less control over what they do with their money here—less than even the CIA." The AID control officer in El Salvador for AIFLD at the time, Tom King, said he talked with AIFLD only once or twice a year, that all auditing procedures were conducted out of Washington, where AIFLD monies are dispensed through a special funding mechanism, and that he knew nothing about the $160,000 AIFLD offer.

The situation grew so bad that Pickering finally took the unprecedented step of requesting Packer's removal from El Salvador. AIFLD complied and on March 11 transferred Packer to Guatemala. Guatemalan unionists, however, who had been receiving reports on the labor situation in El Salvador through internal sources, said they refused to work with Packer. He was then shuffled to Colombia.[8]

On March 20, 1985 the *Washington Post* reported that Christian Democratic party activists "complained that [AIFLD's] shift was undermining Duarte's declared goals of achieving a negotiated settlement of this nation's five-year civil war, prosecuting past human rights violators, and carrying out social and economic changes," and was strengthening the chances of a conservative victory in the elections. AIFLD chief Doherty wrote an angry letter to the *Post* rebutting the charges. Despite the

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weakened backing of the UPD, the Christian Democrats staged an electrifying electoral upset a week later by winning a commanding majority in the National Assembly and 75 percent of the mayoralties.

Packer's departure did little to resolve differences, as AIFLD took an even tougher line in pursuing the CTD project. By early April AIFLD cut off all funding to the UPD organizations, monies which over the past several months it had been gradually rerouting to new CTD groups. In one case, while AID pumped money into a federation of agricultural cooperatives linked to some UPD leaders and liberal Christian Democrats, AIFLD was simultaneously diverting many of these same AID funds to a new CTD-linked coop federation directly competing for members. Said one confused AID official on the matter to a *Boston Globe* reporter (August 19, 1985): "I can't conceive of how we end up giving assistance to two different sides."

The diversion of the AID money was conducted by Tito Castro and another AIFLD-linked labor leader, Samuel Maldonado. As top-ranking officers of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute, they used their posts there to divert AID funds provided to the Reform Institute in order to support the new CTD coop federations. The practice became so blatant that the Reform Institute's own labor union complained in an angry letter to the government on June 12 in which it demanded the removal of Castro and Maldonado.[9] Both were dismissed in July—after AIFLD provided Castro and Maldonado money to stage a demonstration for themselves that fizzled. (AIFLD denied giving the money, but a top-ranking U.S. Embassy official told me the Embassy "knew all about it.")

At this point AIFLD's real motives in the CTD project also became clearer, and clearly contradictory to AIFLD's original statements. Responding to a query from a *Miami Herald* correspondent as to the reasons for the AIFLD shift away from the UPD, AIFLD spokesman Jack Heberle replied that the UPD had served "a useful role" but was now "off to the left of Duarte." (*Miami Herald*, April 20, 1985.) Later, in July, Heberle told the *Los Angeles Times* in response to the same question, "one could say that by pressuring for negotiations, they [the UPD] were pushing Duarte to the left." (*LA Times*, July 11, 1985.)

The Union War came to a head in late April 1985 when word began circulating of a developing alliance between the CTD and right-wing political figures. Sources inside and outside the UPD independently reported an April 28 meeting between Tito Castro and other CTD leaders with Hugo Barrera, D'Aubuisson's former vice-presidential running mate who had left ARENA earlier in the year. Castro was said to have pledged to deliver thousands of CTD signatures for the legal inscription of Patria Libre, a new party Barrera was forming. The CTD vigorously denied the meeting, as did AIFLD, while Barrera simultaneously boasted to reporters of the "very good relations" his new group enjoyed with the AIFLD organization.[10] Months later, when AIFLD officials in El Salvador were still making strong denials about any AIFLD-Barrera relationship in El Salvador, Barrera was received by Heberle in AIFLD's Washington offices in November while on a tour of the U.S. to promote his new party.

Whatever the exact substance of the CTD–Barrera relationship, the reports drew sharper attention to what had been a longstanding project of both AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy—to link labor with landowners who had lost assets as a result of the land reforms. Embassy officials felt that there could never be reinvestment or economic reactivation in El Salvador until the owners disenfranchised by the sweeping reforms in 1980 were given some role in managing their lost assets. This could not mean, however, a repeal of the reforms, which were still politically very popular.

In mid-1984 the U.S. Embassy labor attaché, Eduardo Baez, began hosting regular meetings in his home between prominent local businessmen, big agriculturalists, and peasant leaders, including both Tito Castro and Ramon Mendoza. The purpose, as Baez explained to a colleague, was to "try to bring back together the forces that had clashed in 1980 over the reforms."

"He [Baez] said these were progressive types who accepted the reforms and wanted to work with them," the colleague said.

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Out of the meetings grew a proposal advocating the privatization of the agricultural cooperatives to facilitate joint investment ventures and shared management between the coops and former landowners—part of a broader Embassy effort to give the Salvadoran right wing a stake in the democratic process the U.S. was promoting. UPD leaders were unenthusiastic about the plan because, again, they saw it as undercutting the UPD's relationship with the Christian Democrats (who controlled the vast patronage structure servicing UPD agrarian cooperatives) in favor of a pact with its avowed enemies. Even more discomfiting to the UPD were the backgrounds of some of the entrepreneurs present, particularly Alfonso Salaverria.

The Salaverrias, one of the wealthiest of El Salvador's coffee clans, had long been associated with violent right-wing politics in El Salvador. In the 1960s the family supported the ultraright FUDI party of General José Alberto "Chele" Medrano, who earned for himself the sobriquet "godfather of the death squads" for having established the country's first paramilitary forces. The family later aligned itself with the official Party of National Conciliation but again switched allegiances in 1981 to the newer, more virile ARENA party of Roberto D'Aubuisson. "The Salaverrias were one of the families most associated with right-wing, really rough stuff in El Salvador," said Robert White, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador under the Carter administration.

Alfonso certainly kept the Salaverria tradition alive. His links with D'Aubuisson were particularly close. When the latter was arrested in May 1980 for plotting a coup against the governing junta, security forces nabbed documents that were blueprints for what became ARENA paramilitary death squads, according to a ten-month investigative report by journalists Craig Pyes and Laurie Becklund in which numerous party members went on record as having participated directly in death squad activities.

Alfonso Salaverria, according to these documents, played a key role in these activities. One of the most incriminating pieces of evidence was a notebook containing the names and phone numbers of members of D'Aubuisson's inner circle. On one page of the notebook—which is entered in the U.S. *Congressional Record*—is a list of assassination paraphernalia such as pistols, silencers, machine guns, starlight scopes, etc. On the opposite page is a short list of names, including that of Alfonso Salaverria. His company on the list is instructive: Ricardo Sol Meza, implicated in the murders of two AIFLD advisers in the Hotel Sheraton in January 1981 but released; and Chico Guirola, arrested in a small Texas airport in February 1985 for attempting to smuggle $6 million in cash out of the U.S. to El Salvador. Farther back in the handbook is Mario Sol Bang, identified by the former head of Salvadoran state intelligence, Roberto Santivanez, as having been a trainer for ARENA paramilitaries in neighboring Guatemala.

The Salvadoran prisons are filled with hundreds of individuals jailed on the basis of far less evidence linking them to the violent activities of the guerrillas, yet Salaverria not only remained free but was invited into the Embassy-sponsored talks as a "progressive" to be dealt into the management of UPD cooperatives. A senior Embassy official, when queried about his knowledge of Salaverria's background and the propriety of his participation in the Embassy meetings with labor, said he was "clean" and fully supported his role in the talks. However, a key invited UPD figure who had previously worked as a paid AIFLD adviser refused to participate upon hearing of the role given to Salaverria, saying "They [AIFLD and the Embassy] are asking us to embrace the men who murdered our brothers in the past."

According to one of his close colleagues, Baez, the U.S. labor attaché, developed social relations with a number of right-wing figures suspected of involvement in violence against the labor sector, including Salaverria. He did so, the colleague said, to dissuade these figures from their belief that UPD leaders were "subversives" and hence to give the UPD a veneer of protection from right-wing retaliation. But Baez, a strong supporter of the UPD, slowly began to sour on the Embassy's reconciliation plan because of the crude manipulation of the

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CTD project by Packer and Castro. Soon Baez became more assertive in his complaints to the Embassy and AIFLD. In early February 1985, he was forced to leave El Salvador after receiving a string of death threats. Baez's colleague said Baez believed they were coming from Tito Castro, who was equipped by AIFLD with his own team of heavily armed bodyguards with which he had intimidated other UPD leaders on several occasions.

THE ALLIANCE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS pursued in the meetings hosted by Baez seemed to find its political expression in the alleged relationship between Hugo Barrera's new party and AIFLD's newly created CTD. Indeed, privatization of the land reform cooperatives—the proposal that grew out of the Embassy meetings—was a centerpiece of the new party's platform. And the new party's secretary for international relations? Alfonso Salaverria.

The UPD had seen enough. On July 10, 1985, following a national assembly convened days earlier to discuss the turmoil, UPD leaders announced at a conference for the foreign press corps that it intended to ask the government to expel AIFLD from El Salvador. As an alternative solution, it called upon the AFL–CIO to appoint a special investigative commission within thirty days to look into its allegations against AIFLD. The latter gesture was somewhat quixotic, since neither Doherty nor AFL–CIO President Lane Kirkland had responded to more than a dozen such UPD requests made in private correspondence during the previous four months. In addition, Clemente Hernandez, AIFLD's replacement for the departed Packer, prevented access for the UPD to a group of official AFL–CIO representatives who visited El Salvador just a month earlier in June 1985. The group met only with CTD leaders and were not even apprised of the seriousness of the problems with the UPD. Hernandez explained to one reporter that "the situation was so chaotic that [he] wanted to avoid a confrontation" by shielding the AFL–CIO group from the UPD. (*Boston Globe*, August 19, 1985.) The commission requested by the UPD never materialized, but the UPD did not press its demands for the expulsion of AIFLD, either.[11]

AIFLD did beat something of a retreat. The CTD project failed to attract any significant new unions and its leadership was tarnished by the allegations concerning Hugo Barrera, and also by the Mendoza scandal. The UPD grew more sympathetic to the activities of other union groups with direct and indirect ties to the guerrillas and more openly hostile to the U.S. Embassy. Putting two and two together, the new AIFLD representative, Clemente Hernandez, who had developed an exemplary record for labor organizing in Guatemala over the past two years, made increasing overtures to woo the UPD back to AIFLD's fold. He paid in full the suspended AID monies owed to one UPD organization that had been cut off in April—a move that had earlier been nixed by Doherty—and proposed a merger of the CTD and the UPD which UPD leaders, after initial suspicion, gradually accepted as plausible.

BUT JUST WHEN THE UPD BEGAN to warm to these overtures, more bombshells fell. The SUTC, the large construction trades union that had been placed firmly in the UPD camp with the defeat of Carazo, suddenly found its ranks split again in late November by a small group of leaders who broke away and called their own elections for another full slate of SUTC officers. The money for their activities was funneled to them through a Salvadoran labor federation, FESINCONSTRANS, funded by AIFLD. The new leaders' platform was to reaffiliate the SUTC with the FESINCONSTRANS and hence with the CTD. And hence get their share of the AID money pie.

At about the same time, AIFLD made a move against Adrian Esquino Lisco and his cooperative organization. AIFLD Deputy Director Donald Kessler contacted Esquino's top aide with an attractive offer. AIFLD, he said, was ready to consider renewing its support for Esquino's organization with vehicles, salaries, the works. The catch? Kessler wanted to talk with the lieutenant *alone*, sans Esquino or any other of the association's directors. The offer was turned down flat. AIFLD succeeded in buying away two other colleagues of Esquino, however; the two defectors then offered to pay the same top aide who turned down Kessler's

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approach if he would turn his position over to one of AIFLD's people.[12]

These incidents caused the UPD to conclude that there could be no honest rapprochement with AIFLD. The UPD, along with several other large labor groups, subsequently formed in February 1986 the Workers' Permanent Defense Committee, a broad front whose stated goal was to "combat the politics of war promoted by the Duarte government under pressure from the United States." The formation of the front was the most direct and united challenge yet by the centrist labor sector to U.S. policy in El Salvador and to the policies of the Duarte government. In late February 1986 the new Committee staged the largest demonstration in El Salvador in five years, a protest against tough austerity measures imposed by Duarte several weeks earlier. In a final note of irony, the "independent" and "non-political" CTD promised by Bernie Packer staged a counter-march of its own.[13]

Contrary to AIFLD's professed goal of creating a strong and united centrist labor movement in El Salvador, it has succeeded only in splintering it and radicalizing its politics. The CTD is largely a collection of leaders handsomely paid by AIFLD who now have few followers with whom to share their riches. Four of the six UPD organizations have been split by AIFLD-induced dissidence. What was a potent, progressive and unified democratic labor movement in early 1984 is now in complete disarray, torn by feuds over principles and personalities that may never be mended. After several years of worthy work, AIFLD has permanently stained its image by forcing labor leaders to choose between survival by corruption or death with honor. And El Salvador's militant left looks on with undoubted satisfaction. Such are the Salvadoran grapes of wrath harvested by Bill Doherty's anticommunist freedom fighters. □

Notes

[1] Various UPD leaders confirmed to me that the UPD received a substantial amount to campaign for Duarte, and named the individuals charged with disbursing the funds—Tito Castro, Samuel Maldonado, Salvador Carazo, and Cristobal Aleman. Carazo himself admitted his role to the *Christian Science Monitor*.

[2] I arrived in El Salvador and made my initial contacts with the UPD just two months after the CTD elections, before the split between the UPD and AIFLD came into the open. Four UPD leaders told me in separate interviews that AIFLD had made it clear to them who it wanted elected in the new CTD. The four were thoroughly confused because to that point, neither former director Scofield in El Salvador nor AIFLD/Washington had ever tried so overtly to intervene in internal UPD politics. As the fraternal tone of the UPD's letter to Doherty on January 21, 1985 indicated, they all felt certain this interventionism was an aberration on the part of Bernie Packer rather than organization policy, and that it could be resolved by going through regular channels.

[3] AIFLD's deputy director in El Salvador, Donald Kessler, repeatedly denied to me that Castro was in any way connected with AIFLD. He contended that AIFLD's relationship with Castro was limited to their interaction with him via his position on the board of directors of AIFLD's major Salvadoran organization, the Unión Comunal Salvadorena (UCS). That contention is undercut, however, by numerous interviews with people inside and outside of AIFLD. Packer's predecessor as director in El Salvador, Rupert Scofield, said Packer was already working with Castro before Scofield even left the country in February 1984. Second, Packer's replacement, Clemente Hernandez, admitted shortly after his arrival in El Salvador in June 1985 that there were "evidently some problems with corruption" and that Tito Castro henceforth "would have nothing to do with the Institute." As of my time of departure from El Salvador in March 1986, it appeared Hernandez had remained true to his word.

[4] *Wall Street Journal* reporter Clifford Krausse later related how Kessler tried to exact his revenge on the labor leader who chaired the CTD assembly and walked out. Kessler visited the leader's organization, a large textile workers' union, and offered a large low-interest loan to buy a new motor for the union's bus if AIFLD's favored slate of opposition candidates was voted into office in an upcoming election. Krausse quoted Kessler in a front page *Journal* piece on December 31, 1985 as having boasted about the loan offer. Kessler had warned Krausse against using his name or the quote. "Be a good boy," he told Krausse, "and don't get involved in this."

[5] Doherty's pledge to the UPD was quoted to me independently and in the exact same words by four UPD leaders. Less than four months after Doherty's visit, AIFLD spokesman Jack Heberle admitted to both the *Miami Herald* and the *Los Angeles Times* that AIFLD was, in fact, phasing out the UPD because it had already served "a useful role" and was now "off to the left of Duarte."

[6] Details of the money offer were first provided to me by UPD leaders in March 1985 and subsequently verified by events. Salvadoran Labor Minister Julio Samayoa told me in May 1985 that he personally had not been approached by Carazo but that he "understood" that Carazo had made the offer to Duarte and to Rey Prendes and that it had been turned down. Carazo himself told Chris Norton of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Robert McCartney of the *Washington Post* that AIFLD had promised the money but never delivered. AIFLD denies ever having made the offer.

[7] This account appears in an unpublished *Monitor*

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dispatch by Chris Norton. Robert McCartney, who also sat in on the Carazo interview, used his admissions in a front-page story on the money offer for the *Washington Post* on March 20, 1985.

[8] That Pickering personally intervened in the matter to have Packer removed was confirmed to me by two high-ranking Embassy officials.

[9] Letter from SETISTA's board of directors to President Duarte, June 12, 1985. SETISTA complained in the same letter that Maldonado and Castro had swamped the Agrarian Reform Institute's payroll with hundreds of cronies since their taking office in June 1984, driving the institute more deeply into the red.

[10] Barrera made the statement in different interviews with James LeMoyne of the *New York Times* and with Robert Block of Reuters, the same week that AIFLD deputy director Donald Kessler told me that he didn't even know who Hugo Barrera and Patria Libre were.

[11] Ramon Mendoza, the second man in the UCS who was ousted by AIFLD, gave me copies of all correspondence the UCS and UPD had sent to AIFLD/Washington between January and June of 1985. After Doherty's trip to El Salvador in late January 1985, however, all action thereafter was deferred to AIFLD's people in El Salvador.

[12] Since my departure from El Salvador in February 1986, AIFLD has in fact succeeded in splitting ANIS into two groups, one affiliated with AIFLD's labor faction and the other remaining loyal to Esquino Lisco, who was forced to vacate the ANIS office by the government.

[13] AIFLD spokesman Heberle gloated over the UPD's disintegration in a letter to the *New York Times* on March 18, 1986. He described it as "a hollow shell run by a handful of self-appointed leaders, many of whom lost elections in their own organizations."

Duarte, the Salvadoran Unions, and the AIFLD

SAN SALVADOR—President José Napoleón Duarte has lost much popular support in the past year because of his conservative policies and a series of political mistakes, according to numerous observers here, including members of his Christian Democratic party.

Organized labor, once a major source of backing for Duarte, has swung against him. Union leaders charge that the president has reneged on his campaign promise to seek a negotiated settlement of the nation's civil war and has adopted pro-business economic policies. . . .

. . . [T]he labor movement . . . has become the focus of nonviolent opposition to the government in recent months.

"What worries me most is what is happening in the labor sector. This is going to become a factor of great influence," a high-ranking Salvadoran official said. He and several other observers said that Duarte had made a major political blunder in neglecting to maintain close communication with union leaders.

Several unions and union factions that once supported the Christian Democrats have now severed ties with the party. These groups, which represent at least 50,000 workers, have joined a new labor confederation that includes Marxist-oriented unions with links to the guerrillas.

"The government did not fulfill the promises of the social pact [with the unions] in any way. It has lost most of its social base," said Miguel Angel Vasquez, president of a public workers' union that deserted Duarte for the new federation. . . .

Union leaders, businessmen, and U.S. officials also accused the American Institute for Free Labor Development of weakening Duarte's union base. AIFLD, which is funded jointly by the AFL-CIO and the U.S. government, used its financial and political influence in late 1984 and early 1985 to try to push several unions to adopt more conservative political positions.

Several unions, and union factions, balked at the pressure and ended up joining the new, more radical confederation. A U.S. official said that AIFLD's strategy "totally backfired."

—From the *Washington Post*
Tuesday, March 25, 1986 □

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John Logue

Can Welfare States Survive in the Global Economy?

The welfare state was designed for a more insular world, a time when national policies were effective because the nation was the relevant unit. But that is now a subject for history classes. We have all been drawn into a global economy that threatens to swamp national policies and institutions. Even the United States, with its $4 trillion economy and gigantic domestic market, has been battered by international economic tides that have eroded portions of its rudimentary welfare programs for children, mothers, and the unemployed even as need for them grows.

The same tides are even more threatening to welfare states in small, open economies like those of the Scandinavian countries, which are far more dependent on the international economic cycle. These countries must handle the strain of stagnation and contraction while defending their societies in which the weakest members enjoy a modicum of economic security.

Scandinavian welfare policies need little introduction. The initial model, put in place in the 1930s, coupled maintenance of minimally adequate income levels for the urban working class and for family farmers with policies designed to stimulate employment. In the 1940s and 1950s, both full employment and the economic security provided by welfare measures depended upon economic growth. In Scandinavia the state undertook, through the public sector, a direct reallocation of a good portion of the growth dividend to the worst off. The inequality generated in a dynamic capitalistic market economy was ameliorated through well-funded public programs.

Economic growth and full employment eventually transformed the welfare state in Scandinavia. From their origins in the 1930s through the mid-1960s, welfare programs were designed for hard times. Benefits were set at minimum levels sufficient to keep body and soul together, to take care of the sick, the disabled, and the elderly, and to protect families against economic catastrophe. In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the full-employment economy allowed the model to change. Benefits were raised to levels sufficient to provide income maintenance for those remaining in the labor market during various forms of economic displacement and adjustment, including illness, short-term disability, unemployment, and the like. Programs for children and for assistance to the elderly, designed initially to provide support for the family's effort in these areas, were improved to the point that public-sector programs began to replace the family as the basic institution caring for the elderly and for children during the work week.

But the model also became increasingly dependent on the global economy. Today exports account for one-fourth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Sweden and Denmark and one-third in oil-dependent Norway; imports play a comparable role. (By contrast, exports represent under one-twelfth of the American GDP.) Scandinavian industrial companies export roughly 40 percent of their production, and companies on the leading edge of the economy—world-class companies—are totally dependent on exports. Sweden, for instance, with a population only about three-fourths that of Pennsylvania, has two major auto producers. Volvo sells three-fourths of its production of cars and buses and more than 90 percent of its trucks outside Sweden. Similarly, Saab sells

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two out of three cars and nine of ten trucks abroad.[1] Other major Swedish companies—Electrolux, ASEA, L.M. Ericsson, SKF—are equally export oriented. As a consequence, the Swedish economy is extraordinarily dependent on the world marketplace for its current health and its long-term viability.

From Sheltered Harbor to Global Economic Storms

WE ALL KNOW the initial cause of the economic miseries of the last decade: the industrial democracies and Third World countries had to adapt to a 1,200 percent increase in the price of oil between 1973 and 1983. That jacked up the general energy price level as a proportion of gross national product (GNP) by a factor of roughly three and ratcheted up inflation. Petroleum-producing countries, unable to expand their economies as quickly as their revenues, recycled their profits through Western banks, in part to finance oil purchases by nonpetroleum-producing Third World countries. In turn, newly industrializing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil desperately tried to expand exports to meet their debt service payments.

The problems of the internationalized economy were exacerbated by the economic policies adopted in response to oil price increases. Industrial democracies muddled through the first round of oil price increases in 1973-74 with policies that demonstrated little vision but probably did not actually worsen our problems. The second act of the energy-price drama in 1979-80, however, produced major policy innovations. In 1981 the new French Socialist government under François Mitterrand attempted a unilateral program of reform and recovery that was ultimately swamped by the international economic tide; Mitterrand's failure suggests that even countries with domestic economies of substantial size have lost their economic independence. New conservative administrations in Britain and the United States jettisoned national consensus for policies designed to promote economic revival by reinvigorating capitalism. An elixir of greed, apparently, would restore youth to otherwise mature capitalist economies.

While this unlikely panacea had no demonstrable constructive consequences for the basic economic structure of either nation, it created major rents in the social fabric in Britain, where police were on constant call to deal with distressingly regular race riots, football hooliganism, and uncharacteristically violent strikes. In the United States, the huge financing requirements for Mr. Reagan's policies have drained both domestic and foreign savings. The rapid, artificial appreciation of the dollar temporarily transferred much of the burden of financing the American military buildup abroad, though at substantial expense to our industrial base. The cost of being a net debtor to the rest of the world will be passed on to our children.

OTHER POLICIES, OF COURSE, were possible. By looking at the Scandinavian countries we can see how other nations, despite the more severe challenges they faced, dealt more successfully with the same problems, at least in the sense that it was not the weakest members of society—the lame, the halt, the poor, the sick, pregnant women, and babes in arms—who were expected to shoulder the heaviest burdens of the crisis.

The options for small, open industrial welfare states in today's world are far bleaker than those of the United States for three reasons:

(1) Not only are these states dependent on international trade, they have to meet low-wage competition in markets where they cannot appeal to protectionist sentiments because they too are foreign producers. Moreover, their home markets are too small to sustain their industry, and far too small to give them any bargaining clout in dealing with the Japanese;

(2) They have to control wages, since wage-push inflation could price them out of their foreign markets, and they have to push up productivity as fast or, if possible, faster than their competitors; that requires higher rates of reinvestment; and

(3) They have to meet this competition without reducing living standards—as we have done—or relaxing environmental and social standards. To do otherwise would be to abandon the gains of the past half century and destroy much of the social peace created

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through them. That is the lesson of Mrs. Thatcher's experience.

At the same time these states desperately need economic growth to fund welfare state programs. An instructive example of how these aims might be achieved can be found in the policies pursued to protect the Swedish economy and the welfare state based on it from the vicissitudes of the international economic downturn. I focus on Sweden because its policies present a coherent alternative consistent with these goals.

Responding to Crisis

THE SWEDISH REACTION to the crisis has had four major components. First, heavy public-sector spending has, to a substantial extent, insulated the economy against a decline in domestic demand. Public-sector expenditures went from about 50 percent of the GDP in 1974 when the crisis began to about 68 percent of the GDP in 1983.[2] This development is problematic in many ways, not least because of the heavy deficit it caused (13 percent of the GDP or roughly twice the Reagan deficits that have kept the credit markets in panic), but it has also been the single biggest factor in maintaining domestic demand and stimulating employment. During the decade of economic crisis, Sweden held its unemployment rate under 3 percent (despite the fact that female participation in the labor force is about ten percentage points higher than in many other countries, such as the U.S.) through a variety of selective, as well as general, labor-market measures.

One of the traditional problems of Keynesian measures of this scale in small, open economies has been the import-pull effect, in which a good portion of the stimulus of Keynesian policies is felt not in the domestic economy but in the countries that export to the Keynesians. That is obviously what has happened during the recovery in the U.S. in the last two years. A good portion of the $200 billion in the annual stimulus of deficit spending that the Reagan administration is pouring into consumer pockets has stimulated the import of Japanese video recorders, Toyotas, and even Volvos. What distinguishes Swedish Keynesianism is that much of the increase in public-sector spending is directed toward social services—such as expanding home care for the elderly and day care for children—where the direct import component is close to zero. Sharp increases in public spending for infrastructure—roads, bridges, rail lines, the Stockholm metro—have relatively small import components as well.[3] The heavy spending for energy conservation—another major source of the deficit—actually produces a net reduction in imports in the long run. There is a lesson here for us: It is possible to run strong Keynesian countercyclical policies without being overwhelmed by imports and *without resorting to protectionist measures.*

The second element of the Swedish policy response has been what could be called "supply-side socialism." The reason why the supply-siders in the U.S. failed so abysmally was not that it is not possible to manage a business-investment-led recovery. It is. The Swedish Social Democrats have been working on designing policies to do just that since 1938. What is otherworldly in the American supply-siders' economic theology is the assumption that hardheaded, profit-maximizing American businessmen will choose to act altruistically by sinking their tax cuts into new production facilities when the existing ones are only operating at 60 percent of capacity and when government paper yields 14 or 16 percent. It isn't in their interest. Certainly, if they all did invest, a recovery would be generated, but it is in every businessperson's interest that the recovery be generated by the investments of others while one's own risks are minimized and profits made from increasing utilization of existing capacity.

The Swedish Social Democrats have never expected businesspeople to act altruistically. If you want them to invest, don't give them the freedom to choose. The Swedes have put into place incentives to discourage or encourage investment as the exigencies of managing a countercyclical economic policy demanded. In periods of boom in the 1950s, temporary investment taxes were imposed to cool businesses' investment ardor, while during recessions tax-sheltered investment funds, laid aside by business in blocked bank accounts during good years, were released for the purchase of new machines and construction of new plants. "The

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idea," as Assar Lindbeck puts it in the standard text on Swedish economic policy, "is, as in the case of temporary investment taxes, to induce firms to change the timing of their investment expenditures from booms to recessions."[4]

The investment fund system was initiated in 1938, reformed in 1955, and perfected in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Combined with the more general tools of macroeconomic policy and specific labor-market measures, the options available to the Swedish economic managers provided ample leverage for stabilizing the domestic economy. But these measures seemed inadequate to bridge an international economic downturn.

Stockpiling Inventory

THE 1970S BROUGHT AN INNOVATION in economic policy designed specifically for managing the international cycle. Used for the first time on a small scale in 1972, the Swedish inventory production support scheme provided partial government financing for inventories that exporting firms built up by continuing normal production despite decreased international demand. The aim was to stockpile Swedish inventories during the international downturn, to finance them with cheap money borrowed abroad (interest rates are supposed to go down in a recession), and then to export the stockpiled goods into the international upturn, maintaining employment during the contraction and winning new markets during the expansion. Combined with the release of business investment funds, the inventory scheme kept the Swedish economy growing in 1975 while the rest of the industrial world contracted (the GDP grew 2.2 percent in Sweden and declined 0.9 percent in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries in Europe). The scheme ultimately did not succeed. When the international upturn came in 1976, it was not sufficient to eliminate Swedish stockpiles, and the stock plan was phased out in 1977—with a resulting sharp contraction (2.0 percent).[5] Had the recession stayed within the general postwar range of twelve to eighteen months, we would all be studying the Swedish success.

The third aspect of the Swedish effort to adapt to the new international environment concerns the basic Swedish attitude toward unemployment. Labor regards unemployment both as a tragedy for the individuals and families affected and as evidence of the irrationality of capitalism. Labor governments try to minimize unemployment and maintain the purchasing power of the unemployed. The Swedish Social Democrats have done that with considerable success, holding unemployment under 3 percent throughout the last decade through retraining and employment programs, and maintaining unemployment compensation at 90 percent of industrial wages.

But more than that, Swedish policy in the postwar period has come increasingly to treat the unemployment that economic downturns would otherwise create as an opportunity: an opportunity to provide, at a reasonable price, public goods and services which would otherwise not be provided, or which would strain resources. The tools are simple. The national government subsidizes the development of detailed plans by municipalities and government agencies for employment projects—generally improving the infrastructure—which are then put "on the shelf," as the Swedish phrase has it, until the government acts to release funds for these purposes in response to economic contraction. The government has discretionary spending power sufficient to fund the projects and the flexibility to implement them only where there is in fact local unemployment. Thus, government spending is generally timely, and bridge, road, and, to a substantial extent, apartment construction is used for countercyclical purposes, both increasing economic stability and providing vital infrastructure. In an energy-price-induced recession like the current one, it is not surprising that particular attention has been paid to insulating public buildings and housing, improving rail transportation, building district heating systems, and increasing cogeneration.

THE FINAL COMPONENT was not intended as a response to economic crisis at all. The extensive efforts to increase worker influence in the economy from the shop floor to the boardroom, from health and safety to co-ownership began

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before the economic storm clouds appeared on the horizon. Yet the implementation of measures increasing employee influence during the global crisis probably has had a good bit of influence on economic decisions at the level of the firm. The overriding employee interest in employment security creates additional pressure for higher rates of reinvestment, and the implementation of the wage-earner fund system that began in January 1984 has added a new source of capital for investment. It is possible, though far from certain, that the growth in employee equity capital through the funds may lessen pressure for wage increases as the funds' dividends are paid into the pension system. In any case, the enactment of the funds does seem to have moderated wage demands in 1983 and 1984.[6]

It is very difficult to predict the long-term impact of the growth of employee influence in a capitalistic economy. Reforms may undercut the entrepreneurial instincts and dampen the rate of innovation. On the other hand, there is no question that employee influence will also reduce pernicious, speculative practices, including nonproductive speculation in art, old coins, gold and the like. Similarly, it is more likely that other aspects of the internationalized economy, including Swedish multinational corporations activities and technology transfer, will be subject to substantial bargaining and compromise. Swedish national policy is to regulate international capital flows, limiting capital (and job) export in accordance with national interests, and I have yet to run across any Swede who views deindustrialization as a plausible path for the nation to follow. Maintaining the national industrial base is a sine qua non for any reasonable national economic policy. One can permit—and the Swedes have—the dismantling of some low-wage industries, such as portions of the textile, garment, and shoe industries, in order to absorb Third World imports in labor-intensive fields where the Swedes have no desire to compete on labor costs. But dismantling major national industrial assets, such as steel, auto, or the machine tool industries would strike most Swedes as a primrose path to national economic suicide.

One might note, parenthetically, that not only do Swedish policies make decent economic sense, they make political sense as well. The Swedish Social Democrats fought and won the September 1985 election precisely on the issue of their stewardship of the welfare state.

Coming in the Fall:
Argentina Today:
The Cultural Mood
by
Juan Corradi

What Can We Learn?

ARE THERE ANY lessons here for Americans? It is hard to draw comparisons between Sweden and the United States. Sweden is a small country, relatively easily managed, and national economic policies seem comprehensible to informed citizens; the United States' size is of a different order of magnitude, its policies fragmented and as inscrutable to the average person as modern particle physics. Yet it is hard to escape the sense that we are missing the opportunity of a generation in failing to deal with the issues of economic renewal when confronted by the globalization of the economy.

Instead of treating unemployment as an opportunity to provide goods and services in the public sector that have been long postponed, we prefer to junk the unemployed. Instead of encouraging reinvestment, our depreciation and tax write-off rules seem to have subsidized a massive reduction in capacity in major industries, such as steel, with the federally subsidized transfer of billions from that industry into others, such as oil.

Instead of channeling investment in accordance with human needs, we are plagued with speculative excesses. Gold bugs, silver corners, and commodity speculators seem to flourish. Mergermania has become epidemic. The new options exchanges, where one bets on the rise and fall of the value of the underlying stock or stock index, instead of investing in corporations themselves, have channeled immense sums into the Wall Street version of a Las Vegas casino. Ironically, a good portion of this is

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financed indirectly with the $1.2 trillion in pension funds that are supposed to be invested prudently to provide a secure retirement for employees whose jobs are now threatened.

This is not a law of nature. It is a matter of political choice. What Sweden's experiences mean is that we have better choices. □

Notes

This article is based on a talk given at the Third Annual Conference on Industry and Society, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, October 1984.

[1] The Volvo and Saab figures are for 1982 and are taken from those companies' annual reports.

[2] These and the figures that follow are derived from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Economic Surveys: Sweden* (Paris: OECD, 1973-84).

[3] Swedish policy is premised on a division of the economy into two sectors: (1) an internationally competitive sector that includes production for export and domestic production that competes with imports and (2) a sheltered, noncompetitive sector that includes the public sector, services, and production in noncompetitive markets, like housing and construction. To maintain international competitiveness, wages in the noncompetitive sector follow competitive-sector wages. Similarly, fiscal stimulus can be directed to sectors where the spillover in imports is limited. Cf. Don Schwerin, "Nordic Responses to 'Fiscal Crisis.'" In Norman Furniss, ed., *Futures for the Welfare State*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Forthcoming.

[4] Assar Lindbeck, *Swedish Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 98.

[5] For analysis of the inventory support policy, see OECD, *Economic Surveys: Sweden*, 1975, pp. 7-9, and 1977, pp. 12-14.

[6] For an analysis of the push for worker influence in corporate decisions and of the implications of the wage-earner funds, see Don Hancock and John Logue, "Sweden: The Quest for Economic Democracy," *Polity*, vol. 17, no. 2 (Winter 1984), pp. 248-270.

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THE EDITORS □

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Dealing With the Nuclear Threat

Erazim Kohák

George Kateb's "Nuclear Weapons and Individual Responsibility," (*Dissent*, Spring 1986) achieves an instant credibility by his open acknowledgment of what we prefer to ignore—the possibility of nuclear annihilation and the anonymity of the powers that control that possibility, impervious to the considerations that sway individuals—such as the loss of all we love, of trees, dogs, and wheatfields, not to mention ourselves, in a nuclear holocaust. It is surely important that that unacknowledged reality be made overt and become a part of our decision-making.

It is, however, not so clear that this well-deserved credibility should extend beyond the initial recognition to Kateb's proposals for dealing with the nuclear threat. These are somewhat surprising. "Remote as the connection may seem," he tells us, "the encouragement of state activism, or the failure to resist it, contributes to nuclear statism and thus to the disposition to accept and inflict massive ruin and, with that, the unwanted and denied possibility of extinction." Given his definition of state activism—which includes everything beyond the most minimal police function allowed to the community by classical liberalism—this would mean that if we encourage, say, the Social Security system or even if we just fail to resist it, we are contributing to a future nuclear holocaust. In turn it would seem to follow that if we wish to prevent nuclear extinction, we should, for starters, dismantle the Social Security system, abolish Amtrak and put an end to farm subsidies, all in the name of saving the world from a holocaust. The nuclear threat has become a rather novel argument for Ronald Reagan's social policies.

To be sure, such overextension of credibility is by no means unique to Kateb's argument. In great part, the debate about nuclear weaponry has been so fruitless because authors who raise the issue invariably attempt to use the clear moral imperative of preventing extinction to advance some less clearly imperative agenda of their own, whether it is the struggle against capitalist imperialism, godless Communism or, in this case, state activism. Kateb is actually more honest about it than most. "Even if nuclear weapons did not exist," he tells us, "and there were no possibility of extinction, the fight against state activism would have to be carried on." That, it seems, is his real concern—not nuclear weaponry but the struggle against "state activism" and the advancement of "individualism." The nuclear threat only adds urgency to this basic struggle.

I do not wish to question the reality of the nuclear threat or the urgency of all efforts to prevent nuclear extinction. That possibility is as horrifyingly real as Kateb would have it, though the recognition of it is of an older date than he supposes. In the 1950s, long before Jonathan Schell's very fine book and before Günther Anders, no less a man than Karl Jaspers made it the focus of his thought. There were others as well. It is simply not true that the concern about the apocalyptic possibilities of nuclear weaponry made its appearance only with the coming of the "cultural revolution" and of the "me generation" that followed it. The imperative of preventing nuclear annihilation is a clearly acknowledged one, quite independent of the recent concern with "state activism." The claim that the survival of humankind requires dismantling the Social Security system cannot be made credible simply by invoking the real and undeniable horror of a nuclear holocaust.

Just how does Kateb arrive at his surprising conclusion? Largely, I believe, by playing fast and loose with both theory and experience. Invoking the 17th century social contract theories, he sets up what purports to be an exhaustive dichotomy between a totalitarian state (he uses the French

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terms, *étatisme* and *dirigisme*, since he draws largely on French thought and experience in the decade following the upheavals of 1968) and a rather abstract "individualism," marked by a "well-bred contempt for authority," which denies the legitimacy of all social constraints not justified by individual self-interest. In terms of this polarity, any attempt to take seriously the need to create an infrastructure of civilization, whether by protecting the environment, succoring the aged and the infirm, or assuring adequate transportation and communication, becomes automatically "totalitarian," or, in Kateb's words, a manifestation of the "passion of statism." (In one particularly farfetched Lacanian excursus, Kateb suggests that even attempts to protect the environment are an expression of a totalitarian passion for regimentation and perhaps of a death wish, not of a genuine concern about the danger of ecological extinction.) The only policy that would escape the charge of "state activism," it seems, would be laissez-faire carried to extremes undreamt of even by our Victorian ancestors. Then, since "state activist" regimes are most likely to make use of nuclear weapons—"... where the state is regarded ... as the source of contented and adjusted and regularized life [through its welfarist policies and other interventions], it is subtly empowered to take the next step and become the source of mass death"—the struggle against state activism acquires the moral sanction of the struggle against nuclear extinction. And there we have it: although Reagan's defense policy is the quintessence of statism, his social policies strike a valiant blow against it. The master and the serf, so beloved by all Hegelians, have become one.

I BELIEVE THAT THE FATAL FLAW that leads to this paradoxical conclusion is Kateb's binary vision of an abstract anarchic individualism on the one hand and of "statism" on the other. Such an exhaustive polarization is problematic already on theoretical grounds. Though it might be made consistent with the views of Thomas Hobbes, who formulated his political views at the exiled Stuart court, it is in clear conflict with the views of John Locke, who learned his politics in the Netherlands and under the Commonwealth—and whom Kateb also invokes. Locke does not conceive of an anarchically individualistic state of nature and an intrinsically totalitarian civil state. As he presents it, humans in the natural condition are already humans in a community. The state of nature, he insists, has a law of nature to govern it. The social contract is simply a formal recognition of a naturally existing community, not an arbitrary imposition on atomic individuals.

Lived experience here bears out Locke, not Hobbes. The atomic individual is a legal fiction. Individual humans in reality are and can be individuals only within the context of a community. It is the ties of family, language, and custom, the bond of common hope and shared vision, that make individual moral growth possible. And not only that: it is this well-functioning social matrix that makes a noncoercive community of mutual respect possible. As Hobbes knew and experience amply confirms, it is atomic individuals, recognizing no bonds other than those justified by self-interest, who can only be governed by coercion.

And therein lies the rub. The abstract "individualism" that Kateb advances as "the most adequate idealism [*sic*]" for a nuclear age is not an alternative to statism. Quite the contrary. It is precisely what makes statism both possible and necessary. All the notorious instances of statism, whether dramatic like the Soviet or tedious like the French, came into being as a response to the breakdown of a functioning community. It is precisely when the infrastructure of civilization breaks down that society becomes quite necessarily a disciplining society.

Perceiving social coexistence as a dialectic between individual demands, cast in the role of forces of freedom, and social needs, cast in the role of illicit repression, may appeal to the "me generation," since it endows its egocentric claims with the gloriole of "struggle against oppression," but it is fundamentally unproductive. Not anarchic individuals but free and responsible individuals in a community provide an alternative to paternalism and statism. Not a "contempt for authority," well-bred or not, but a willingness to assume personal responsibility for the common weal, a readiness for in-

Silver Lining

The elections in France this spring, which gave a parliamentary majority to a coalition of conservatives, nevertheless held some unexpected bright spots for the Socialists. Despite predictions of a huge defeat, the Socialists gained 32 percent of the popular vote and remained the largest single party in parliament. And they did this by winning 40 percent of the vote among voters from 18 to 24 years of age, and 41 percent among voters from 25 to 34. □

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volvement in authority that transforms its anonymous "they" into a "we," is what is needed. The opposition is not one between "individualism" and "statism." Those belong together, as two sides of a coin. The real opposition is between the polarization represented by the dialectic of statism and individualism on the one side and the committed building of a democratic community of participants in the common weal on the other. Or, metaphorically, the fundamental opposition is not that between the master and the serf, but between the master and the serf on the one side and the New England town meeting on the other.

Then what does all this have to do with nuclear weaponry? Precious little, since contempt for authority is not likely to inhibit that authority from pursuing its desired course. The struggle against the threat of nuclear annihilation demands more than a gesture of protest. It demands the difficult and determined work of building a community of morally mature, free, and responsible individuals who would make statism superfluous—just as anarchic individuals make it necessary.

And here, finally, may lie Kateb's great and valid insight: a community that does not need the disciplining hand of authority requires morally mature citizens, prepared to accept responsibility for the common weal rather than leave it up to "the authorities." Individualism, not in the sense of heedless gratification of personal whims but in the Enlightenment sense of *Bildung*, of fostering the growth of each individual to moral maturity, is the cornerstone on which free and responsible societies are built.

Jean L. Cohen

At first glance, George Kateb's stirring plea for renewed moral reflection on the subject of human extinction seems utterly unobjectionable. The nuclear situation *does* create a radical discontinuity with the past: for the first time human extinction is conceivable not as the result of some natural disaster, but as the work of our own hands. It is to Kateb's credit that he has reopened the discussion. The philosophical position he defends with respect to this issue is a coherent one. And yet, there is something disturbing about the way in which he addresses the subject. My initial reaction was similar to the one I had upon reading the work on the subject most admired by Kateb, *The Fate of The Earth*: to acquiesce speechlessly, for what *can* one say when confronted with the topic in this way?

But the particular and exclusively moral terms in which Kateb poses the issues point us away from addressing the political dilemmas of the nuclear age.

Kateb explicitly calls upon writers to withdraw the subject of human extinction from both common sense and policy discourse and to "entrust it to philosophers." By implication, the common-sense standpoint does not take the moral issue seriously enough, while a political approach dissolves it into strategic or instrumental considerations. The terms of the debate are thus considerably and misleadingly narrowed: they reduce to a set of moral either/or propositions: Either we are for or against human life; either we are for or against life-threatening nuclear weaponry; either we passively accept raison d'état or we consider every state that threatens to use nuclear weapons to be illegitimate.

I can neither go along with this way of posing the issue nor restrict my comments to the purely moral plane Kateb delineates. I shall, instead, insist upon the indivisibility of the moral and political dimensions of the issues and pose some political questions that are unfortunately buried in Kateb's moralistic argumentation.

Kateb is trying to do three things. First, he would force us to confront the threat to human existence posed by nuclear weapons, and persuade us to embrace the position of "no use." Second, more subtly, he attempts to use the whole nuclear issue to justify his version of philosophical individualism based on a number of seventeenth-century natural-right theories. Third, more subtly still, he attacks etatism, which, in our context, amounts to the politics and culture of the welfare state. Let me address each point in turn.

II

Kateb is right to argue that any *use* of nuclear weapons carries the real danger of escalation to a general nuclear war and hence, extinction. Distinctions between tactical and strategic weapons, be-

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tween limited strikes and all-out attack are technically and morally dubious. Using his own version of Pascal's wager, Kateb at this point takes leave of all politics. Given the scope of the danger, deterrence is identified with the same immorality as actual use on any scale. It may not be obvious but it is an inevitable and only thinly disguised trend of Kateb's argument that he is advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament. Why?

It is obvious that, by definition, *having* nuclear weapons carries the threat of their use. It cannot be assumed that any country possessing such weapons would never at least threaten to use them. For the very point of having them is to ensure that others take the possibility seriously enough not to provoke their threatened use. Thus, the obvious conclusion that Kateb wants us to draw from the slogan of "no use" is to press for *total* nuclear disarmament.

From the political and common-sense point of view (I insist on both), this moral position translates into the advocacy of *unilateral* nuclear disarmament—we in the U.S. cannot press effectively for the disarmament of the USSR (especially given the impossibility of any autonomous movements there parallel to our own peace movement). We can only pressure our own superpower. We must believe or hope that our exemplary unilateral actions will be imitated by others. But even if there is no such hope, it follows from Kateb's argument that I as a moral individual must insist on the destruction of the weapons in my own country where I have some say, *regardless* of how much the other side may benefit from such a policy.

As a regulative principle, "no use" or "total disarmament" could play the important role of pushing for the greatest possible reduction of arsenals. And I support without reservation politics aimed at mutual reduction to the barest minimum of nuclear stockpiles. Moreover, this principle would invalidate the unacceptable policy position of the U.S. (and France) of a "limited" first use in case of massive conventional aggression in Europe by the Soviets. But Kateb clearly wants this principle to function as the political guideline for judgments about the *legitimacy* of governments. Those that rely on a deterrent are, he suggests, illegitimate. Thus, whatever Kateb says otherwise about the legitimacy of the U.S. government/system, in effect, all nuclear powers have illegitimate governments.

The issue of the deterrent, about which Kateb is uncompromising, is nevertheless the Achilles' heel of his analysis. Knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons involves in itself a threat that is here to stay and in some sense is identical with the issue of deterrence. We will use them if . . . ; we will make them and use them if. . . . From the normative point of view there is little difference between these warnings. Indeed, the warnings do not even have to be uttered: possession and knowledge are in themselves threatening.

But deterrence as it now operates, however dubious morally, can be done away with through unilateral fiat only at great political *and* moral cost. Since we exist within a system of states that will last either until the emergence of a world empire (undesirable) or a stateless or federated world society (unlikely), it is naive to think that at least some states will not seek to have the most advanced weaponry available. To argue, in such a context, that all governments which have/threaten to use nuclear weapons are illegitimate is to imply that the only polities that are worth defending (those that respect rights and are formally democratic in Kateb's view) must be defenseless in order to retain their legitimacy!

The political paradox involves a moral one. Assuming for a moment that statism is evil and individualism is good, Kateb's scenario can only mean that the states with the highest degree of statism and the lowest level of human rights would be in a position to dictate to those embodying the opposite principles. The full exercise of individual rights in internal politics could lead to the international collapse of these rights. And even if such a consequence is only a possible one—Pascal's wager could apply equally to this other, infinitely evil outcome. In short, Kateb's argumentation tends to involve an absolute opposition between the values of life and freedom, even if he marshals the forces of individual freedom on behalf of life.

If the choice were life or freedom, anyone would probably choose life. But as long as the enemies of freedom can be deterred, the choice may not be an absolute one—humankind can hope to have both. Kateb, by depriving precisely the legitimate governments of means of defense (why should conventional weapons of mass destruction escape his strictures?), urges us implicitly to put life, not freedom, above all else. Such an outcome is hardly good evidence for the moral philosophy he seeks to defend.

III

THE CORE OF KATEB'S ESSAY is that the doctrine of moral individualism bequeathed to us from seventeenth-century Protestant England and America is the best philosophical tradition for showing the illegitimacy of governments having/threatening use of nuclear weapons, and for justifying the right

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of resistance. Certainly one can refer back to this set of doctrines, but it is not the *only* tradition of moral philosophy adequate to the task. Taoism would do just as well in revealing the absolute immorality of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, it seems to me that Kateb's purpose is almost the reverse of what he states: he does not *simply* use moral individualism to demonstrate the immorality of nuclear weapons. Rather, he intends to utilize the explosiveness of the nuclear issue to legitimate the tenets of a dogmatic philosophical position.

The various groundings of individualistic natural-right theory available to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers—nature, physics, God—are not so readily available to us. The old self-evident truths are no longer self-evident—they have to be argued for. It is thus surprising that Kateb did not choose the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to sustain his case. The position of Kant is not based on dogmatic assumptions and involves a far more universalist attitude to the dignity and rights of *all* human beings than anything to be found in the seventeenth century. Indeed, one might be tempted to derive, in the nuclear age, an absolute pacifism from a Kantian categorical imperative, and traces of such argumentation are present in Kateb's essay. But Kant was *also* a philosopher of freedom who could not possibly admit heteronomy even in defense of life. This distinguishes his position from that of Hobbes, one of Kateb's models. Hobbes was all too eager to trade off freedom for life and security with all of the well-known statist consequences in his theory.

Far be it from me to deny the catalogue of rights inherited from the natural-right theory of Locke and his forerunners. But today argumentation with respect to these rights requires free public spaces and open democratic discussion. I would thus argue, against Kateb's dogmatic individualism, that individual rights are not the given, unquestionable substratum of the political process, but rather, that democratic public spaces within which rights can be posited are the core of individual rights.

IV

THE KEY COMPONENTS of the seventeenth-century theories upon which Kateb draws to vindicate the right to resist illegitimate nuclear governments are the Hobbesian right to self-preservation and the Lockean notion of having property in oneself. Despite his references to the Levellers and his mention of the "political rights" to vote and hold office, neither democracy nor the notion of a political public sphere play any role in Kateb's argumentation other than the instrumental one of protecting the rights of the private individual. Following Hobbes and Locke, Kateb implicitly derives all the other rights from the absolute right to life of every individual. Accordingly, the only acceptable purpose of legitimate governments is to secure individual rights. Obviously the point is that those governments having nuclear weapons threaten (some) innocent individual's life and are thus rightfully resisted in the name of individual rights. The limits to government set by Kateb are transgressed by the threatened use of nuclear weapons—such governments thereby become statist.

Nevertheless, the last few pages of Kateb's essay reveal that state-activism *with or without nuclear weapons* is the real target of his individualism. "Even if nuclear weapons did not exist, and there were no possibility of extinction, the fight against state-activism would have to be carried on. But the link between state-activism and extinction suggests itself and a cultivated individualism must be enlisted against such activism. . . ." This very revealing statement maintains that the solution to statism is more individualism! Individual sovereignty should replace and control state prerogative.

But surely Kateb knows that it was precisely in the name of providing security (of life) to every individual, that Hobbes justified absolute amoral political power and transferred the sovereignty of the individual to the state. Surely he knows that Locke's extension of the right to life to the right to property presupposes a strong and fully sovereign state able to protect both. And surely he sees the *continuity* between the so-called minimal state based on the principle of protecting the rights to life and property, and the welfare state that simply extends the principles of security of life from existence and property to well-being. Indeed, the paternalism, instrumentalism and therapeutic welfarism he criticizes have been fostered precisely on the basis of the individualist principles and the specific "purposes of government" that he defends.

Yes, Kateb does know all this. He even cites the famous Tocquevillian linkage between privatization, individualization, and statism (democratic despotism). He also cites the Arendtian and Foucaultian critiques of the welfare state, without, however, bothering to mention that the latter two insisted upon the interconnection between the individualism of natural-right theories, especially Hobbes's, illusions of individual sovereignty in the private sphere, and statism. With respect to Tocqueville, the error is more serious than that of omission; it is one of misrepresentation for political purposes. For it is *not*, as Kateb would have it,

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Tocqueville's thesis that democratic despotism derives from *insufficient* individualism. For Tocqueville, statism derives from insufficient political democracy and a surfeit of atomization and individualization. It was Tocqueville who advocated a multiplicity of participatory public spaces in civil society as the only solution to individual passivity and to statism on the part of formally democratic governments with paternalist tendencies.

Clearly Kateb wants none of this—limited representative democracy as it exists is as far as he is willing to go along the path of democratization. Instead, Kateb wants a universalistic interpretation of human rights to ground the attack on nuclear weapons and on state interventionism. But it is hard to see how his cultivated moral individualism can measure up to this task. Surely if they have accomplished nothing else, the peace movements (not even mentioned by Kateb) have shown that only the democratization of existing public spaces and the creation of new ones can place the nuclear issue on the agenda. Only the further democratization of formally democratic states and of civil societies that already guarantee individual rights can counter the negative aspects of statism. The error of the peace movements, one that Kateb shares, is their effort to resolve the nuclear issue on the basis of moral commitment alone, forgetting politics in two senses: the reality of the state systems and the desirability of a democratic polity. Only by keeping the three together can we hope to survive the nuclear age in a condition of freedom.

Michael J. Sandel

There are many things wrong with destroying humankind—the lives lost, the suffering and pain, the futures denied. But these terrible things are also wrong with wars that spare the species. What makes the nuclear nightmare different is not simply the scale of suffering or the number of deaths, but the possibility that human history could come to an end. Unlike other instruments of destruction, nuclear war introduces the possibility of extinction, and this possibility makes a moral difference. But what does this difference consist in? What is the moral difference between the loss of human lives and the end of human life?

Such speculation may seem as idle as it is grim. But as George Kateb rightly insists, policy must answer to philosophy, even a policy so powerfully governed by military and technological imperatives as nuclear deterrence. What is puzzling is not his enterprise but his answer. According to Kateb, the moral crux of the nuclear peril consists in the fact that nuclear war violates individual rights. If this seems a small complaint for so fateful an event, Kateb claims nonetheless that the doctrine of individualism is "the most adequate idealism" for the nuclear age, the moral philosophy best suited "to see the nuclear predicament truly and to protest and resist its perpetuation."

Kateb believes that individualist principles rule out the use of "any nuclear weapon, of any size, for any purpose, by any country." This he calls "the no-use doctrine." Since the only end of legitimate government is to protect individual rights, and since nuclear war violates those rights, no use of nuclear weapons is morally permissible. Those who use nuclear weapons forfeit their right to govern, and can justifiably be overthrown, by violence if need be, by their fellow citizens or others. Indeed, even the threat to use nuclear weapons, implicit in the doctrine of deterrence, is at odds with legitimate government, and gives rise to the right to resist.

Kateb's hard line against nuclear war seems to offer a firmness appropriate to the peril. And as Kateb reminds us, it is the peril of extinction that makes the nuclear world "utterly distinct." But why, from the standpoint of individualism, *is* the destruction of humankind a loss beyond the loss of lives? Why should we worry about the survival of the world, apart from the reasons we have to worry about the survival of the millions who comprise it? By tying his case to an individualistic ethic, Kateb obscures the distinctness of the peril he would confront; he makes it difficult to see how extinction could be, so to speak, a fate worse than death.

There are at least two ways of accounting for the special loss of extinction; neither fits well with the individualism Kateb defends. The first appeals to the common world we share as human beings. As

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Hannah Arendt writes,

> The common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when we die. It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but also with those who were here before and with those who will come after us.

According to Arendt, the permanence of the common world is essential to the possibility of human meaning. Only by engaging in significant action can mere mortals aspire to an "earthly immortality." But to escape the ruin of time, such acts must be remembered; meaning depends on memory. As the common world is the carrier of memory, no less than the possibility of human meaning depends on its survival. It is from this point of view that Jonathan Schell describes the nuclear predicament as "a crisis of life in the common world."

A second case against extinction appeals to those particular common worlds defined by peoples and nations, cultures and communities. The memories they bear draw their resonance from local references and traditions. The events they recall have meaning for their members even when they lack universal significance. To care for the fate of a community is to care for a way of life more enduring than an individual life, but less expansive than humanity in general.

dissent

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This explains why genocide is a crime more heinous than the many murders it entails. To destroy not only persons but also a people is to extinguish a language and culture, a distinctive way of being. By destroying a world, even one more bounded than the world of humankind, genocide intimates the ultimate extinction. It diminishes our humanity by effacing one of its distinctive expressions.

The idea that we should cherish the common worlds we inhabit draws Kateb's emphatic rebuke. "Such a way of conceiving a people does not answer to the American experience." It is alien, "Old World," "folk-mystique," a piece of superstition. Far from an argument against annihilation, the conviction that cultures and peoples are worth preserving "constitutes a fertile source of the possibility of extinction." Once we believe that a people outlives the individuals who at any moment comprise it, we are more likely to prefer our own kind, to fight for abstractions, to travel down the road of massive ruin. "The idea of a people is a pernicious atavism," the very thing modern individualism is meant to cure.

Those who prize communal ties need to guard against the decay of pride into chauvinism, especially where the community commands, as it sometimes does, the power of a state. The suggestion that solidarity as such is a slippery slope to statism, however, is a caricature of vast proportions. Nor does Kateb say enough about his individualistic alternative to show whether it can overcome such familiar difficulties as sustaining a scheme of rights without appealing to a sense of community beyond the social contract. But leaving aside these broader questions of political theory, the question remains how Kateb can cast extinction as a special kind of peril, while at the same time denying any notion of a common world worth preserving. If individualism teaches us to outgrow all solidarities, what reason does it leave to love the world? And if we have no reason, why worry so about extinction?

The nuclear peril is different because it threatens us whole; it threatens the continuities that situate us in the world. In the individualist view, the extinction of the species can only be another case, a bigger case, of murder. Kateb seems to concede as much when he writes, "The emphasis is on the death of millions of individuals." But this denies our sense that the loss of the world is a loss beyond the loss of lives. The language of individual rights does not help us say what is wrong with nuclear war. Without some kind of communal language, the distinctness of the nuclear age is likely to defy description.

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George Kateb Replies

The response of Jean L. Cohen and Erazim Kohák are, for the most part, polemical. I have no wish to defend my views against polemical attack, or to answer an attack with an attack. Cohen's response does, however, raise some serious questions, and I would like to comment briefly on two of them.

I

COHEN SAYS, "IT MAY NOT BE OBVIOUS, but it is an inevitable and only thinly disguised trend of Kateb's argument that he is advocating unilateral disarmament." I do not deny that some who take seriously the possibility of massive ruin or the qualitatively distinct possibility of human and natural extinction may come to believe that unilateral nuclear disarmament is necessary. It may even be the case that such a conclusion is the only right one to draw. But I do not think that it is the only right conclusion; in fact, I incline to the view that it may be a wrong one. My hunch is that such a unilateral step might increase the chances of ruin or extinction by encouraging other countries to enter the nuclear field, their statist minds filled with fantasies of uninhibited power plays. Even if one confined oneself to a concern for ruin and extinction, and did not take into account any other sort of more conventional principle, one could make a strong case for avoiding unilateral nuclear disarmament.

I am not sure, but I think that I could accept some version of the doctrine of deterrence. I am sure, though, that it cannot be Cohen's version, which is an enlarged doctrine of deterrence. The version that may be acceptable to me is minimal, very restricted. I have sympathy for the position of the Catholic bishops of the United States, which allows provisional acceptance of a minimal theory of deterrence on condition that nuclear states work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. But elimination will be politically impossible for as long as one can imagine. I am also sympathetic to the theory of "existential" deterrence brilliantly suggested by McGeorge Bundy. Though denouncing it as a bluff, Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois has nicely given the gist: You say that you would retaliate with nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack, while all along persuasively and unmistakably indicating that you wouldn't.

Yet Hyde may err in thinking that that is the end of the matter. The mere fact that the United States sincerely says that it would not retaliate does not mean that, faced with an attack, it would be able to live up to what it had sincerely been saying all along. Its reaction would be unpredictable. In that unpredictability lies the deterrent force. On the other hand, to say all along that there will be nuclear retaliation is to adopt an inhuman position. To say that because it is inhuman it is not credible is false. As W. W. Rostow said: "Credible deterrence in the nuclear age lies in being prepared to face the consequence if deterrence fails—up to and including all-out nuclear war."

The heart of a minimalist theory of deterrence has a number of components. The main one is that the nuclear deterrent exists only to deter, and what it exists to deter is only a first use of nuclear weapons. It does not exist to deter all sorts of unwanted political behavior. It does not exist to deter, for example, nonnuclear policies or acts of war by a nuclear state, or to threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear reprisal. I believe that these latter policies and speculative policies are invalid. Unfortunately, the nuclear doctrine of the United States includes these enlarged meanings of deterrence. My judgment is that forfeiture of office would occur theoretically whenever officeholders acted in accordance with these elements of nuclear doctrine. That is, they would forfeit office if they used nuclear weapons first against nuclear states in a case where the existence of these weapons had failed to deter some kind of unwanted behavior; or if they merely threatened to use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear power. All first uses and all specific (as distinguished from existential) threats compel the judgment that officeholders have forfeited the right to stay in office.

There are other components to a minimalist theory of deterrence. Their guiding precept is that every effort to achieve a stunning breakthrough in nuclear weapons technology be abandoned. The ultimate reason is to prevent the desperate fear and then the paranoid panic that must ensue when another state feels that time is working against it—the sort of fear that Thucydides said Sparta felt when faced with Athenian aggrandizement. Obviously, this guiding precept applies not only to the United States. But because of this country's energy, wealth, and virtuosic drive, it may apply especially to the United States. The plea for a nuclear weapons freeze is in line with the precept,

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and so are at least some of the plans for arms control.

II

COHEN SAYS, "INDEED, THE PATERNALISM, instrumentalism and therapeutic welfarism he criticizes have been fostered precisely on the basis of the individualist principles that he defends." Now, my concern in the piece published in *Dissent* (which was the first of three lectures on the relevance of several doctrines of individualism to the nuclear situation) is with the individualism of individual personal and political rights. I do not exclusively associate this individualism with any one thinker, nor do I say that any idea found in any earlier thinker is right as it is and needs no revision. I say that the Levellers, Hobbes, Locke, Tocqueville, and Mill provide inspiration to further thinking. There are numerous American sources as well. If, therefore, an individualist idea here or there has actually lent or would seem now to lend encouragement to the growth of state power, one would have to take that possibility into account. But because I was working, in the first lecture, with an individualism of personal and political rights, I believe that I worked with a cluster of concepts that stand in perpetual antagonism to the exalted or energetic idea of the state and hence to any mystification of it. Individual human dignity is inextricably tied to suspecting, restraining, and confining the state power, and resisting its extension beyond a certain point. What is feared is a condition of psychological dependence and diminishment as much as unjust or inefficient policies. As Mill says in chapter eight of his book on representative government: "Every one is degraded, whether aware of it or not, when other people, without consulting him, take upon themselves unlimited power to regulate his destiny."

Of course, democratic political rights are essential to the avoidance of this condition. But let us notice that *dirigisme* (state-activism), the servant and support of *étatisme*, is always an exercise of executive or administrative power. Though a democratic legislature acting as a result of democratic participatory pressure enacts *dirigiste* legislation, the entrusted work is done by bureaucracies. The power belongs to bureaucracies. The detailed interpretation and application belong to bureaucracies. Democratic politics can facilitate bureaucratic ruling. But anyone who takes individual human dignity seriously must oppose state-activism. Naturally, one of the basic methods of opposition is voluntary association. We should remember, however, that the practice of voluntary association is suffused with the very spirit that suffuses the individualist understanding of the proper origin of legitimate government; whether it be the consent of individuals in the immediate postrevolutionary period, or the consent given (if it is given) by each individual as she or he attains adulthood. It is scarcely an accident that the practice of *voluntary* association grows only in societies committed to the idea of contracting individuals. Nothing I said disparages such practice. When I claim that individualism must itself be the source of resistance to state-activism, even when (especially when) it supplies some of the energies of state-activism, I am referring, in part, to the inward affiliation between it and the practice of voluntary association. The practice exists not only to work on government, or to work against it, but also to work instead of it.

Historically, the degradation Mill refers to comes before the individualism of personal and political rights. The parental state and the war-making state are the same thing, and this kind of state dominated European mentality long before individualist resistance to it arose. Is there something within the individualism of personal and political rights that supplies some of the energies of state-activism? I doubt it. I believe that the individualism of personal and political rights is not consistent with itself when it promotes state-activism. Yet I know that there are humane sources of state-activism. Following Tocqueville, I think that it is likely that individualism from within itself promotes state-activism when it is the individualism of personal rights unconnected to political rights, or connected belatedly or artificially. This kind of individualism consists in defining the good life as living for oneself and for one's own, and hence living for domestic intimacy, religious piety, and material gratification. Such a life need not promote state-activism, though it is certainly compatible with it; even as it is compatible with the minimal state. Circumstances will decide whether the "good" private life becomes dependent on state-activism. But when, from the start, individualism is dedicated to political rights as well as to personal rights, dependence on the state must be felt as abhorrent. And when individualism goes on to inspire "an original relation to the universe," dependence on the state is scorned; though dependence on a boss is scarcely ideal.

The more relevant point is that in the United States the greatest impetus to state-activism has come from an unacceptably swollen notion of personal rights. Claims are made in the language of rights, but what is being claimed is not a right but a benefit or a cure. One example is the way in which

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the effort to end legal discrimination has turned into a continuously invasive effort to achieve affirmative action. Another is the way in which the sense of being slighted has been turned into a litigious demand for the processing of grievances. In both examples, individuals try to use coercive administrative methods in place of the proper cultural methods of persuasion. The result is an inexorable growth of state bureaucratic power, and with it, the spreading sense that we are all either wards of the state or culprits mischievously defending injustice. But even these tendencies that derive from a swollen notion of personal rights may be minor in comparison with the effects of the overall project of furthering socioeconomic equality (as distinguished from the struggle against poverty and misery). This project is historically perhaps the most important source of state-activism. It is not a project of any version of genuine individualism. It is, however, the project of *Dissent*. It must be reexamined by its humane adherents, not because it has any chance of great success in the United States, but because adherence to it withdraws humane passion and talent from the most urgent mission: thinking about everything as if for the first time. That means thinking from the perspectives of avoiding massive ruin and possible human and natural extinction. It also becomes much easier to recognize and resist state pathologies of every sort—including the pathologies of information-gathering, surveillance, and thought-control—when the project of socioeconomic equality is abandoned for the reason that it is inevitably joined to state-activism. It becomes mixed up with and provides a cover for the project of pervasive social discipline. There can be no society-wide democratic socialism or social democracy in the modern age; there can be only statist socialism or social democratic statism. The only really emancipatory cause is anti-state. If the theoretical price for the reduction of state power is a great decrease in the number of opportunities for democratic politics, so be it.

III

Michael Sandel's response is certainly not polemical. I admire the reserved expression of its passion. He says, "... the question remains how Kateb can cast extinction as a special kind of peril, while at the same time denying any notion of a common world worth preserving. If individualism teaches us to outgrow all solidarities, what reason does it leave to love the world?" The second and third lectures attempt to answer this question. I can give only a brief indication of them here.

I propose that the great democratic individualist thinkers (Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman) and the great antidemocratic individualist thinkers (Nietzsche and Heidegger) point to an attachment to human and natural existence that may surpass in intensity any other kind of attachment. The common core that I find is a wish to go beyond the social: a wish for individuals to define themselves as aspiring to go beyond the social in order to try to have moments of aloneness when the shock of wonder at existence permeates the individual's spirit. The effect of wonder is pictured as a poetical or philosophical attachment to existence. This is not love of the world—there is so much in the world that is not lovable. Nor is it love of one's common world, of one's particular world, whether one's family or type or society. The individualism lies in the refusal to be only social, so that one may see and know, in one's withdrawn moments, something other than one's self or one's extended self. True individualism is the only unidolatrous self-loss: "all mean egotism vanishes," as Emerson puts it. A partial detachment from one's world is preliminary to a new attachment to existence. One grows attached to the indefiniteness of human and natural life, generation after generation. The indefiniteness can't be sanely loved. No particular emotion—not even love or Nietzschean affirmation—can possibly be adequate to indefiniteness. There is only the repeated shock of wonder that there is existence, that there is so much existence, rather than nothing. The inessentiality, the uncreatedness, of human and natural existence foster the wonder. God would be well dead. In the nuclear situation, the shock of wonder at the inessential and unencompassable indefiniteness of human and natural existence on earth receives a fresh inspiration: the possibility that human action can end it all, and for no purpose at all commensurable to unmeasurable indefiniteness. Wonder makes it impossible to live with the thought of extinction; it rebels.

Individualism (rightly understood) can help heal the blindness of self-love and group self-love, and thus induce that passage to a protective sense of wonder, that change of heart, which may be the best resource in the effort to make the nuclear peril recede. □

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David Garrard Lowe

"Julia"—and Muriel Gardiner

Many of our readers will remember that Muriel Gardiner, together with her husband Joseph Buttinger, a leader of the Austrian Socialist underground in the 1930s, were among the early and then continuing supporters of Dissent. *The following interview with her was conducted by her former private secretary.*—Eds.

Shortly after the publication of Lillian Hellman's book *Pentimento* in 1973, Muriel Gardiner began hearing from friends who asked if she were "Julia," the heroine of the story of that name in the volume. In the course of an interview I conducted with her a few months before her death in February 1985, she recalled the first inquiry: "I first learned about Julia from Anna Frank, who had once been married to Karl Frank, a leader in the anti-Fascist German underground. Anna telephoned me one day and said, 'Muriel, you're Julia.' I said, 'Who's Julia?' 'Oh,' she replied, 'haven't you read Lillian Hellman's *Pentimento*?' I said, 'No.' 'Well,' she went on, 'you must read it, because I think you're Julia.' Of course I was curious and when I read it I was indeed struck by the strong similarities in our lives."

This conversation was conducted in the late spring of 1984. I had gone out to interview Muriel Gardiner at her farm in Pennington, near Princeton, New Jersey. The interview took place in the house that she had built in the 1960s for herself and her husband, Joseph Buttinger, the well-known Austrian Socialist.

Muriel's use of the word "similarities" allowed me to go to the heart of the matter: "Do you think that you were the model for Lillian Hellman's Julia?"

It was late afternoon and she was sipping vodka and lemon juice. She took another sip and then said in her very precise manner: "I have never claimed to be Julia. As for the possibility that I am, there *are* those similarities between my life and Julia's life."

There it was again, the word "similarities."

"What are they?" I asked.

Muriel looked at me. She was well into her eighties, but there was no sense of age about her. The strong profile, the powerful hands—large for a woman—the shock of short-cropped white hair all gave a sense of vitality. "To begin with," she said, "there were our backgrounds: my father's father, Nelson Morris, founded Chicago's Union Stockyards; my mother's father, Gustavus Swift, was the founder of the Swift meat packing company.

It was Muriel's way of avoiding saying that, like Julia, she had been born very rich. Looking about the living room where we sat, it was obvious to me that the comfortable but comparatively modest house with its contemporary furniture, its fieldstone fireplace, its broad expanses of glass, was a conscious break with Muriel's opulent, Edwardian childhood.

"And like Julia you went to Oxford?"

"I first went to Wellesley, about two months before the end of the First World War. I was not quite 17 years old. A year after I graduated from Wellesley, I went to Oxford. My ambition had been to be a teacher, so I thought that I should do graduate work. I was in Oxford from the fall of 1923 until June of 1925."

The telephone rang and Muriel went into an-

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other room to answer it. Left alone, I glanced about. She was in the process of leaving this house and moving into a retirement home some twenty miles away. The late afternoon sun, slanting through the westward-facing windows, fell upon the record of an extraordinary life: a white marble bust of Muriel when she was 25, a bronze one of Joseph Buttinger, an award for help given to the Hungarian freedom fighters, illustrated books on the cities she adored: Vienna, Venice, Rome, Prague. There was a jumbled collection of mice of every material given to her over the years by friends who knew of her affection for the creature. There were volumes of poetry, some by her old comrade, Stephen Spender, and books by and about Sigmund Freud.

When Muriel returned, I observed that after Lillian Hellman's character leaves Oxford, she goes to Vienna to be psychoanalyzed by Freud.

"It was late April or early May, 1926, when I went to Vienna," Muriel said picking up the thread. "I wrote a note to Freud asking whether he would see me. I received a reply promptly, informing me that he was not taking any new patients and referring me to a pupil of his, Dr. Ruth Mack."

"And like Julia you also went to medical school?"

"Yes, in the fall of 1932 or '33. I went because Dr. Mack, who had become my analyst, said that if I wanted to be a psychiatrist, which I did, I would have to go to medical school in order to practice in the United States. It was during my second year at the Vienna Medical School that the fascist problem became really serious."

As she spoke, my eyes fell on a small wooden bust of Lenin. Muriel told me that it was by the Russian sculptor, S. T. Konenkov, who had also done the busts of her and Joseph Buttinger.

"Were you a socialist when you went to Vienna?"

Muriel answered that after she began living in Vienna and saw what the Social Democrats, who then controlled the city, were doing in the way of building good apartments for workers, improving the school system, planting gardens for the people, she thought: "If that's what's meant by 'socialist,' then I am a socialist."

I asked her about her exploits in the socialist underground in the 1930s, exploits which had led Anna Freud to praise her "helpfulness and compassion."

If Muriel had been reticent about speaking of the wealth which had surrounded her Chicago childhood, she was perhaps even more so when it came to speaking of her heroism after the Austrian fascists and later the Nazis had taken over Austria. But slowly, deliberately, as the room grew darker, she recalled her deeds under the code name of "Mary," told of hiding Joseph Buttinger in her Vienna apartment, of getting money and affidavits for those wanting to leave Austria, of procuring false passports.

"Was there ever a time when you were afraid?"

Muriel laughed, a deep, husky laugh. "Afraid? Plenty of times."

The "similarities" between Muriel's life and Julia's were undeniable.

"Do you have any idea of how Lillian Hellman might have heard your story?"

"Yes," she answered without hesitation.

"We had a mutual friend, Wolf Schwabacher. He was my lawyer and he was the attorney who defended the producer of Hellman's play, *The Children's Hour*, after the play had been banned in Boston. He told me a good deal about Lillian Hellman and I think it possible that he told her something of me."

"After you read *Pentimento*, did you ever try to contact Miss Hellman?"

"I sent her a letter. I remember that it was a pretty polite letter."

It was quite dark by now. Muriel had recently been operated on for a cataract and she could not tolerate much light. One lamp burned across the room.

"Do you remember what you said?"

She reached for a manila folder on the couch next to her and handed me two pieces of paper.

"Here it is. I have never shown it to anyone."

I took it, walked over to the lamp, and read:

October 26, 1976

Muriel M. Gardiner, M.D.
Brookdale Farm, RR1—Box 264
Pennington, New Jersey 08534

Dear Miss Hellman,

Ever since your beautiful book *Pentimento* appeared, friends and acquaintances have been asking me whether I am Julia. Unlike your Julia, I am—obviously—still alive, and I have not been wounded and my daughter lives with her family in Aspen, Colorado. But many other things in Julia's life agree with mine.

My parents were rich Americans, who travelled a great deal. After my father's death, in my childhood,

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my mother married an Englishman. At twenty-one I went to Oxford to study English literature. I had been to Wellesley before that, and there had become a Socialist (though I did not call myself that) and had brought Norman Thomas, Roger Baldwin and others to Wellesley to talk to our Student Forum. After Oxford I went to Vienna, hoping to be analyzed by Freud, who however, referred me to a pupil of his. Wishing to become an analyst, I studied medicine at the University of Vienna, and eventually got my degree there—under Hitler in 1938! I had been inactive politically in Europe until February, 1934, but from then on was very much involved in anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi work. I enclose a little essay my husband wrote about me for a psychoanalytic journal containing "tributes" to me on my seventieth birthday. ["Mary," Bulletin of the *Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis*, June 1972.]

Some of my loving friends even think your descriptions of Julia apply to me, and wonder whether she could be a composite of several persons. I do not at all think so, but cannot help wondering that I never—as far as I know—met Julia. Nor have I met you, though I heard of you often from our good friend, Wolf Schwabacher, with whom we shared a two-family house in Pennington for many years; and I have seen and admired many of your plays and enjoyed your books.

I hope you do not find this letter an intrusion. There is no need to answer it. I often thought of writing you before, but did not want to bother you. Now, however, several more recent friends have again asked, "Are you Julia?"; and one called me, having cried himself to sleep after reading your moving story.

Sincerely yours,

Muriel Gardiner

Muriel Gardiner never received a reply from Lillian Hellman. After the publication of Muriel's memoirs, *Code Name "Mary,"* by the Yale University Press in 1983, Hellman was questioned concerning the many parallels in the lives of Julia and Muriel. Miss Hellman denied that she had ever heard of or from Muriel Gardiner. Later, Hellman did call Muriel in Pennington and the two spoke briefly on the telephone. But they never met. The two women with their strange bond died within months of one another: Hellman in midsummer of 1984, Gardiner in the winter of 1985. □

Public Space:
Essays by Marshall Berman,
Michael Rustin, and Michael Walzer
in the Fall issue.

Edouard Roditi

American Psychoanalysts And Homosexuality

My very extensive and varied experience of psychoanalysis as a patient in both Europe and the United States corroborates much that Henry Abelove writes in "Freud, Male Homosexuality, and the Americans" [*Dissent*, Winter 1986]. I indeed agree with him that most American analysts have tended to pervert Freud's views on homosexuality, whether male or female, and to have injected into them some very American notions of morality and, above all, of social conformism or integration into a middle-class society. I also agree with Abelove in distrusting, as Freud did too, all minority homosexual movements that tend to stress the "difference" of homosexuals. Most of my own lovers have been men who were otherwise apparently heterosexual, but who experienced with me, sometimes over a period of several years, a perfectly satisfactory homosexual phase. I have even remained a close friend of four who left me to marry and start families.

I first underwent analysis briefly in Paris, when I was twenty, with a French practitioner. My father had discovered that I had engaged in a few casual homosexual relationships and was so shocked that he consulted our family physician, who decided that I should be analyzed. But my father's understanding of analysis was so simple that, after almost every session, he asked, "Do you feel any better?" When, after a few weeks, I failed to "feel any better," this treatment was interrupted. A year later, however, as a student in Germany, I attempted on my own to undergo analysis with a German analyst, but very soon gave it up because I could not express myself fluently in German.

SEVEN YEARS LATER, I was living in Chicago and was experiencing great anxiety which had little to do with my homosexuality. On several occasions, in moments of extreme stress, I lost consciousness. Dr. Lionel Blitzsten, a well-known pioneer American analyst, happened to be one of my close personal friends and was kind enough to discuss my problems with me in a couple of nonanalytical sessions. He was well aware of my homosexuality, but appeared to attach little importance to it. A close friend of Harry Stack Sullivan, he suspected, quite rightly, that my fits of extreme anxiety and

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depression and consequent losses of consciousness had other causes, probably my sense of alienation from my Chicago environment and my difficulties in establishing satisfactory "interpersonal relations." As I was about to move to California for professional reasons, Blitzsten recommended me to a San Francisco psychiatrist who might help me find a suitable local analyst.

This psychiatrist was horrified when, after admitting that I was homosexual, I also admitted that I occasionally went to Turkish baths. He recommended me to a woman analyst, a recent refugee from Germany who had been analyzed in Vienna by Freud. She belonged to a family of which I had known several members in Berlin, and bore a striking physical resemblance to one of her cousins who had been, both in Berlin and later as a refugee in Paris, one of my closest friends. This might have complicated our relationship but, on the contrary, somehow made things much easier. I was able to be quite frank with her about my homosexuality until she told me one day that the psychiatrist who had recommended me to her had warned her that she was to report to him if I continued to go to Turkish baths, in which case he would insist that I undergo shock treatment. Further complications in our relationship arose when I happened to meet her stepdaughter socially on a number of occasions and, above all, when some close friends of mine told me that they had met the psychiatrist at a dinner party where he had described rather freely a number of cases of homosexuals that had come to his attention, including such a detailed description of my case that my friends immediately knew that he was speaking about me.

I nevertheless continued this analysis for a few months, although I was still experiencing occasional losses of consciousness, which were attributed for the time being, after a glucose tolerance test, to hypoglycemia. For professional reasons, I then interrupted this analysis when I moved from San Francisco back to the Middle West for a year. Two years after interrupting it, I was living in New York and began to look for a suitable analyst. Among others, I consulted Edmund Bergler, who stressed so much my homosexuality and his own ability to cure me of it that he failed to inspire confidence in me, which he attributed, of course, to "resistance." Ultimately, I found an analyst of European origin who appeared to be suitable but who, after a while, proved to be so inscrutably uncommunicative that I made little progress with him, especially after meeting him as best man at the marriage of one of my colleagues with whom I worked daily. This analysis too was interrupted when, again for professional reasons, I moved away from New York.

In 1954, I then underwent in Paris another analytical treatment, though of a less orthodox Freudian nature, under a French therapist of the *rêve éveillé dirigé*, or directed dream, movement. Although this treatment appeared to purge me of most residual anxieties or guilt feelings about my homosexuality and of much of the accumulated grief caused by the suicide of a very dear friend or the deaths of relatives or friends who had been victims of the Holocaust, it was interrupted because of conflicts of a very different nature in my professional life. Meanwhile, I continued to suffer occasional losses of consciousness.

In 1960, at the age of fifty, I happened to be hospitalized in Switzerland for a serious skin ailment when I suddenly suffered one of these losses of consciousness, after which I underwent an electroencephalogram that revealed that I had suffered a very slight brain injury, presumably at birth as a breech baby, and was subject to a mild form of epilepsy known as anterior temporal lobe seizures. Appropriate medication was then prescribed and these seizures have occurred far less frequently ever since. I now know that the more extreme manifestations of my troubles have always been caused by my anterior temporal lobe trauma rather than by any emotional maladjustment which could be attributed to my homosexuality, although the latter could, in the past, cause the kind of stress that triggered my losses of consciousness.

In now reading Henry Abelove, I was thus surprised to note that he neglected to mention the late Harry Stack Sullivan among the few "dissident" American analysts who appear never to have considered that homosexuality is a disease. Sullivan's publications are numerous and still deserve to be consulted. That Abelove should not have mentioned Blitzsten as another such "dissident" doesn't surprise me. As far as I know, Blitzsten refrained from writing or publishing, perhaps in order to avoid becoming involved in fruitless controversies on the subject of Freud's and his own views on homosexuality. Edmund Bergler, however, deserved to be mentioned by Abelove, if only because Bergler, with his *chutzpah* and rash promises of being able to cure homosexuality, managed successfully for many years to exploit the anxieties of wealthy parents of homosexual sons. Finally, Abelove failed, as Freud did too, to investigate at all the very peculiar problem of American attitudes towards female homosexuality, the very existence of which appears to have long been ignored even in the laws of most states. □

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Robert Boyers

Politics and Post-Modernism

THE REAL LIFE OF ALEJANDRO MAYTA, by Mario Vargas Llosa. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 310 pp. $16.95.

In the new novel by Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa there is an arresting sequence in which the protagonist and his revolutionary comrades stop at the ancient mountain community of Quero. They rest there for two hours before continuing their flight from government troops sent to bring them back to be punished for revolutionary crimes against the state. What is striking in the handful of pages devoted to Quero is not the quality of the political ideas brought forward or the revelation of character facilitated by the protagonist's reflections. What emerges so forcefully, rather, is a powerful sentiment of disgust focused not only on the trappings of the place but on its inhabitants. That disgust, we cannot but note, is accompanied neither by qualification nor apology. "All the houses in Quero had to be like that," we read: "no light, no running water, no drainage, and no bath. Flies, lice, and a thousand other bugs must be part of the poor furniture." But if this is a sorry spectacle, we are admonished, consider the people who live in this filth: "If they had to pee at night, they probably wouldn't feel like getting up and going outside. They pee right here, next to the bed where they sleep and the stove where they cook. . . . And if at midnight they had to shit? Would they have enough energy to go out into the darkness and the cold, the wind and the rain? They'd shit right here, between the stove and the bed."

This is not an isolated passage in Vargas Llosa's novel. Still in Quero, he wants us to note that the lady of the house probably sleeps with her animals, that she has no doubt been wearing the same skirt for many years, and that it has probably been many years "since she had washed herself." Elsewhere in the book there are many references to the mountains of garbage threatening to overwhelm the city of Lima, and to middle-class citizens who grow so accustomed to it that they no longer notice what has become of their neighborhoods. Poorer citizens are described as "resigned," not only to the garbage, which they routinely throw out of their houses, but to such emblems of crime and disorder as "a decapitated body" lying untended in the street.

Some will speak of all this as part of the author's apocalyptic vision, reading the signs as a warning of the disaster that is about to befall Peru as it has already befallen other countries in the region. But more than a prediction of political or social disorder is at issue in the imagery that so pervades this novel. To be confronted so steadily with filth and wretchedness is in fact to suspect that political categories are inadequate to comprehend what is happening in places like Peru. Tempted like the rest of us to come at problems of poverty, inequality, and tyranny with the vocabulary of revolution, reaction, and reform, the novelist also seems more than a little tempted by the thought that politics inevitably misses the point. If, as his narrator has it, "Peru's going down the drain," mightn't it be the case that there's no help for it, or worse, that the people almost deserve what they've got? No such awful conclusion is drawn in this novel, but it is hard not to feel that the novelistic intelligence shaping the material has barely managed to resist it.

OSTENSIBLY VARGAS LLOSA HAS WRITTEN a political novel. The setting alternates between the Peru

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of the late 1950s and the Peru of the near future. The central figure is an old-line Trotskyist disappointed in the merely theoretic communism he's pursued for twenty years. A member of a splinter party with seven members, Alejandro Mayta has had reason to feel disappointed. His one attempt to break out of the sterile round of ideological disputation and ineffectual pamphleteering was a minor revolutionary action that had no real chance of succeeding and that cost Mayta all the political friends he'd had. Vargas Llosa's narrator, who closely resembles the novelist himself, reconstructs the story of the long forgotten Mayta and his abortive insurrection by means of interviews with those who knew Mayta in the 1950s. By the end of the novel we see Mayta as a sixty-five-year old man whose chief desire is to keep himself and his family afloat and whose principal dream is of escape to another country. He lives in an already dilapidated "new town" in the shadow of the prison in which he spent many years of his adult life. Obviously, there are grounds for despair in this narrative outline; and in the detail Vargas Llosa supplies, relentlessly, there is more than reason for disgust. Mayta himself may not inspire revulsion, but the spectacle of his failure and the humiliation of his hope is rarely edifying.

It is legitimate to wonder precisely what Vargas Llosa hoped to accomplish in this novel, indeed, to wonder whether Vargas Llosa knew quite what he was after in a work that is full of misleading details and false starts. If he wished to say, simply, that there is no hope for improvement in countries like Peru, he certainly could have examined the consequences of that observation more rigorously than he chose to. If he wished to inquire, as he did in the earlier novel *Conversation in The Cathedral*, "When did Peru get fucked over?", he could certainly have provided a more ample historical perspective, going back before the 1950s to discover what made revolutionary agitation seem attractive to so many people in his country. If, on the other hand, he wished simply to settle old scores with a Latin American left that has often seemed not to know what it was doing, he could surely have made things easier for himself by creating a less likeable protagonist than Mayta and by portraying the conditions of life in Peru as requiring something less than total renovation. As things stand in Vargas Llosa's novel, it is hard not to feel that we have been given contradictory signals: on the one hand, a situation that is ripe for revolution; on the other hand, a portrayal of revolutionary ambition that makes it seem alternately cynical or childish, and always futile. If the carefully deposited signs of filth and degradation in the novel do not finally add up as we expect them to, neither do the indications that the book is to be read as a political or historical inquiry.

Already a number of reviewers have described *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta* as a more or less standard post-modern novel which creates narrative obstacles only for the pleasure involved in overcoming them. In such a work, some reviewers have said, we are necessarily reminded "that art is as arbitrary as truth is relative" and that "life itself is a moment by moment invention." The author of such a work insists on his own duplicity so as to assert, in Vargas Llosa's words, the author's "enormous deicidal will for the destruction and reconstruction of reality." In these terms, Vargas Llosa may be said to make common cause with those who read him as if he were a contemporary Latin American follower of Vladimir Nabokov, measuring his success by his willingness to use "to the hilt" the narrative instruments he elects. No doubt, as John Updike has aptly noted, "the intelligence of Mario Vargas Llosa plays above the sad realities and unrealities with a coolness that should be distinguished from Nabokov's hermetically aesthetic ardor." But it is the novelist as gamesman and master strategist who most frequently emerges from accounts of the present work.

There is much to be said for such an approach. The novel reads like a post-modern work, moving rapidly and often without transition from one time plane to another, mingling past and present so dexterously as to subdue them to a single, almost undifferentiated texture. What happened, what might have happened, and what is likely to happen are accorded equivalent status, and the author-narrator's desire to get at the truth is explicitly confounded with the need for a plausible basis on which to fabulate and embellish. Though the apparent subject of the book is Mayta and the unsuccessful uprising in which he participated, we are so often reminded of Mayta's fictional status and of the author-narrator's literary exertions that we might well think it chiefly important to concern ourselves with the creative impulse itself. The advantage of such an approach—apart from the fact that it may answer directly to Vargas Llosa's intentions—is that it forces us to treat a novel as a novel, that it dismisses as trivial or irrelevant questions of historical accuracy that may only confuse our responses as readers. If there is a vision at work in this novel—so we may want to feel—it is the vision *of a novelist*. The views of Vargas Llosa as

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expressed in his latest journalistic contribution to the *New York Times Sunday Magazine* may interest us in various ways, but they can have little to do with the vision of the novelist, whose business is to ask questions rather than to promote a position. If *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta* is a novel of politics, we may feel, it is also a work that refuses to endorse any programmatic reading of its material.

THE NARRATOR IN VARGAS LLOSA'S NOVEL is a writer who is clearly intended to remind us of the public figure Vargas Llosa has become. Like other thoughtful persons, he is interested in the fate of his country and knows a good deal about its history. He is also attracted to a wide range of ideas. In sum, we know relatively little about him, but we have reason to believe that he is not a frivolous man. Though he is something of a "possibilitarian"—Robert Musil's word describes a person who cannot forget that things can easily have been other than they are—his words have a gravity about them that belies the seeming arbitrariness of his novelistic invention. He may play tricks on us, carefully establishing a character's identity only to reveal at last that we were misled; but we feel all the same that his games have a purpose, even if we cannot always say with certainty what it is. Kierkegaard's fear—that if everything is possible and every "fact" subject to sudden contradiction, then nothing is true—does not do justice to our sense of this work. So intent is our narrator upon his inquiry into Mayta and, more especially, into Mayta's abortive revolutionary gesture, that we cannot but feel he believes in the truth his exertions will uncover. In no way reducible to a disembodied voice speaking arbitrary words, he seems everywhere to feel that things have weight, that there is such a thing as a necessity to which even the most playful imagination is responsible. If we are occasionally irritated by the liberties he takes and puzzled by his desire to sabotage his own credibility, we are nonetheless confident that for him certain things are real, the desire to know what they are genuine and, in its way, admirable.

The notion that for such a narrator, as for Vargas Llosa himself, the traditional idea of character has been abandoned is at once plausible and misleading. Obviously the absence of linear narrative will entitle the reader to feel to some extent like a participant in the piecing together of the story. So, too, will the reader feel that he or she chooses from among conflicting possibilities so as to create characters whose identity will nonetheless remain ambiguous. But it is one thing to project possibility without motive or consequence, another to insist that there are always motives and consequences, however difficult they may be to assemble. Character in this novel is always a primary concern, the key to what may be said about the validity of an enterprise. When we think of the narrator himself, we consider not only his duplicities and stratagems but his character. We try to determine what matters to him, and we conclude at last that we know enough about him to reject certain possibilities and to emphasize others. His absorption in Mayta of course tells us more about him than anything else, quite in the way that Mayta's obsessions largely define his identity. To conclude that Mayta has no identity, no character, simply because there are unanswerable questions associated with his conduct, is to ignore how much is revealed. Vargas Llosa here affirms a traditional conception of character by forcing us to acknowledge that *we know these people*, indeed, that we can judge them by considering motive, circumstance, and consequence, quite as we would if we were working at a more conventional narrative.

Does this mean that Vargas Llosa's narrative procedures are merely a smoke-screen designed to conceal the conventionality of his purpose? Those who would draw such a conclusion would then have to feel that for Vargas Llosa there is a plain truth which the novel is after, that underlying all the complex authorial derring-do there is a simple narrative of naive revolutionary aspiration and inevitable disappointment. But so obviously is there no such plain truth, no such schematic narrative program in this novel that one cannot but concede the futility of attempting to formulate conclusions in a neatly edifying or chastening way. Our attention to character and to its elusive relation with politics will rather lead us to ask whether the novel adds up, whether its devices have something to do with its purpose.

To say that a book of a certain kind adds up is usually only to say that its various parts cohere and collectively underwrite an overarching purpose. With the Latin American novel that purpose is usually taken to include the setting out of a political conflict. Vargas Llosa's novel deals with an incident that actually occurred in Peru in 1962, though he sets the events in 1958, before the consolidation of Castro's revolution in Cuba, so as to make more palpable the audacity of Mayta's insurrection. No attempt is made to justify the insurrection by providing a detailed account of Peruvian politics in the 1950s. Neither does Vargas Llosa at all go over the failure of democracy in Peru in the late 1960s or the coming to power of the military "revolutionary experiment" at that time.

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The atmosphere of Peru in the near future of the novel makes us feel that all manner of awfulness has occurred. But issues of the sort that Vargas Llosa will debate in public meetings or in newspaper articles are not a part of the texture of the novel. "We know" as we read that politics in Peru has everything to do with ill health, malnutrition, terrorism, corruption, military dictatorship, and the relationship between various despots and the United States marines. But the novel furnishes no way to talk about these issues. They are part of an undifferentiated given, the more or less unarguable facts of life. In the face of such facts, never really subject to rational discussion, the activist impulses of a Mayta can only seem misguided (which is to say, without reasonable hope of success), or inevitable (a necessary expression of a desire for drastic change which cannot be impugned by recalling that it had no reasonable expectation of success). It is the special purpose of Vargas Llosa's novel to make the impulses of a Mayta seem both misguided *and* inevitable. Insofar as his motives seem to us idealistic and he proceeds to act without any taint of self-importance, he will seem to us an embodiment of an inevitable and largely attractive will to change. Insofar as his thinking is revealed as inadequate to the magnitude of the forces arrayed against him, he will seem disappointing. For the reader of Vargas Llosa's novel there is no way to ask whether Mayta might have gone about the business of changing his society in another way, say, by embracing some form of parliamentary democracy and strenuously working towards that ideal. As readers we are only in a position to consider the motives of the character and the palpable consequences of projects like the one he undertakes.

Evaluated simply in terms of consequence, Mayta is undeniably a failure, his revolutionary aspirations clearly hopeless. The insurrection he leads is rapidly broken up, his chief cohort is shot and killed, and Mayta spends many years in prison. What is worse, this first Peruvian Marxist uprising and subsequent small- or large-scale insurrections have inspired nothing but a further cycle of repression and brutality. The Peru of the near future is, if anything, in worse shape than it was when Mayta was young. The evidence, in other words, suggests not only that Mayta was unable to foresee the consequences of his actions, but that motives in isolation from the capacity to think clearly and consequentially are not to be judged as good motives at all. This is not to suggest that the only good motives are those that lead more or less inevitably to the accomplishment of reasonable ends. But Vargas Llosa *would* seem to suggest that idealism and utopianism ought to be susceptible to judgment in the way that more ordinary and pragmatic approaches to reality have been.

That such judgments are not easy to arrive at or to trust we discover again and again as we try to get a definitive fix on Mayta. Early in the novel he emerges as a genuine priest of revolution, an ascetic with a vocation, obsessed with the sufferings of the poor and "capable of reacting with the same indignation to any injustice." Nothing we hear about him in the various interviews conducted by the author-narrator can quite dislodge from our minds that initial, powerful image of the man. None of his homosexual exploits, for example, can at all tarnish the image of the somewhat juvenile idealist, and it matters little to our ultimate sense of Mayta that the vivid accounts of him as a practicing homosexual are later repudiated. Neither is our sense of his somewhat sophomoric enthusiasm diminished by those passages in which he reflects with a grave sobriety on revolution as "a long act of patience . . . a thousand and one vile deeds," and so on. For if Mayta is at forty still a *naif*, he never seems to us a fool or without the capacity to surprise us. If as the novel progresses he seems less and less the intellectual we had perhaps taken him for, he remains in important respects the person we thought we admired earlier, and might still admire at novel's end.

What continually complicates our view of Mayta is what we take to be the inconclusiveness of Vargas Llosa's feelings and intentions. The conflicting accounts of Mayta offered by this person or that we can explain by speaking of their needs or their limited perspectives. But the author-narrator has a perspective that by definition cannot be limited in the same way, encompassing as it does the full range of sentiments and motives expressed in the novel. If we say that he maintains—through all of the changes Mayta's portrait is made to undergo—a consistent affection for Mayta, and that this affection is more than the novelist's love of a creation upon whom he can project anything he likes, then we have still to say what it is he admires. Perhaps it is Mayta's capacity to hope, to defy reality. Perhaps it is the absence of cynicism, the inexplicable intensity of resolution. Is this what the narrator wants us to admire when he gives us Mayta imagining the aftermath of his little insurrection: "the working class would shake off its lethargy, all the reformist deceptions, all its corrupt leaders, all those illusions of being able to coexist

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with the sell-outs, and would join the struggle.'"?

But even in this passage we suspect that Vargas Llosa wants to admire Mayta's optimism more than he can bring himself to do, that the impulse to caricature is as strong as the impulse to celebrate. Eighty pages later, when we read, "He saw them multiplying like the loaves of bread in the Bible, every day recruiting scores of boys as poor and self-denying as themselves," or "the assault on heaven, I thought. We shall bring heaven down from heaven, establish it on earth," we cannot but feel that the gap between Mayta's optimism and the reality he confronts is an essential component of the portrait. What may have seemed simply a portrait of the revolutionary as idealist is also the portrait of a dreamer dangerously yielding to a vision that has taken possession of him utterly. As we confront the futility of Mayta's enterprise and its delusional component, we are left with an uneasy sense of not knowing quite what we feel or why we have been taken through Mayta's adventures.

Does it clarify matters to recall that Mayta's delusions are explored again and again in the novel, that the narrator is routinely at pains to remind us that Mayta "let his imagination run wild," and that Mayta's optimism strikes most of his acquaintances as incomprehensible or ludicrous? But this doesn't alter the fact that Mayta remains in many respects an appealing person. Compare him with alternative figures who lucidly criticize his naiveté and his gift for defeat. Even those who are most sensible and sophisticated, like the intellectual in charge of a progressive development center, have little to offer apart from a knowing disdain for visionary intensity and a capacity to thread their way between partisans of the left and the right. It is Mayta's naiveté, after all, that permits him to conclude in his one year at the university "that the professors had lost their love of teaching somewhere along the line"; and it is that same naiveté that permits him to summon something like the old intensity when, at age 65, he tells our narrator about the food kiosk he ran with a friend amidst the squalor of the unspeakable Lurigancho prison. "'We created a genuine revolution,' he assures me with pride. 'We won the respect of the whole place. We boiled the water for making fruit juice, for coffee, for everything. We washed the knives, forks, and spoons, the glasses, and the plates before and after they were used. Hygiene, above all. A revolution, you bet.... We even set up a kind of bank, because a lot of cons gave us their money for safekeeping.' "

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Perhaps naiveté is not the word with which to describe the quality of character involved in these passages. One way or the other, is the feeling evoked merely pathetic? Here I think we must answer that it is not. If the mountains of garbage swallowing the landscape of Vargas Llosa's Peru have something to tell us about his vision of the country and its people, then surely Mayta's revolutionary pride cannot be dismissed so easily. It may not provide the key to the political vision of the novel, but it does suggest the kind of thing to which the novel most warmly responds. In fact, as already intimated, it is difficult to say that there is a politics in this novel beyond its elaboration of attitudes which in another work might have informed a more focused vision. Mayta, after all, late in the novel remarks not only that he is no longer involved in politics but that "politics gave me up." Is this intended to suggest that he is too good for politics, or, more broadly, that politics cannot finally address what is most real in our lives? Again, it is hard to be sure precisely what Vargas Llosa would want us to feel about this. But he would seem to suggest that those who cannot do justice to Mayta will not know how to think about politics or the future.

If this seems doubtful, a passage near the end of the novel may help to clarify what may be taken to be a proper attitude to Mayta.

> Later, when there were outbreaks of guerrilla fighting in the mountains and the jungle in 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966—all inspired by the Cuban Revolution—no newspaper remembered that the forerunner of those attempts to raise up the people in armed struggle to establish socialism in Peru had been that minor episode, rendered ghostlike by the years, which had taken place in Jauja province. Today no one remembers who took part in it.

Here, beyond the prestidigitations of Vargas Llosa's post-modern narrative procedures, is some semblance of the sentiment that unites the author-narrator with his protagonist. For all of the novelist's oft-repeated insistence that "all fictions are lies" and that we can never know anything with certainty, he cannot but affirm that there is something in Mayta which continues to compel and attract. The impulse to honor—with whatever misgivings—whatever is authentic in Mayta's passion for social justice is the center of Vargas Llosa's novel and the substance of the meaning that abides. □

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James B. Rule

Ideas of Solidarity

SOLIDARITY: POLAND 1980–81, by Alain Touraine et al. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 205 pp. Cloth $21.95; paper $9.95.

POLAND'S SELF-LIMITING REVOLUTION, by Jadwiga Staniszkis; edited by Jan T. Gross. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 352 pp. $25.00.

General Jaruzelski's desperate coup against his own people bought his bankrupt regime some time. It also had the effect, no doubt quite unintended, of freezing Solidarity in time, and of ensuring that movement a permanent place in Poland's national mythology. Throughout its brief and tempestuous existence, Solidarity flourished as a movement of opposition in a system where opposition was in principle impossible.

The movement's sustained commitment to participation, egalitarianism, and nonviolence stands as an enormous historical and political achievement. Perhaps more than any episode since World War II, the rise of Solidarity reaffirmed the appeal of economic and political egalitarianism, the resilience of grass-roots democracy, and the ability of a movement based on such principles to thrive even against the ugliest sorts of totalitarian force.

The abrupt repression of Solidarity may have distracted attention from some important questions of self-definition that it never had a chance to answer. How much power—and what kind of power—could a grass-roots movement aspire to in a Soviet-bloc country? Could it, should it remain a trade union—or seek to evolve into one or more political parties? Should it, even if invited, participate in the exercise of state power? Could it expect to *avoid* such participation, if it succeeded in its other aims? Should it seek worker-management, or a role in economic planning, if not political power? If so, how would the prerogatives of economic power be reconciled with the ethic of egalitarianism? How would a successful Solidarity come to terms with the needs to modernize and streamline the country's economy—with all the human disruption such a transition would inevitably occasion?

Such questions received endless debate throughout the life of the movement. And, as if these questions were not agonizing enough in themselves, the debates took place against a backdrop of seeming total fluidity in national life—in a period when the nightmare of a Soviet-led invasion never seemed far away. Had Solidarity escaped destruction on December 13, 1981, its eventual responses to such questions would inevitably have altered its significance. Given the events of that day, the questions remain for reflection by all who care about democratic renewal.

In different ways, these two books treat these debates from the standpoint of thoughtful, engaged Poles living through the Solidarity months. Both books were completed at about the time of the coup; both have the chaotic quality of works created in the midst of exhausting and heartbreaking events.

• *Solidarity: Poland 1980–81,* by the eminent French sociologist Alain Touraine and his collaborators, most of whom are Poles, is the far more accessible book. These authors, sociologists all, worked as participant observers in Solidarity groups in six major Polish cities throughout much of the lifetime of the movement. Though there is some analysis, the book's importance is as a record of the soul-searchings and debates among rank-and-file participants as to possibilities and prospects.

These highly personal testimonies remind us of something that distance may lead us to forget: that Solidarity was always a heterogeneous, volatile mixture of aspirations and tendencies not always compatible with one another. Summarizing the deliberations of the Warsaw group, the authors write:

> At the onset the group had found it difficult to accept the idea that Solidarity was a fusion of different elements, but it now settled itself much more firmly than the two other groups in the centre of the ground which we have defined as Solidarity II. The Gdansk group remained too attached to the spirit of the Gdansk Agreement to accept without much reluctance that the movement should move on from that phase to another, while some members simply leapt forward to more immediately political positions. The Katowice group, for its part, was too rooted in working-class consciousness to see the transformation of economic institutions as centrally important. The Warsaw group, on the other hand, took hold of the idea of self-management and placed it at the centre of its preoccupations, in order to avoid the threat of being split between a base completely taken up with the most immediate material problems and a leadership predominantly political in character.

Democracy, these accounts demonstrate once

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again, is an exhausting discipline; many Solidarity supporters seem to have spent the months of the movement in a state of permanent exhaustion.

• *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* contains a series of theoretical essays on relations between movement, state, party, and the rest of Polish society. As a young sociologist, the author had taken major personal risks in opposing the regime well before 1980. That year she was among the first to cement the ties between workers and intellectuals that added so much to the movement's stature. As Solidarity flourished, she quickly became known as an originator of new and unpredictable visions of the movement's future. Often considered excessively radical, even outlandish, her views and her rapport with workers commanded respect throughout the movement. Yet she never held a major official position in Solidarity.

Though some of her book is straightforward history, most is an attempt to develop theories about intricacies of the Polish political situation that are bound, at first, to be obscure to most non-Polish readers. Unfortunately, Staniszkis is one of those who cannot resist propounding at least one theory for every fact she reports. Thus discussions proceed under a cloud of abstractions many will find maddening. Analyzing techniques used by the regime to control popular dissent, she writes,

> These techniques effectively prevented the emergence of conflict outside the framework of institutions. They operated on several planes. First, steps were taken that led to stabilizing the status quo by promulgating a peculiar definition of reality that saw no alternatives to the current institutional form of social life. Other measures, not without influence, were intended to keep conflicting interests below the threshold of articulation. This was possible not only because society was atomized but also (indicative of much more advanced control) because various notions traditionally linked with the so-called liberal ethos were kept from being openly advanced. When such notions were monopolized by the superficial official language and grew devoid of meaning, they were no longer regarded by the population as an instrument of communication. . . .

All of this is highly suggestive and intriguing. But one yearns for examples that would make such statements concrete and persuasive. What Staniszkis gives us here is not so much an argument as theoretical stream of consciousness.

The activists' thoughts captured in *Solidarity* were evolving from day to day as the researchers recorded them. Staniszkis's theories often read as though they were racing to keep up with events. It would be fascinating to know how both books' authors, and the informants who provided the material for *Solidarity,* would regard their positions of 1981 in the light of events since then.

THESE BOOKS, then, are raw materials for a history of Solidarity—a work yet to be written. The curtailment of the movement has itself created a political and historical anomaly of extraordinary proportions—a case of Walzer's "failed totalitarianism" even more conspicuously failed than that of the U.S.S.R. itself. Solidarity is crushed, yet it is an open secret that the "victorious" regime cannot hope to realize its own ends without enlisting the political forces and personal energies that Solidarity captured.

In a country where myths of national identity in the face of foreign persecution have enormous potency, the memory of Solidarity has become an enduring cultural, and hence political, force. Have the faceless characters now running Poland really reckoned with this fact? □

Oliver Conant

Politics & Fiction

ATROCITY AND AMNESIA: THE POLITICAL NOVEL SINCE 1945, by Robert Boyers. New York: Oxford University Press. 259 pp. $29.95.

Robert Boyers, a professor of English at Skidmore College and editor of *Salmagundi*, an intellectual quarterly, offers in the first two chapters of this critical study what he calls a "fluid definition" of the political novel since 1945. He then discusses novelists he deems to have contributed notable examples of the genre: V.S. Naipaul, Graham Greene, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Alejo Carpentier, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nadine Gordimer, Jorge Semprun, George Steiner, Günter Grass, and Milan Kundera.

This list includes some great along with some unexpected names. George Steiner's elevation is due to his *The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H.* Without having read this novel, I cannot say that

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the case Boyers makes for it convinced me that it belongs among the other works. Graham Greene, who seems too much the entertainer to be included in a critical study with so grim a title as this one, is allowed in (after expectable detraction) for having written *The Quiet American*, which Boyers pronounces to be "a minor classic in the genre of the modern political novel."

Boyers's list includes no Americans. In his preface he speaks of the "provincial element" in American fiction. He complains of the "striking disjunction between political intelligence and advanced literary thinking in the United States" and remarks that "had there been a dominant American political novel that would stand in relation to American culture in the way that *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* stands to Czech culture I would, of course, have included it." It does seem broadly true that only rarely has the American novel accorded to politics the centrality it occupies in the works, say, of Stendhal or Dostoyevsky, or, as Boyers suggests, in the work of Milan Kundera, born out of an experience of politics more complete and painful than most Americans could know. Still, looking back to the very beginning of Boyers's period, I think it might fairly be said that Lionel Trilling's *The Middle of the Journey*, or Robert Penn Warren's *All the King's Men*, are political novels that stand in an important relation to American culture. And surely much could be said about the more recent and overtly political work of E.L. Doctorow, Joseph Heller, Robert Coover, John Updike, and Robert Stone. Judging by the sense Boyers manages to make out of complex political novels written beyond our shores, one may regret his omission of American political novels in two ways—for the interest of the novels themselves, and for the intelligence of the response they would have received.

Boyers, however, has enough to do without the Americans. He has to find ways of thinking about the political novel that will succeed in communicating his sense of what is valuable in these books. This task, never easy for a critic at any time, is today more formidable than ever. Not only is Boyers faced with the difficulty of communicating his belief in the public dimension of art at a time and in a culture which is increasingly fragmented and privatized, but when he turns to the academy, he must face the equal difficulty of getting through to colleagues increasingly under the sway of one or another theoretical absolutisms either hostile or indifferent to an effort such as his.

It is, I think, an indication of the strain resulting from these obstacles that Boyers chooses to switch from the third to the second person in the last chapter of his book, "Between East and West: A Letter to Milan Kundera." Addressing himself directly to the Czech novelist, Boyers wins through here to a number of important truths, including the observation that for Kundera the "struggle to remain human" is identical to "the struggle to remember." I am not comfortable with the construction Boyers appears to place on Kundera's impatience with the accounts of *The Joke* by Western journalists—it does not seem fair to suggest, as Boyers does, that because Kundera is annoyed at oversimplifications he is averse to having his books understood in political terms. But the letter to Kundera is of interest less for this than for the impulse from which it springs—the impulse to write as if we really lived in a world in which intellectuals addressed one another on matters of public concern.

CAUTIOUS NOT TO PRESCRIBE anything that might not fit one or another of the vastly different novelists in his purview—different in their methods, relation to tradition, formal ambitions, ideological perspectives, and much else—Boyers insists that his definition consists only of the "more or less constant" features of the political novel. These include an ethical claim of some sort; a "highly developed sentiment of Being," that is, a commitment to representing things as they are in the world (this even if, as is often the case, the novelist is opposed to every condition of life in the present); a pronounced attitude towards time; a deep sense of the workings of change; and a concern with ideas, or with the relation between political ideas and the characters who hold them. Finally, the political novel almost always includes a "capacity to project what an admirable political culture might be." As an ideal, this can be no more than the barest of possibilities, the most fragile of hopes—but it is this which seems most to move Boyers in the political novel. As he says, "if most political novels were unable to project some sense of a vital political culture, were wholly resistant to projections of hope, we should have to revise our view of the species." Boyers does not say so, but I think we should then also have to revise our view of the human species.

However sensible the definition he offers might seem, Boyers knows that such influential critical tendencies as deconstruction are likely to deny its validity, possibly on the grounds of its sensibleness, inevitably because of the animus between the genuinely political and the pseudo-political. There are indeed moments when Boyers seems so bent on accommodating those whom he calls his "ostensi-

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bly advanced" colleagues, that he is capable of writing sentences that mime the abstract ponderousness of the adepts of Theory: "A deconstructive emphasis on the diversity of codes inscribed within a single text and on the structural discontinuities even of works that labor to conceal the competition among the several narrative paradigms they contain will usefully remind us to beware of seductive unitary schemas." If not exactly jargon, this kind of language has a fuzzying effect. The use of "inscribed" has a way of obscuring just who or what is doing the inscribing. The term always makes me think of the literal inscribing that takes place on the body of the convict in Kafka's great story "The Penal Colony"—could the critics who use this term so freely have some lurking idea of the experience of literature as a form of passive torture?

BOYERS IS LESS PONDEROUSLY repetitive whenever he turns his attention from critics to the novels themselves, although it must be said that even here, despite his opposition to current academic modes, he never seems to break completely free of current academic style. Thus on a novel by Günter Grass he can write, "Though we may rightly be uneasy about reducing the novel to an argument or about privileging one kind of paradigm at the expense of others, the novel instructs us in what are its intentions by dwelling even to excess on the exigencies and liabilities of narrative itself." The task that Boyers sets himself in his chapter on Grass, "Günter Grass: Negativity and the Subversion of Paradigms," and that in my view might have been accomplished in prose considerably less thick with terminological abstraction, is to locate the existence in Grass of moral purposes and a preoccupation with politics and history which, incredibly enough, other critics seem routinely to deny.

The best chapters in this book are those in which Boyers confronts works and writers that seem to call for straightforward exposition, for example, the chapters examining the nature of political commitment in Nadine Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter*, or the centrality of fact in Solzhenitsyn's imagination. His elucidation of the Latin American novel, and of the Latin American situation, "... a compound of disaster, mass hysteria or delirium, and a brutal ignorance that issues alternately in melancholy, violent paroxysm or avoidance," has a life missing from the talk of Grass's "auto-critique," his "politics of negative dialectic." His concluding praise of Alejo Carpentier's *Reasons of State*, that it "effectively communicates the sense that the world exists, that some things in it are more significant and desirable than others, and that the effort to see what exists is worth making," is an eloquent statement of Boyers at his best as a critic.

Terrible things have happened in our time. The memory of these things, whether the Gulag, or the Final Solution, or the murder and torture campaigns of Latin American dictators, has been kept alive, in works of art or in more modest ways, against the suppression of memory by states and governments or the human impulse to censor what is too terrible to remember. Whenever Boyers allows himself to keep these facts before him, *Atrocity and Amnesia* is a convincing testimonial to the many and varied ways that the modern political novel has contributed to the effort of memory—and resistance. □

Guillermo Grenier

The Vicious Circle: Control & Anti-unionism

INSIDE THE CIRCLE: A UNION GUIDE TO QWL by Mike Parker. Boston: Labor Notes-South End Press. 154 pp. $10.

Since 1973, when the government report *Work in America* officially proclaimed the American worker to be unhappy, unwilling and unproductive, managerial ideologues have concentrated on the development of a control strategy grounded in the liberal concept of "worker participation." This workplace humanism emphasizes the uniqueness of the individual, the legitimacy of managerial prerogatives, and the importance of worker contributions to the stable operation of the enterprise while carefully avoiding discussion of power-sharing or worker control of production or investment decisions. It revives the old "human relations" approach to curtail the destructive effects of worker alienation and restore productivity.

Quality of Worklife (QWL) has become a hot topic in labor relations and management schools. Consultants have started dusting off their "small group dynamics" manuals and, looking to Japan

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for counsel, gainfully marketing them as the cure-all for American industry. Seemingly overnight thousands of Quality Circles and other Quality of Worklife programs have sprung up. Today well over a million problem-solving groups of one kind or another meet regularly in the United States as small-group QWL techniques become the leading human relations strategy of managers. United for the common good, goes the story, managers and workers are finally discussing mutual problems, each bringing to the meeting bits of the puzzle that, when solved, promises to make American industry whole again. Consultants wax lyrical with stories of how workers become leaders and leaders become workers. By most accounts QWL is really an acronym for Quasi-Worker Liberation.

From this orgy of success Mike Parker dissents. He argues that what we have here is not the overcoming of traditional failures to communicate, but rather a calculated attack on unions by managers and consultants who have finally learned how to combine the subtle powers of small group dynamics with anti-unionism. While it would help to know a bit about the QWL battles fought during the last decade to appreciate the book fully, Parker's argument is simple and convincing: where unions exist, QWL programs will weaken them and where unions do not exist, QWL will be used to keep it that way. For Parker, QWL is an acronym for Qualitatively Weaker Labor.

Drawing heavily from his experience as a unionist involved with UAW/QWL programs, Parker guides us through the mine field of managerial control in the ostensibly neutral, treacherously seductive world of consultant-designed human relations techniques. What makes these programs effective is how they build on concepts and emotions familiar to unionists in order to redefine their perception of the nature of work. The pride unionists have traditionally expressed in their work, for example, the QWL program manipulates into a misplaced loyalty to the corporation and a destructive competition with fellow workers.

If the "we-they" mentality is the root of unionism, as Parker explains, the gist of the QWL mentality is the acceptance of a monolithic "we." He recognizes the split in the labor movement concerning QWL and tactfully refuses to blame anyone for the official AFL-CIO position supporting QWL in unionized shops. In fact, he attributes the best intentions to pro-QWL unionists like Irving Bluestone who support QWL in behalf of democracy and dignity, not productivity. Instead, he argues that those who support QWL know little

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not only about the long-range results of such programs, but also how the very design of the program serves to coopt and coerce workers into viewing the experience of work from the managerial perspective. Due to this capacity to humanize coercion, QWL programs are now "the instrument of choice for achieving or restoring workplace control."

Parker insists that managerial interests have not changed since the days of Taylorism. He calls ours the age of "improved Taylorism," since now managers often achieve their interests with the support of workers. These interests remain constant: an increase of managerial control over the production process. The five major goals of QWL, according to Parker, are: (1) benefiting from the workers' knowledge about the labor process, (2) achieving greater cooperation from unions in introducing new technology, (3) acquiring new flexibility and greater control over production decisions, (4) contract concessions, and (5) undermining unions.

These goals are attained, at the expense of union power and the solidarity of their members, by picking apart the "way of thinking that makes unions possible in the first place." Both unionists and managers boast that through QWL training not only do workers and managers begin to see the problems of the enterprise through a single lens, but the casual observer will be unable to tell them apart. Equality at last.

This equality, like most of QWL dynamics, is an illusion. Unionists are up against decades of managerial expertise in manipulation and control. Parker briefly mentions the Hawthorne Studies of the 1920s and 1930s as well as quickly reviewing social science research into QWL.

While he sees some potential for turning QWL programs against management, Parker sees no organized attempt by labor in that direction. In fact, the only identifiable strategy unions have is to keep the QWL program separate from the collective bargaining process. Not only is this futile in practice, Parker argues, but it weakens unions. The issues affecting daily work are discussed regularly at QWL meetings while most unions interpret bargaining in its narrowest sense of yearly contract negotiations. This reinforces one of the major arguments of anti-unionism: the "old way" of doing things (unionism) is anachronistic in today's fast-changing work environment.

New strategies are needed to combat the erosive effects of QWL, and Parker suggests a few, ranging from the general necessity for increased solidarity among unionists to a detailed eleven-point outline for the development of a union-run QWL program. He also packs several appendixes full of resource materials for unionists interested in or forced to work with QWL programs. So while he is critical, he is also realistic. For unionists, and anyone interested in detailing how the modern class struggle is waged inside workers' minds, this is an important book. □

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LETTERS

Crisis of Kilson

Editors:

Martin Kilson has had a troubled passage and his recent piece in *Dissent* (Winter 1986) indicates that he has not triumphed. "The Paradoxes of Blackness: Notes on the Crisis of Black Intellectuals" could have been more aptly titled "Notes on the Crisis of Martin Kilson." There has never been a paradox of blackness. It seems to occur because he confuses blackness with black people, but blackness is not merely a color but a philosophical perspective. Such a perspective is hammered out of the existential encounter of those who articulate it. There is no paradox of blackness as there is no paradox of whiteness.

There is no "ambiguous status of blackness" either as a philosophy or in any personal sense. There are only ambiguous people who happen to have African ancestry. Black artists such as Stevie Wonder, Wynton Marsalis, Bill Cosby, Charles Fuller, Sonia Sanchez, and Haki Madhubuti produce unambiguous art because they do not suffer from the kind of distortion of place or audience that Kilson appears to experience. The Afrocentric artist or writer knows full well that her or his art will be available for the entire society. They are not busy denying their blackness either as artists or as human beings. They understand that you are not less human or less "universal" because you are black.

There is really no person who is "just a human being," because all human beings are inextricably connected to some core cultural community. So ultimately there is no competition for the cultural or market values of blackness as Kilson suggests; there is only the persistent need for the black artist and intellectual to be as true to his or her center as the white or Jewish artist or intellectual seeks to be. When André Breton commented that Aimé Césaire was a surrealist, Césaire was quick to remind him that as a black man he wrote poetry that spoke to the reality of his world.

Addison Gayle, of course, is capable of defending himself, but surely he is not an ethnocentrist. A black aesthetic theorist is no more an ethnocentrist than a white intellectual who is a European aesthetic theorist or an Asian who is an Asian aesthetic theorist. Kilson's confusion relates to a sense of inferiority often found among historically oppressed people.

Kilson admits he does not understand black America's attraction to what he calls the populist road because it is in his words "constrictive for those black intellectuals who seek creative autonomy." From what do they seek autonomy? I have yet to hear a white writer expressing the desire for creative autonomy from his or her culture. Precisely because Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X, among others, did not denigrate either the philosophy of blackness or their own blackness as human beings, they were able to command a far greater mass audience than any of Kilson's philosophical deviants.

What I find most terrifying about Kilson's essay is his cavalier attitude toward historical analysis. The Harlem Renaissance, more than anything else, was a small cadre of black artists performing in a few well-to-do homes of white patrons. Kilson's so-called "creative autonomy" of the Harlem Renaissance writers had little to do with the black masses (such as was the case in the 1960s) and the war for American egalitarianism and economic justice. In his quest to obfuscate the strongest intellectual heritage of black America, Kilson tries to raise the right-wing flagbearers to respectability. Others have shown that the black right-wingers have produced not one political, cultural, or economic advance for black Americans. In fact, every gain toward full participation in all sectors of American society has resulted from the agitations and intellectual struggles waged by Kilson's "ethnocentrists."

The dust on the pages of Kilson's essay smells of the early 1970s inasmuch as the language he resorts to for a discussion of black intellectuals is as dated as his ideas.

Molefi Kete Asante
Philadelphia, Pa.
Editor, *Journal of Black Studies*

Martin Kilson Replies

I hesitate to reply to Molefi Asante's comments on my article, for a very good reason—Asante's criticisms are lacking in rudimentary intellectual quality. Asante can't even sustain the logic of his simplistic arguments for more than a single sentence.

For example, Asante claims "there is no ambiguous status of blackness," and then proceeds in the next sentence to describe a fundamental source of the ambiguity of black ethnicity in white America—"There are only ambiguous people who happen to have African ancestry." This sentence identifies a basic element in the paradox of blackness in American society, but Asante lacks the wit to grasp such paradox.

For instance, Asante remarks (wrongly I should add) that the Harlem Renaissance intellectuals were "more than anything else . . . a small cadre of black artists performing in a few well-to-do homes of white patrons" (and just before writing this sentence Asante has the gall to attack me for a "cavalier attitude toward historical analysis"). Yet in the very same breath we find Asante celebrating Harlem Renaissance artists as "the strongest intellectual heritage of Black America . . . ." Compounding illogicality even further, Asante proceeds to criticize my analysis of right-wing black intellectuals like Thomas Sowell, Ann Wortham, and Glenn Loury, charging me with raising these black right-wing "flag-bearers to respectability." Yet even a reader with a child's brain would not misconstrue as Asante does the following observation I made about right-wing

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black intellectuals: "Neoconservatives such as Sowell and [Walter] Williams are pathetically uncritical of the American establishment's plutocratic pretensions—pretensions aggressively reinforced under two Reagan administrations."

Asante offers a list of black artists he says produce "unambiguous art"—whatever that is—yet if you ponder his list for one minute there is nothing straightforward or one-dimensional about the artists named. For example, Stevie Wonder's pop-swooning for mainly middle-class white audiences is a way of packaging black entertainment modalities that is fundamentally different from, say, the mode-and-purpose of ethnocentric pop-poetry by Haki Madhubuti (Don L. Lee). Similarly, the very fact of the "Bill Cosby Show" is riddled with irony and paradox regarding black/white patterns in American life. To wit—a brilliant comedian from a once heavily denigrated ethnicity dominating TV ratings by serving up for white viewers (and black ones too) comic episodes that are blackness-tinged but deferential toward mainstream Americanism.

Alas! I could go on, and on . . . and on illustrating the shallowness of Molefi Kete Asante's intellect. But I'll leave it to your readers to finish the boring chore. □

Martin Kilson
Cambridge, Mass.

The Long March

Editors:

I found it difficult to recognize Harrison E. Salisbury's book, *The Long March,* in the review by Simon Leys (*Dissent,* Spring 1986).

How does Leys go about demolishing Salisbury's book? He asks why the Communist authorities suddenly showed such sympathetic interest in his project, while denying it to others. First of all, the Chinese had denied Salisbury's request for twelve years and granted it when they were allowing a very wide diversity of people to come to China, for varied purposes. David Rockefeller was not being recruited for Maoism or Dengism (if there is such an animal) when he was given repeated red-carpet welcomes to China.

Leys argues that the Chinese Communists allowed Salisbury to write this book because they felt he would do a propaganda job for them. Leys's charge is that Salisbury was welcomed to perform as a Chinese Communist agent. And *ad hominem* and *guilt by association* methods are combined by Leys's charge that Salisbury was friendly with Wilfred Burchett and that in Salisbury's 1967 book on the folly of America's war against Vietnam, he was fed material by Burchett, who was, indeed as Leys says, a "notorious agent of Soviet disinformation."

Is Salisbury supposed to be serving Soviet disinformation here? Or is it Chinese Communist disinformation? The two, obviously, are not the same. In Leys's view, Salisbury's association with Burchett reveals Salisbury's "working methods." Actually, Salisbury's book whitewashes neither Soviet nor Chinese Communism. It does the reverse, it shows that despite the truly epic significance of the Long March, the only way China could make any progress would be by ridding itself of Mao and Maoism. Salisbury shows that Mao proved to be as murderous a dictator as Stalin. Mao's role in the Long March is examined to explain how Mao became ascendant in the Chinese Communist Party and how it triumphed in the end.

Leys says it's an exaggeration to say that Mao "saved the situation" in the Long March, noting that at the end of the march, "they were a mere four thousand out of the 86,000 who had evacuated the Jiangxi base twelve months earlier." As I read that sentence I wondered for a moment why it was so familiar. Then I recalled Salisbury's book and picked it up again—the figures come from his book and appear not once but at least three times, in the beginning, the middle, and the end. That's what the book is about. Salisbury explains how an event that was really a retreat, that decimated the Red troops (by far more than the figures quoted by Leys; Salisbury points out that the dead and deserters were more numerous because the Red Army added to its ranks as it went along) still served to become the basis for the Communist triumph. How?

The point Salisbury makes is that the cadre that came out intact from the Long March was the cadre that established Communist rule in 1949. It was, as he writes, a "nucleus for the revolution that they all believed they would bring to China." This is in line with what the best scholars of the Chinese Communist revolution have written; observe the trenchant comment by Benjamin I. Schwartz in his book, "*Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao.*" Schwartz writes:

> The Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung has not been the party of the industrial proletariat nor has it been the party of the peasantry in the Marxist-Leninist sense. It has rather been an elite corps of politically articulate leaders organized along Leninist lines but drawn on its top levels from various strata of Chinese society. Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung this elite group has come to realize in the face of Marxist-Leninist dogma that the peasantry could itself provide the mass basis and the motive power for a revolutionary transformation. . . . The Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung has been . . . an elite of professional revolutionaries which has risen to power by basing itself on the dynamic of peasant discontent.

Schwartz relates this to the experience of the Long March:

> Having taken the initiative in the field of strategy in the early thirties, having exercised actual state power during the Soviet period, and having led the movement through the vicissitudes of the Long March,

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> Mao was now sufficiently self-confident to take the initiative in the field of theoretical formulation.

Salisbury's book, far from being an exercise in hagiography, describes how the Long March became the cauldron in which the Maoist cadre was forged and organized to take power. Salisbury does not argue, as Leys implies, that the Long March was a great victory. Salisbury opens his book with the declaration that

> It was not a "march" in the conventional sense, not a military campaign, not a victory. It was a triumph of human survival, a deadly, endless retreat from the claws of Chiang Kai-shek; a battle that again and again came within a hair's breadth of defeat and disaster. It was fought without a plan. Mao was excluded from the preparations and was only told at the eleventh hour. In the end, it won China for Mao Zedong and his Communists.

It did that by creating the cadre, the elite that Schwartz writes about, who found support among the land-hungry peasants and the people as a whole who wanted to defeat the Japanese invasion.

Salisbury tackles the matter of how Mao turned the triumph of Communism into a war against the people, bringing them famine instead of plenty and a murderous decimation of Communist ranks equaled only by Stalin's pogroms. This book, Leys argues, is just what the Communists wanted in a situation where they have to dump Mao's policies but still defend their legitimacy. But when Salisbury interviews numerous survivors of the Cultural Revolution madness, he asks them bluntly how all this could happen. He asks them as they and he recount stories of endless death sentences during the Long March itself. None of those he interviews cite what Salisbury does himself, that the atrocities are "one more product of the hysteria that arises within a closed conspiratorial world."

If Leys is right and the Communists wanted what Salisbury produced, then the Deng transformation in China is more basic than anyone, even Salisbury, has suggested. Salisbury describes how the Communists raised money during the Long March—by taking hostages, holding them for ransom and killing them if their friends or relatives didn't come across. He tells of the fate of American missionaries, such as John and Betty Stam, who were killed by the Long Marchers while their three-month-old baby was left to fend for herself.

No one has asked the question more dramatically than Salisbury does in this book: "The question nags—why did Mao's eyes turn cold? . . . Why did he savage his comrades of the Long March and shake China into anarchy?" Salisbury rejects suggestions of clinical illness or any other excuse for Mao's (and Stalin's) behavior. He draws a deadly parallel between the crimes of the Russian and the Chinese Communists.

But Salisbury is happy that much of this Maoist madness has been rejected. Apparently Leys is not. Anyway, David Rockefeller and Harrison Salisbury are guests in China. Rather better than the times when some Americans and many Chinese were being jailed, tortured, and murdered in China.

JOSEPH CLARK
New York, N.Y.

SIMON LEYS Replies:

Mr. Clark does not seem to have read my article.

I had no quarrel with Salisbury's main outline of events (which I summarized in the first part of my review) and I found his work to be, on the whole, "painstaking and meticulous."

Yet, we are dealing here with a very sensitive subject, on which full light will probably never be shed—and my feeling is that this book, however useful in some respects, should be handled *with caution.* My uneasiness comes essentially from the fact that the general inspiration of Salisbury's narrative seems to coincide *exactly* with the new political line in China. This uneasiness is further reinforced by the knowledge that, in the past—in at least one significant instance—Salisbury appears to have uncritically transmitted communist propaganda material.

Naturally, we cannot exclude the logical possibility that Salisbury's harmony of views with the present Chinese line simply resulted from a common dedication to historical truth. If this proves to be the case, there should indeed be much cause for rejoicing, as Mr. Clark himself observed quite pertinently. □

To Letter Writers

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OLOF PALME: 1927–1986

Socialism as a Moral Passion

HIS SOCIALISM WAS A MORAL PASSION. I remember him at the Congress of the Socialist International in Portugal in 1983, giving a speech about his conversations with unemployed men and women that burned with a sense of the devastating psychic consequences of being out of work. Afterward, when we chatted, he came back to his point as if it were a memory of personal anguish.

He was being, one might say, very "Swedish." He was, after all, the leader of the party that, more than any other in the Western world, made full employment a central priority. Yet when he was in the United States on a private visit in 1970, already prime minister, and no one from the U.S. government would even meet with him because of his opposition to the Vietnam War, he told me that it was his student experience in this country, his concern for the *American* poor, that played a significant role in forming his socialist convictions.

His commitment to the Third World, and particularly to Africa, had the same existential quality.

Only last June the International met at Boomsersvik, the Socialist youth camp not far from Stockholm, to discuss peace and the world economy. Palme, without a tie, presided at the opening session.

At a dinner that night in the rustic dining room, Palme sat across the table from former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, his friend and mentor. Next to Brandt sat Michael Manley, the former prime minister of Jamaica. Agapito Aquino, brother of slain Philippine opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino Jr., was at Palme's side.

Palme joked about his days in the youth movement, yet he also kept talking about how disarmament might free the funds for a truly concerted effort to end poverty in the Third World. For him, the personal, the moral, and the political were of a piece.

The quintessential memory, though, goes back to Stockholm in 1970. There was that magnificent democratic informality that was to lead to his death: while waiting for an elevator at the party headquarters, my wife was joined by two men who walked in from the street, the prime minister and his predecessor, Tage Erlander.

Later, at the University at Lund in southern Sweden, there was "Prime Minister's Night." The gym was packed to the rafters, the band played the "Internationale" and the "Stars and Stripes Forever," and the chief of state walked in alone and sat down at a little table. The students had elected ten of their number to question him. Most of them were, as befit those hectic times, Maoists.

They denounced Palme as a sell-out, a social democratic traitor to the working class, and demanded that he advocate violent and radical overthrow. Palme replied patiently but with great force.

He was not, he said, a pacifist. Yet he understood the limits of violence, the fact that socialism itself could be built only by nonviolent cooperation, by consensus and participation. After the seizure of power in the Third World, he continued, what did many revolutionaries do? They went to Sweden to ask help in creating a medical system for the people or in building an education system.

That memory of a wonderful, rumpled, implacably logical and infinitely compassionate man makes it all the more utterly senseless that he was taken away from a world that desperately needed him. And still does.

—Michael Harrington □

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Contributors: Irving Howe, Debora Silverman, David Bromwich, Murray Hausknecht, Bernard Rosenberg

dissent
521 Fifth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017

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PETER HAVAS
1634 HAMPTON RD
ABINGTON PA 19001

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